Jul 18 2013, 6:31 am
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JACK QUIRK GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ELLEN H. MEILAENDER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CLINT BRADLEY a/k/a SAM JONES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 18A02-1209-CR-760
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Marianne L. Vorhees, Judge
Cause No. 18C01-1105-FA-5
July 18, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Clint Bradley entered pleas of guilty to two Class B felonies, but then moved to
withdraw those pleas. The trial court denied Bradley’s motion. Bradley raises three issues,
two of which we may address on direct appeal:1 whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied Bradley’s motion without a hearing and whether his trial counsel was
ineffective. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The State charged Bradley with eight felonies. Bradley moved to suppress certain
evidence because a search warrant was defective. After a hearing, the motion was denied.
Bradley then agreed to plead guilty to Class B felony dealing in cocaine2 and Class B felony
unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon,3 and the State agreed to dismiss
the other charges.
Bradley moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but the trial court denied that motion
without a hearing.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
1. Withdrawal of Plea
After a defendant pleads guilty but before a sentence is imposed, a defendant may
move to withdraw the plea. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001). The court
1
Bradley’s convictions were entered pursuant to a plea agreement. He now challenges the denial of his
motion to suppress, but a defendant cannot question pre-trial orders after a guilty plea is entered. Branham v.
State, 813 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.
3
Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.
2
must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest injustice,
but must deny the motion if withdrawal would substantially prejudice the State. Id. In all
other cases, the court may grant the motion for any fair and just reason. Id.
A ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea arrives before us with a presumption in
favor of the ruling. Id. We will reverse the trial court only for an abuse of discretion. Id. In
determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we examine the statements made
by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was offered “freely and
knowingly.” Id.
Withdrawal of a plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice when:
(1) the convicted person was denied the effective assistance of counsel;
(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the convicted person;
(3) the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made;
(4) the prosecuting attorney failed to abide by the terms of a plea agreement; or
(5) the plea and judgment of conviction are void or voidable for any other
reason.
The motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw the plea need not allege, and
it need not be proved, that the convicted person is innocent of the crime
charged or that he has a valid defense.
Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4.
Bradley’s argues the trial court abused its discretion because it denied his motion
without a hearing: “when the Court overruled his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty,
without a hearing, he was denied the opportunity to present evidence to support his verified
3
petition.”4 (Br. of Defendant-Appellant at 10.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion, as
it was not required to conduct a hearing on the matter.
In Fletcher v. State, 649 N.E.2d 1022, 1023 (Ind. 1995), Fletcher contended he was
entitled to a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Our Supreme Court held
convening a hearing on such a motion is merely a discretionary option of the trial court: “by
requiring such a motion to be verified and to contain facts in support of the relief demanded,
and by expressly permitting the State to file counter-affidavits in opposition, the statute
contemplates a summary proceeding.” Id.
As the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct a hearing on
Bradley’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and Bradley offers no argument why denial of
the motion was a manifest injustice, we find no error and affirm the trial court.
2. Effectiveness of Counsel5
Bradley argues his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel’s actions “were not
supported by a reasonable strategy” and “better care and diligence should have been used to
obtain a plea agreement which did not call for eighteen (18) years executed.” (Br. of
Defendant-Appellant at 13.)
4
The petition was premised on Bradley’s allegation a search warrant should not have been issued. That issue
was litigated in the Motion to Suppress proceedings, and as noted above, cannot be revisited on direct appeal.
5
The State asserts this allegation of error is not available to Bradley because it is a “challenge[] to the validity
of his conviction,” (Br. of Appellee at 9), which may not be raised on direct appeal after a guilty plea. As our
Supreme Court has explicitly said ineffectiveness of counsel may be raised on direct appeal, we will address
Bradley’s claim his counsel was ineffective. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1216 (Ind. 1998)
(“ineffective assistance may be raised on direct appeal, but if it is not, it is available in postconviction
proceedings irrespective of the nature of the issues claimed to support the competence or prejudice prongs”).
4
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal bears a
rigorous burden. Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1252 (Ind. 1999). When the challenge is
to counsel’s strategic decisions, ineffectiveness is very rarely found. Id. We are particularly
deferential to counsel’s strategic decision making. Id.
Pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Bradley must show that
specific conduct of counsel was outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance. If that is done, he must show that except for the errors of counsel there is a
reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. Morrison v. State,
535 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Bradley has shown neither.
Bradley concedes the “record is void of evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel,”
(Br. of Defendant-Appellant at 13), and he directs us to no “specific conduct” by counsel
except that “the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was without facts.” (Id.) That
mischaracterizes the motion, which explicitly lists four “facts in support of the motion.”
(App. at 65.) As Bradley has not met his rigorous burden to show counsel’s conduct was
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance and he was prejudiced as a
result, we cannot reverse on that ground.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was not obliged to conduct a hearing on Bradley’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, and Bradley has not demonstrated his counsel was ineffective. We therefore
affirm.
5
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
6
Clint Bradley a/k/a Sam Jones v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion