An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-9
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Cleveland County
Nos. 11 CRS 51589–90
RONALD CRAIG SHOATS
Appeal by Defendant from Judgments entered 23 July 2013 by
Judge William R. Bell in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 23 June 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Donna B. Wojcik, for the State.
Sarah Holladay for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Procedural History and Evidence
Defendant Ronald Craig Shoats appeals from judgments
entered based upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of
possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, the
sale or delivery of cocaine, possession of hydrocodone with
intent to sell or deliver, and the sale or delivery of
hydrocodone. The trial court consolidated Defendant’s
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convictions into two judgments and sentenced him to consecutive
terms of 20 to 24 and 25 to 30 months imprisonment. Defendant
gave notice of appeal in open court.
At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that, on 5
January 2011, officers of the Cleveland County Sheriff’s
Department conducted a controlled buy of hydrocodone pills from
Defendant with the assistance of Gary Richard Smart, a
confidential informant and cooperating witness. During the
controlled buy, Smart asked Defendant if Defendant could provide
him with powder cocaine. Defendant stated he could provide Smart
with the cocaine, and, on 21 January 2011, officers and Smart
set up a controlled buy of powder cocaine from Defendant. At
trial, Smart testified that he had purchased hydrocodone pills
from Defendant approximately ten times in the four months
preceding the date of the first controlled buy.
Discussion
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred when it admitted testimony that Defendant had previously
sold hydrocodone pills to Smart. Defendant contends that the
admission of this testimony violated rules 403 and 404(b) of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence. We find no error.
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Because Defendant failed to object to Smart’s testimony at
trial, we review this issue only for plain error. N.C.R. App. P.
10(a)(4); Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362
N.C. 191, 196, 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (2008). To establish plain
error, a defendant must
demonstrate that a fundamental error
occurred at trial. To show that an error was
fundamental, a defendant must establish
prejudice — that, after examination of the
entire record, the error had a probable
impact on the jury’s finding that the
defendant was guilty. Moreover, because
plain error is to be applied cautiously and
only in the exceptional case, the error will
often be one that seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted; certain
alterations in original). Even assuming it was error for the
trial court to admit Smart’s testimony about the previous
purchases, we conclude that any such error did not have a
probable impact on the jury’s verdict.
According to the State’s evidence, the 5 January 2011
purchase of hydrocodone occurred in the parking lot of a
McDonald’s restaurant. Smart drove to the McDonald’s in a red
pickup truck accompanied by an undercover officer who sat in the
truck’s passenger seat and observed the entire transaction.
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Smart parked next to Defendant, who was waiting in a white
Lexus. Defendant walked over to the driver’s side of Smart’s
truck and gave Smart a pill bottle containing forty hydrocodone
pills in exchange for $200. A second officer witnessed the
transaction from inside the McDonald’s restaurant.
The purchase of cocaine on 21 January 2011 occurred at a
truck stop. Smart drove to the truck stop and again parked next
to Defendant’s white Lexus. Smart got out of his truck, walked
to Defendant’s door, and gave Defendant $175 in exchange for 3.2
grams of cocaine. An officer witnessed this transaction from a
nearby fuel pump.
Smart testified that Defendant was the person who sold him
hydrocodone on 5 January 2011 and cocaine on 21 January 2011. In
addition, an audio recording of the 5 January 2011 transaction
was made and a video recording of the 21 January 2011
transaction was made. Both recordings were played to the jury.
Further, both transactions were witnessed by officers as they
occurred, and the officers identified Defendant as the seller of
the narcotics.
Defendant challenges the above evidence by arguing that the
recordings and officers’ testimony were not sufficient to prove
his identity. Specifically, Defendant asserts that the 5 January
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2011 recording was deficient because it was “at times muffled,
crackling, and difficult to hear” and the 21 January 2011
recording was deficient because it was “so grainy that the jury
would have struggled to identify the man shown as the
defendant.” Defendant also notes that “[n]o officers accompanied
. . . Smart to the [21 January] buy” and the officers who were
there had an obscured view of the transaction. We are
unpersuaded.
Regarding the 5 January transaction, the officer who
participated in the transaction testified that the voices in the
recording were those of Smart and Defendant. The officer also
explained that their conversation dealt with “the weight of the
powder” and resulted in the sale of “forty hydrocodone pills
. . . [by Defendant to] Smart.” A second officer, who observed
the transaction, testified as follows:
[Second Officer]: We arrived at McDonald’s
. . . . We noticed a white Lexus pull up and
a little bit after that, [a] black male got
out of the Lexus. I want to think that . . .
Smart was in [the] red truck. I think it was
a red truck. It was a — I observed a red
Chevrolet extended cab truck back into a
parking space beside the white Lexus.
[Prosecutor]: Was [the participating
officer] in the red truck?
[Second Officer]: He was.
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[Prosecutor]: What did you observe between
the individuals in these vehicles?
[Second Officer]: I observed a black male
with a brown had [sic], brown jacket,
wearing glasses in the driver’s seat of the
white Lexus. The driver’s door opened and
the black male’s feet were on the asphalt.
. . .
[Prosecutor]: What did you do next?
[Second Officer]: A short time later, you
know, the cooperating witness and [the
participating officer], I believe they
backed in right beside the white Lexus. I
think the exchange was made, and they left,
both left.
[Prosecutor]: Who was the exchange made
between?
[Second Officer]: Gary Smart and
[Defendant].
Given the testimony of both officers, any difficulty the jury
experienced in hearing and understanding the recording is
irrelevant as there was ample other evidence to establish
Defendant’s identity as the person who sold the hydrocodone
pills to Smart. Accordingly, Defendant’s argument as it pertains
to the 5 January transaction is overruled.
Regarding the 21 January transaction, a third officer, who
observed the controlled purchase, testified that the video (1)
depicted “[t]he deal [between Defendant and Smart for the sale
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of powder cocaine] taking place” and (2) included discussions
“about possibly making future deals for cocaine and also [other]
pills.” The second officer, who also observed the 21 January
transaction, testified as follows:
[Prosecutor]: What did you do [on 21 January
2011]?
[Second Officer]: I drove to the parking lot
of the truck stop and sat near a fuel pump
where I could watch the buy take place.
[Prosecutor]: What did you observe on that
date?
[Second Officer]: I seen [sic] a white Lexus
parked toward the far pump, and [Smart]
pulled up beside him to make the purchase.
[Prosecutor]: Did you observe anything?
[Second Officer]: [Smart] got out of his
vehicle and met [Defendant] at the driver’s
side door of his vehicle. I believe the door
was open on . . . the Lexus.
[Prosecutor]: What happened next?
[Second Officer]: Once the deal was done,
. . . Smart met us back at the location
. . . [and returned] the drugs and
equipment.
Only the third officer described having an obscured view of the
transaction, testifying that he observed “Smart pull into the
parking lot, but as far as where he parked, we could not see.”
Even assuming this testimony supports Defendant’s assertion that
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the third officer’s ability to see was “obscured,” it has no
bearing on the testimony of the second officer, who explicitly
stated that he was parked in a place where he “could watch.”
Accordingly, Defendant’s argument as it pertains to the 21
January transaction is overruled.
We conclude that the evidence of Defendant’s guilt was
overwhelming and, consequently, that Smart’s testimony regarding
the prior purchases of hydrocodone did not have a probable
impact on the jury’s verdict. Therefore, the trial court did not
commit plain error in admitting Smart’s testimony.
NO ERROR.
Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).