An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1256
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
Nos. 12 CRS 50549-50
WILLIAM LEVI GILL
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 July 2013 by
Judge Richard L. Doughton in Buncombe County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 June 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Adam M. Shestak, for the State.
Wait Law, P.L.L.C., by Kerri L. Sigler, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Defendant William Levi Gill appeals from a judgment entered
upon revocation of probation and activation of his suspended
sentence. We affirm.
On 22 May 2012, Defendant pled guilty to possession with
intent to sell and deliver marijuana and maintaining a dwelling
used for keeping and selling a controlled substance. The trial
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court sentenced Defendant to 6 to 17 months imprisonment,
suspended the sentence, and placed him on supervised probation
for 24 months.
On 5 March 2013, Defendant’s probation officer filed a
report alleging that Defendant had violated his probation by:
(1) failing to make required monetary payments, (2) failing to
pay his supervision fee, and (3) being “convicted of: reckless
driving to endanger – 12CR702190[.]” The trial court held a
probation violation hearing on 18 July 2013. Defendant, through
counsel, “denie[d] the willfulness of the money [sic] but
admit[ted] the new conviction.” When the court asked if
Defendant admitted the three alleged violations, Defendant’s
counsel stated that Defendant willfully violated, “3, but not 1
and 2.” The probation officer testified that Defendant had not
paid on his monetary obligations. Defendant testified that he
“got in a collision with another vehicle” and received a ticket
for reckless driving. Defendant informed the court, “I’ve done
everything for probation that I’ve been asked except for the
reckless driving.” By judgment entered 18 July 2013, the trial
court found Defendant willfully violated the terms and
conditions of his probation, revoked Defendant’s probation, and
activated Defendant’s original sentence. Defendant appeals.
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Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked
his probation and activated his original sentence. We disagree.
At a probation violation hearing, the evidence need only
“reasonably satisfy the [trial court] in the exercise of [its]
sound discretion that the defendant has willfully violated a
valid condition of probation or that the defendant has violated
without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which the sentence
was suspended.” State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 353, 154 S.E.2d
476, 480 (1967). Defendant advances arguments that his failure
to comply with the monetary conditions of his probation was not
willful. However, those alleged violations could not serve as
grounds to revoke Defendant’s probation under the circumstances
presented here. Under the Justice Reinvestment Act (“JRA”),
probation is subject to revocation only when a probationer
“[c]ommit[s] [a] criminal offense[,]” “abscond[s] by willfully
avoiding supervision[,]” or has been subject to two prior
periods of “Confinement in Response to Violation.” See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a) (2013) (“The court may only revoke
probation for a violation of a condition of probation under G.S.
15A-1343(b)(1) or G.S. 15A-1343(b)(3a), except as provided in
G.S. 15A-1344(d2).”). Thus, we need not consider Defendant’s
assertions of error in the court’s findings of fact as to those
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violations.
Regarding his reckless driving conviction, which did
subject him to revocation of probation under the JRA, see id.,
Defendant argues that no competent evidence supported the
finding of this willful violation. However, Defendant, through
counsel, twice admitted violating the conditions of his
probation by being convicted of reckless driving to endanger.
More importantly, Defendant personally admitted that he was
convicted of reckless driving and offered no excuse or lack of
willfulness for committing the criminal offense. This was
competent evidence to support the court’s finding that Defendant
willfully committed a criminal offense in violation of his
probation.
Defendant also argues that the trial court did not make
sufficient findings of fact to support its judgment revoking his
probation. We are not persuaded.
In its written judgment, using form AOC-CR-607, entitled
“JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT UPON REVOCATION OF PROBATION — FELONY
(STRUCTURED SENTENCING) (For Revocation Hearings On Or After
Dec. 1, 2011),” the trial court found: (1) the violation report
was incorporated by reference; (2) a hearing was held and, “by
the evidence presented, the [c]ourt is reasonably satisfied in
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its discretion that [D]efendant violated each of the conditions
of [D]efendant’s probation as set forth below[;]” (3) Defendant
violated paragraphs “1-3 of the Violation Report or Notice dated
3/5/2013[;]” and (4) the court had the authority to revoke
Defendant’s probation under the JRA “for the willful violation
of the condition(s) that he/she not commit any criminal offense,
G.S. 15A-1343 (b)(1), . . . as set out above.” These findings
are more than adequate to support revocation of Defendant’s
probation pursuant to sections 15A-1343(b)(1) and 15A-1344(a).
State v. Henderson, 179 N.C. App. 191, 197, 632 S.E.2d 818, 822
(2006) (holding findings of fact on a pre-printed form were
sufficient to support probation revocation). Accordingly, the
judgment revoking Defendant’s probation and activating his
sentence is
AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C., and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
State v. Gill
Combined Opinion