Jun 12 2013, 9:05 am
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CHRIS P. FRAZIER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
E.W., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1211-JV-918
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Scott Stowers, Magistrate
Cause No. 49D09-1208-JD-2244
June 12, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge
E.W. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for committing acts that would
constitute Criminal Trespass, 1 a class A misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. E.W.
presents a single issue for review: was there sufficient evidence to support the true finding of
criminal trespass?
We affirm.
The facts favorable to the adjudication are that on August 20, 2012, Officer Julian
Wilkerson, an off-duty police officer providing security for Carriage House West Apartments
(Carriage House), identified E.W., checked him for outstanding warrants, and entered his
name in the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Computer Automated
Dispatch (CAD) and trespass list. Kathy Young, the manager of Carriage House and Officer
Wilkerson’s employer, then placed E.W. on the Carriage House trespass list after Officer
Wilkerson informed her that a group of kids, including seventeen-year-old E.W., was found
loitering in the hallway. Officer Wilkerson was responsible for maintaining a trespass list,
with Young’s discretion, and completing other contractual duties that Young and Wilkerson
agreed to.
On August 21, 2012, Young informed Officer Wilkerson of E.W.’s presence, once
again, at Carriage House. Officer Wilkerson approached and identified E.W., placed him in
handcuffs, and informed E.W. that he was being arrested for trespass.
The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that E.W. committed an act that
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Ind. Code Ann. § 35-43-2-2 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 171 with effective dates through May 7,
2013).
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would constitute the crime of criminal trespass, a class A misdemeanor, if committed by an
adult. The juvenile court entered a true finding that E.W. committed the act alleged. Also, at
the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adopted the pre-dispositional report’s findings
and accepted the probation department’s recommendation of disposition. The juvenile court
awarded wardship of E.W. to the Department of Correction, suspended the wardship, and
placed E.W. on probation with special conditions.
E.W. contends the evidence is insufficient to show that the arresting officer was acting
as an agent of the apartment complex. In a juvenile case, the State must prove every element
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. S.D. v. State, 847 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
trans. denied. Upon review, we will not reweigh the evidence, judge the witnesses’
credibility, or resolve conflicts in testimony. Id. Instead, we review the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence to support a true finding. Id. We will
affirm a true finding if there is probative evidence from which the fact-finder could conclude
the allegations are true beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
E.W. was found delinquent based on a true finding that he committed acts that would
constitute the offense of criminal trespass, a class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
I.C. § 35-43-2-2 states, “A person who: not having a contractual interest in the property,
knowingly or intentionally enters the real property of another person after having being
denied entry by the other person or that person’s agent . . . commits criminal trespass, a class
A misdemeanor.”
E.W. argues that Officer Wilkerson was not acting as an agent of the apartment
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complex on Aug. 20, but instead, he was acting in his capacity as an officer of the IMPD.
Therefore, Officer Wilkerson was not an agent of the apartment complex or its management,
so he could not legally deny E.W. entry.
“To establish an actual agency relationship, three elements must be shown: (1) a
manifestation of consent by the principal to the agent, (2) an acceptance of the authority by
the agent, and (3) control exerted by the principal over the agent.” Glispie v. State, 955
N.E.2d 819, 822 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
E.W. does not dispute that the first and second elements of the agency requirement are
met, but he contends Carriage House failed to exert adequate control over Officer Wilkerson.
Therefore, the argument goes, the agency relationship was not properly established, which
resulted in an improper finding of trespass by E.W.
To the contrary, the aforementioned facts suggest that on Aug. 20, Officer Wilkerson
consulted with Young about placing E.W. on the trespass list and kept her apprised of the
details concerning E.W.’s presence on the property. In Glispie, the officer testified that his
agency status was created by his declaration alone, but the court explained that more is
required. Id. at 822. By analogizing the relationship in our case to that in Glipsie, it is clear
that Young did exercise a sufficient amount of control over Officer Wilkerson and his actions
concerning E.W.
Considering these facts, it is clear that Officer Wilkerson’s actions were subject to
Young’s authority and control and he was acting as an agent of Carriage House at all relevant
times in this case.
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Judgment affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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