Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MATTHEW G. GRANTHAM TODD A. WHITEHURST
Bowers, Brewer, Garrett & Wiley, LLP Indiana Department of Child Services
Huntington, Indiana Wabash, Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE
DCS Central Administration
Indianapolis, Indiana
Apr 26 2013, 8:25 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN RE THE TERMINATION OF THE )
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF )
C.R. (Minor Child) and )
)
T.R. (Mother), )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 35A05-1208-JT-435
)
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )
SERVICES, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE HUNTINGTON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, Judge
Cause No. 35C01-1103-JT-5
April 26, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
T.R. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her parental
rights to her child, C.R. Among other things, Mother contends that the trial court’s findings
are insufficient to support its judgment because they merely summarize the witnesses’
testimony and “do not reflect the trial court’s independent judgment as to what the specific
facts of her case were.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. She asserts that, “[a]t a minimum, this Court
should order a remand so that the trial court can submit appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law.” Id. The Indiana Department of Child Services agrees. Appellee’s Br.
at 12.
This Court has said,
A court or an administrative agency does not find something to be a fact by
merely reciting that a witness testified to X, Y, or Z. Rather, the trier of fact
must find that what the witness testified to is the fact. Additionally, the trier of
fact must adopt the testimony of the witness before the “finding” may be
considered a finding of fact.
In re Adoption of T.J.F., 798 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). The
trial court failed to do so here. See, e.g., Appellant’s App. at 12 (“The Family Case Manager
(FCM), John Lane, testified to the following: ….”); id. at 13 (“The service provider from the
Bowen Center, Lynn Baker, testified to the following: ….”). Therefore, we reverse and
remand with instructions to enter specific factual findings and to provide an explanation as to
how the findings support the judgment. Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 894
N.E.2d 218, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Reversed and remanded.
ROBB, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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