Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res
Apr 09 2013, 9:17 am
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ERIN L. BERGER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JONATHAN R. SICHTERMANN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEFFREY L. JONES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 87A05-1210-CR-546
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WARRICK CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David O. Kelley, Judge
Cause No. 87C01-1104-CM-392
April 9, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Jeffrey Jones appeals his conviction for Class B misdemeanor battery. We affirm.
Issue
Jones raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to
sustain his conviction.
Facts
On July 30, 2010, seventeen-year-old M.A. was spending the night with Jones’s
daughter. M.A. was sleeping on the couch in the living room. M.A. woke up during the
night and found that her shirt was raised. Jones had one hand along M.A.’s “waist line”
and his other hand where her “bra would sit.” Tr. p. 10. M.A. turned over, started
crying, and pretended to go back to sleep. When Jones left for work, M.A. had her
mother pick her up. When M.A.’s mother picked her up, M.A. was upset and crying.
The State charged Jones with Class B misdemeanor battery. After a bench trial,
the trial court found Jones guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Jones to six
months in the Warrick County Security Center suspended to probation.
Analysis
Jones argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because
M.A.’s testimony was incredibly dubious. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence needed to support a criminal conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge
witness credibility. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider
only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of
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probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Appellate courts may apply the “incredible dubiosity” rule to impinge upon a
jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness. Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810
(Ind. 2002).
If a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony
and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a
defendant’s conviction may be reversed. This is appropriate
only where the court has confronted inherently improbable
testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated
testimony of incredible dubiosity. Application of this rule is
rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is
so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no
reasonable person could believe it.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
According to Jones, M.A.’s testimony was incredibly dubious because she is
“untrustworthy and untruthful.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. Jones points to testimony that
M.A. invents stories for attention, makes up stories about pregnancy, imaginary people,
forced prostitution, and other men who have molested her. M.S. has repeatedly lived in
group homes and been placed in mental institutions. Jones contends there were two other
people in the room that did not witness the battery.
The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply here. Nothing in M.A.’s testimony
was inherently improbable, and there was no evidence her testimony was coerced or
equivocal. Rather, Jones’s argument is a request that we reweigh the evidence and judge
M.A.’s credibility, which we cannot do. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Jones’s
conviction for Class B misdemeanor battery.
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Conclusion
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Jones’s conviction. We
affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
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Jeffrey L. Jones v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion