FOR PUBLICATION FILED
Feb 07 2013, 8:51 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER DARREN BEDWELL
Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
ANDREW A. KOBE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1206-CR-526
)
WILLIAM COATS, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Barbara Collins, Judge
Cause No. 49F08-1004-FD-30232
February 7, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
The State appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to commit William Coats to
the Indiana Division of Mental Health and Addiction (“DMHA”). We affirm.
Issue
The State raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly
denied the State’s motion to commit Coats to the DMHA for competency restoration
services.
Facts
On April 15, 2010, the State charged Coats, who was born in 1943, with Class D
felony sexual battery against his granddaughter. Coats had been diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease, and Coats’s counsel filed a motion to determine Coats’s
competency to stand trial. The trial court assigned two doctors to examine Coats. Both
doctors diagnosed Coats with dementia. Noting that dementia is a progressive disease,
both doctors found that Coats would not improve over time and that there was little
chance of Coats being restored to competency.
At a hearing on February 7, 2012, the trial court found that Coats was incompetent
and “will not return to competency.” Tr. p. 6; see also Appellant’s App. p. 31. The trial
court noted that Coats was residing with his wife and was not a public safety risk at that
time. The State requested that Coats be committed to the DMHA, but the trial court
denied the motion.
On February 29, 2012, the State filed a written request that Coats be committed to
the DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-3-1. The State argued that Coats’s
2
commitment was required due to the trial court’s finding that Coats was incompetent. On
March 20, 2012, Coats filed a motion to dismiss the charges due to his incompetency.
Coats argued that, since he could not be returned to competency, his commitment would
result in a violation of his constitutional rights.
At another hearing on June 15, 2012, Coats’s counsel again argued that Coats was
incompetent and could not be restored to competency. Coats’s counsel asked that the
charges be dismissed. The State again asked that Coats be committed to the DMHA.
The trial court denied both motions and reset the matter for another hearing in three
months. The trial court granted the State’s motion to certify the order for interlocutory
appeal, and this court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B).
Analysis
The issue is whether the trial court properly denied the State’s motion to commit
Coats to the DMHA.1 According to the State, the trial court failed to follow the relevant
competency statutes when it denied the State’s request to commit Coats. Coats argues
that his commitment would violate his constitutional rights.
“Statutes control the appropriate way to determine a defendant’s competency and,
if necessary, to commit the defendant and provide restoration services.” Curtis v. State,
948 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011). “In the interpretation of statutes, the trial court’s ‘goal is to
determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature in promulgating it.ʼ” Ryan v.
State, 900 N.E.2d 43, 44-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Porter Dev., LLC v. First Nat’l
1
Coats does not appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
3
Bank of Valparaiso, 866 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ind. 2007)). Our primary resource for this
determination is the language used by the legislature. Id. Thus, “our interpretation
begins with an examination of the statute’s language.” Id. “We presume that the words
of an enactment were selected to express their common and ordinary meanings.” Id.
“Where the statute is unambiguous,” we “read each word and phrase in this plain,
ordinary, and usual sense, without having to resort to rules of construction to decipher
meanings.” Id. Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the court and is
reviewed de novo. Shaffer v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). De
novo review allows us to decide an issue without affording any deference to the trial
court’s decision. Id.
The State sought to have Coats committed to the DMHA pursuant to Indiana Code
Chapter 35-36-3, which governs comprehension to stand trial. Indiana Code Section 35-
36-3-1 provides that, if the trial court finds the defendant lacks the ability to understand
the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his or her defense, the trial court:
shall delay or continue the trial and order the defendant
committed to the division of mental health and addiction.
The division of mental health and addiction shall provide
competency restoration services or enter into a contract for
the provision of competency restoration services by a third
party in the:
(1) location where the defendant currently resides; or
(2) least restrictive setting appropriate to the needs of the
defendant and the safety of the defendant and others.
Within ninety days, the superintendent of the institution where the defendant is
committed must certify to the trial court whether the defendant has a “substantial
4
probability” of attaining competency “within the foreseeable future.” Ind. Code § 35-36-
3-3(a); see also Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1153. If a “substantial probability does not exist,”
the DMHA “shall initiate regular commitment proceedings under IC 12-26.” I.C. § 35-
36-3-3(b). If there is a substantial probability, the DMHA has six months from the
original admission or initiation of services to continue providing competency restoration
services. Id.; Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1153. At the end of those six months, if the
defendant has still not attained competency, the DMHA must initiate regular commitment
proceedings. I.C. § 35-36-3-4.
The trial court here found that Coats was incompetent, and the State does not
dispute that finding. The State argues, however, that once an incompetency finding was
made, the trial court was statutorily required to commit Coats to the DMHA. Instead, the
trial court found that Coats would not return to competency and denied the request to
commit him. The State contends that the statutory framework does not allow the trial
court to make a determination as to whether Coats can be returned to competency; rather,
that decision is left to the DMHA. Coats argues that the State’s interpretation of the
statute conflicts with Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845 (1972). According
to Coats, in light of the trial court’s finding that he cannot be returned to competency, his
commitment for competency restoration services would violate his equal protection and
due process rights.
We begin by discussing the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Jackson.
There, the defendant was charged with two robberies but was found to be incompetent.
He was committed to the Department of Mental Health until the Department could certify
5
that he was “sane.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 719, 92 S. Ct. at 1848. Defendant’s counsel
contended that the trial court’s order amounted to a life sentence without ever being
convicted of a crime because the defendant would never be competent. The Indiana
statutory scheme at that time made “no statutory provision for periodic review of the
defendant’s condition by either the court or mental health authorities.” Id. at 720, 92 S.
Ct. at 1849.
The Supreme Court noted that the statute did not make the likelihood of the
defendant’s improvement a relevant factor and that the record established that the
defendant’s chances of “ever meeting the competency standards” were “at best minimal,
if not nonexistent.” Id. at 727, 92 S. Ct. at 1852. Further, the defendant’s long-term
commitment under the competency statute subjected him “to a more lenient commitment
standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all
others not charged with offenses . . . .” Id. at 730, 92 S. Ct. at 1854. As a result, the
Court concluded that the defendant’s commitment deprived him of his equal protection
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held:
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is
committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable
future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the
State must either institute the customary civil commitment
proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any
other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it
is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to
stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by
progress toward that goal.
6
Id. at 738, 92 S. Ct. at 1858 (footnote omitted).
The statutes at issue here do not raise the same concerns that the court addressed
in Jackson. The current competency statutes require a report to the trial court within
ninety days regarding whether the defendant has a substantial probability of attaining
competency. I.C. § 35-36-3-3(a). If a substantial probability does not exist, the DMHA
must institute regular commitment proceedings. I.C. § 35-36-3-3(b). If a substantial
probability does exist, the DMHA must again report to the trial court within six months
of the original admission or initiation of competency restoration services. Id. If the
defendant does not attain competency during those six months, the DMHA must institute
regular commitment proceedings. I.C. § 35-36-3-4. Coats makes no argument that the
ninety day and six month reporting requirements in the current statutory scheme exceed
the “reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Jackson, 406 U.S.
at 738, 92 S. Ct. at 1858. Thus, the concerns addressed by Jackson are not evident here.
It is clear that the competency statute required the trial court to commit Coats to
the DMHA for competency restoration services once the trial court found Coats
incompetent. See I.C. § 35-36-3-3. However, it is also clear that, in this case, those
competency restoration services would be ineffective given Coats’s progressive
dementia. Our supreme court addressed the competency statutes in Curtis v. State, 948
N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011). There, the defendant was diagnosed with dementia, and one
doctor concluded that he would “never be restored” to competency and another
concluded that it was “unlikely” he would be restored to competency. Curtis, 948 N.E.2d
7
at 1146. The trial court stated that the defendant would “never become competent,” but
the trial court then denied the State’s request to commit him to the DMHA and denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges. Id.
The defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. In discussing the
defendant’s due process rights, our supreme court noted that the statutory procedures
“establish a comprehensive method that balances the various interests at stake.” Id. at
1153. “Involuntary commitment is a clear deprivation of the defendant’s liberty that can
be justified only on the basis of legitimate state interests.” Id.
The State has dual interests in committing an incompetent
defendant: (1) to restore the accused to competency due to the
“right of the public and the defendant to the prompt
disposition of criminal charges pending against him” and (2)
to protect the defendant “against being required to answer to
charges that she lacks the capacity to understand or assist her
attorney in defending against.”
Id. at 1154 (quoting State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ind. 2008)). “Of course, the
State’s interests cannot be realized if there is a finding that a defendant cannot be restored
to competency.” Id. Noting that the trial court had never found the defendant
incompetent nor committed him, our supreme court held: “There is no viable
fundamental-fairness argument when [the defendant] has not been involuntarily
committed and when there has been no appropriate finding that he will never be restored
to competency.” Id. at 1154.
This court’s opinion in State v. J.S., 937 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied, is also relevant here. There, a sixteen-year-old juvenile had multiple social and
developmental disorders. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that the juvenile
8
had committed various sex offenses, and the trial court eventually found that he was
incompetent. The trial court then dismissed the delinquency petition.
The appeal concerned the dismissal of the delinquency petition, not the failure to
commit the juvenile. This court noted that, although the trial court did not make a finding
regarding whether the juvenile would regain competency, the record showed that he was
“unlikely to regain competency before he reaches the age of eighteen, if ever.” J.S., 937
N.E.2d at 834. After reviewing the circumstances and the purposes of the juvenile justice
system, this court held that “it is clear that J.S. is receiving the care, protection, treatment,
and rehabilitation that he needs.” Id. at 835. This court found that the juvenile court’s
decision to dismiss the delinquency petition did not unduly endanger the public.
Although neither Curtis nor J.S. addressed the exact situation and issues here, both
emphasized the purposes of the relevant statutes. Our supreme court has also emphasized
the purposes of the competency statutes in Davis, where it noted:
Justification for the commitment of an incompetent accused is
found in the State’s interest in the restoration of the accused
to competency because of the right of the public and the
defendant to the prompt disposition of criminal charges
pending against him, Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434,
439 n. 2, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973), and the
protection of the accused against being required to answer to
charges that she lacks the capacity to understand or to assist
her attorney in defending against. Drope [v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975)]. Commitment of an
accused thus focuses on the State’s interest in the accused’s
restoration to competency and necessarily entails a finding of
probability that the accused can be so restored.
Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 289.
9
Here, the trial court expressly found that restoration to competency is improbable
and unlikely, and the report supports that finding. Although the better practice in most
cases is to follow the statutory commitment procedures, given Coats’s progressive
dementia and the trial court’s finding that he will not be restored to competency, the
purposes of the competency restoration process cannot be met by following those
procedures here. It is clear that Coats’s dementia will progress, and there simply is no
hope nor medical reason to believe that competency will be restored. The discussion in
Curtis informs and instructs us that “the State’s interests cannot be realized if there is a
finding that a defendant cannot be restored to competency.” Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1154.
We conclude that the trial court properly denied the State’s motion to commit Coats. 2
Conclusion
The trial court properly denied the State’s motion to commit Coats to the DMHA.
We affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., concurs.
RILEY, J., dissents with opinion.
2
We also note Coats’s argument that the denial of the motion to commit Coats under the competency
restoration statute does not prevent the prosecutor from bringing regular commitment proceedings under
Indiana Code Chapter 12-26-7. That chapter applies to the commitment of an individual alleged to be
mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled whose commitment is expected to last more than
ninety days. I.C. § 12-26-7-1. The chapter contains a list of those that may file regular commitment
procedures, including a health officer, police officer, friend, relative, spouse, or guardian of the
individual, the superintendent of the facility where the individual is present, or the prosecuting attorney
under certain circumstances. I.C. § 12-16-7-2. Those circumstances are not present here, and the State
correctly notes that the prosecuting attorney would be unable to file for a regular commitment. However,
the temporary commitment procedures do not have the same requirements as to who may file. See I.C. §
12-26-6-2(b) (noting that a petitioner must be at least eighteen years old). Thus, if appropriate, a
prosecutor could file for temporary commitment.
10
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1206-CR-526
)
WILLIAM COATS, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
RILEY, Judge, dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s denial
of the State’s motion to commit Coats to the Department of Mental Health and Addiction
(DMHA). The statutory scheme does not allow the trial court discretion over the
statutory commitment procedures. If the trial court finds that a defendant lacks the ability
to understand the proceedings and assist with the preparation of his defense, “it shall
delay or continue the trial and order the defendant committed” to the DMHA. Ind. Code
§ 35-36-3-1(b) (emphasis added). Consequently, the statute does not give the trial court
discretion to decline to order commitment even where it concludes that the defendant
could never be returned to competency.
11
In support of its conclusion, the majority latches on to one sentence in Curtis v.
State, 948 N.E.2d 1143 (Ind. 2011). There, the supreme court noted that the State’s dual
interests of competency restoration and protection of the accused “cannot be realized if
there is a finding that a defendant cannot be restored to competency.” Id. at 1159. From
this premise, the majority reasons that if “the purposes of the competency restoration
process cannot be met” there is no need to follow the statutory commitment procedures.
Slip Op. at *10. Yet, it is a stretch to conclude that the process itself must be abandoned
where the trial court has determined that the defendant lacks competency.
Indeed, that result is expressly foreclosed by I.C. § 35-36-3-1(b), which requires
the trial court to take the additional step of ordering commitment following its
determination that the defendant lacks competency. Following commitment, the DMHA
superintendent or authorized third party contractor has ninety days to observe and provide
treatment to an incompetent defendant. I.C. § 35-36-3-3. If there is a substantial
probability that the defendant will attain the ability to understand and assist with his
defense, DMHA has up to six months to provide further competency restoration services.
I.C. § 35-36-3-3(b). However, if substantial probability does not exist, whether at the
outset or after a six month interim provision of competency restoration services, DMHA
must institute regular commitment proceedings under I.C. art. 12-26. I.C. § 35-36-3-3(b);
-4.
The majority concedes as much. Its admission that “[a]lthough the better practice
in most cases is to follow the statutory commitment procedures” is nothing more than a
concession that procedures should be followed. Slip Op. *10. Indeed, there are
12
compelling reasons why this is so. Foremost is the clear duties assigned to the trial court
and the DMHA. The trial court determines whether the defendant is incompetent in the
first instance, but the statutory scheme entrusts the ultimate determination on competency
to the superintendent, who has not only the skills to make such observations but also the
time within which to do so. In sum, the express statutory directive and the
comprehensive nature of the statutory commitment scheme overcome even those cases
where a progressive illness renders no hope nor medical reason to believe competency
will be restored. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s denial.
13
State of Indiana v. William Coats
Combined Opinion