Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
FILED
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res Feb 07 2013, 9:25 am
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY E. STRATMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Aurora, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
BRIAN REITZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHRISTOPHER ESTRIDGE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 15A01-1205-CR-209
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jonathon N. Cleary, Judge
Cause No. 15D01-0902-FB-1
February 7, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Christopher Estridge appeals the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
Issues
Estridge raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the trial court properly revoked his probation; and
II. whether the trial court properly ordered him to serve two
years of his suspended sentence.
Facts
In 2009, the State charged Estridge with Class B felony dealing in a schedule II
controlled substance (methadone), Class D felony unlawfully acquiring a controlled
substance, and Class D felony conspiracy to unlawfully acquire a controlled substance.
Estridge pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in a schedule II controlled substance. The
trial court sentenced Estridge to 7,300 days with 6,205 days suspended to probation.
On February 21, 2012, the State alleged that Estridge had violated his probation by
failing a urine drug screen and testing positive for benzodiazepines without a valid
prescription. At a hearing on the probation revocation, Estridge and his wife testified that
his wife accidentally gave Valium to Estridge while he was sick. The trial court stated
that it had “a hard time accepting” Estridge’s defense on “many different levels.” Tr. p.
56. The trial court found that Estridge had violated his probation and ordered him to
serve 730 days of his previously suspended sentence with 365 days imprisonment and
365 days in community corrections home detention. Estridge now appeals.
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Analysis
I. Probation Revocation
Estridge argues that the trial court improperly revoked his probation. Probation
revocation is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3. A probation hearing is civil
in nature, and the State need only prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the
evidence. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999). We will consider all the
evidence most favorable to the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that
evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is substantial evidence of
probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a defendant has violated any
term of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation. Id.
Estridge argues that the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to find that he
violated his probation. According to Estridge, there was no evidence to show that he
knew he was violating the terms of his probation when his wife gave him the medication.
The trial court considered Estridge’s defense and found it unbelievable. Estridge’s
argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of
the witnesses, which we cannot do. The State presented evidence that Estridge’s urine
screen showed the presence of benzodiazepines and that Estridge did not have a valid
prescription. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to show that Estridge violated a
condition of his probation.
II. Sentencing
Estridge argues that the sentence imposed following the revocation of his
probation was an abuse of discretion. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court
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discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878
N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and
may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3).
A trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the
abuse of discretion standard. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. Upon the
revocation of probation, the trial court may impose one or more of the following
sanctions: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging
the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than one year
beyond the original probationary period; and (3) order execution of all or part of the
sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h).1
Although the trial court could have ordered Estridge to serve his entire 6,205-day
suspended sentence, the trial court instead ordered him to serve 730 days of his
previously suspended sentence with 365 days imprisonment and 365 days in community
corrections home detention. Estridge argues that this sentence was “harsh” because he
was employed and supporting his wife and four children, he had significantly improved
in his drug addiction, his family had suffered significant hardship during his last
incarceration, and this was his first probation violation. Appellant’s Br. p. 6. The trial
court here noted Estridge’s significant criminal history and that he was at the beginning
of a 6,205-day probationary period. Given the circumstances here, the trial court was
1
Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3 was amended effective July 1, 2012. See Ind. Pub. L. No. 147-2012, §
10. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) was formerly Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(g).
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within its discretion to order Estridge to serve only two years of his previously suspended
sentence.
Conclusion
The trial court properly found that Estridge violated his probation and did not
abuse its discretion when it sentenced Estridge for the probation violation. We affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
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