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before any court except for the purpose
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APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
RUDY J. SMITH GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RUDY J. SMITH, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 53A04-1202-PC-280
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Kenneth G. Todd, Judge
Cause No. 53C03-1010-PC-2680
January 29, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Rudy Smith appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We
affirm.
Issue
Smith raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the post-
conviction court properly denied his request for credit time.
Facts
In 2005, Smith was sentenced to eight years, with one year executed and seven
years suspended, for Class B felony dealing in cocaine and Class D felony resisting law
enforcement. Smith was also sentenced to five years probation. At sentencing, Smith
was credited for the sixteen days he was in jail awaiting trial and the 182 days he was on
pretrial home detention. Smith was required to serve 150 additional days of home
detention to fulfill his original executed sentence. Prior to the 2005 sentencing, Smith
began a substance abuse program as a condition of probation. Smith successfully
completed this program in 2006.
On March 21, 2009, while on probation following his home detention, Smith was
alleged to have violated probation by committing the new offense of dealing in cocaine.
On September 2, 2009, Smith admitted to the alleged violation and was ordered to serve
five years of his previously suspended sentence.
On September 22, 2011, Smith filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief
asserting that he was entitled to credit time for time served on house arrest in 2005 and
2006 and for his 2006 completion of a substance abuse program. On January 20, 2012,
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after a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, concluding that Smith had
already been credited for all of the time served on home detention and that he was not
statutorily entitled to credit time for the substance abuse program he completed in 2006.
Smith now appeals.
Analysis
Smith argues that he was improperly denied credit for time served on home
detention and for his completion of a substance abuse program. Generally, the
completion of the direct appeal process closes the door to a criminal defendant’s claims
of error in conviction or sentencing. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. 2009).
However, defendants whose appeals have been rejected are allowed to raise a narrow set
of claims through a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. (citing Ind. Post-Conviction
Rule 1(1)). A post-conviction court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law
on all issues presented in the petition. Id. (citing P-C.R. 1(6)). The findings must be
supported by the facts, and the conclusions must be supported by the law. Id. “Our
review on appeal is limited to these findings and conclusions.” Id.
The petitioner bears the burden of proof, and an unsuccessful petitioner appeals
from a negative judgment. Id. A petitioner appealing from a negative judgment must
show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion
opposite to that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. We will disturb a post-
conviction court’s decision as being contrary to law only where the evidence is without
conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the post-conviction court has reached the
opposite conclusion. Id.
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Smith argues that the denial of credit for his time served on home detention in
2005 and 2006 is clearly erroneous.1 Smith relies on Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220,
223-24 (Ind. 1999), Dishroon v. State, 722 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000),
superseded by statute, and Stith v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1266, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
which held in various contexts that an individual is entitled to credit toward his or her
sentence for time served on home detention. These cases are distinguishable, however,
because unlike Purcell, Dishroon, and Stith, Smith received credit for the time he served
on home detention in 2005 and 2006 toward his original one-year executed sentence.
Nothing in these cases stands for the proposition that time served on home detention
should be credited toward a defendant’s original sentence and then again toward the
sentence imposed following a violation of probation. Smith has not established that the
post-conviction court’s denial of additional credit time was clearly erroneous.
Smith also asserts that he was entitled to 180 days of additional credit time for
successfully completing a substance abuse program in 2006. Indiana Code Section 35-
50-6-3.3(b)(3)(B) allows a person to earn credit time if, “while confined by the
department of correction,” the person is in credit Class I, demonstrates a pattern
consistent with rehabilitation, and successfully completes the requirements to obtain a
1
To the extent the prosecutor generally agreed that Smith was entitled to credit for the time served on
home detention at the post-conviction relief hearing, we do not believe the prosecutor intended to concede
that Smith was entitled to credit toward his original sentence and to credit toward the sentence imposed
following his violation of probation for the same time served on home detention. Similarly, we do not
believe that the post-conviction court’s observation during the hearing that there might be less of a
question regarding the credit for home detention was an oral pronouncement of its ruling where it went on
to state, “I’ll take a look at it and I’ll issue an order.” Tr. p. 7. The post-conviction court properly
considered the arguments made at the hearing in light of the credit time Smith actually received for his
home detention when it denied his petition.
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certificate of completion of a substance abuse program approved by the department of
correction. At the hearing, Smith acknowledged that he was on home detention and not
in the department of correction when he completed the program. As such, we cannot
conclude that he was “confined by the department of correction” when he completed the
program. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(b).
To the extent he relies on Rodgers v. State, 705 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), for the proposition “an inmate earns the right to credit time under the education
credit statute when the inmate successfully completes the requirements for the degree as
long as the inmate has, until that point, demonstrated a pattern consistent with
rehabilitation.” Rodgers, however, is distinguishable for a variety of reasons. First, the
statutes at issue in Rodgers have been amended, and Smith provides no analysis of those
changes. Second, Rodgers earned the credit time while in a regional corrections work
release program, not while on home detention. Finally, nothing in Rodgers suggests that
a person should be able to “bank” credit time to be used toward some future probation
revocation. To the contrary, the court observed that Rodgers’s “entitlement to the
education credit time accrued immediately upon his completion of the degree.” Rodgers,
705 N.E.2d at 1043. Accordingly, Smith has not shown that the post-conviction court
erroneously denied him credit for his 2006 completion of a substance abuse program
while on home detention.
Conclusion
Smith has not established that the post-conviction court improperly denied his
petition. We affirm.
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Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
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