An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-33
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 17 June 2014
In THE MATTER OF: New Hanover County
No. 12 JA & JT 222
N.M.
Appeal by Respondents from order entered 21 October 2013 by
Judge Jeffrey Evan Noecker in New Hanover County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals on 19 May 2014.
Dean W. Hollandsworth for petitioner-appellee New Hanover
County Department of Social Services.
Mary McCullers Reece for respondent-mother appellant.
Ryan McKaig for respondent-father appellant.
Administrative Office of the Courts, by Associate Counsel
Deana K. Fleming, for guardian ad litem.
DILLON, Judge.
Respondents, the mother and father of the juvenile Nancy1,
appeal from an order terminating their parental rights. After
careful review, we affirm.
1
A pseudonym.
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On 11 September 2012, the New Hanover County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Nancy was
an abused and neglected juvenile after Respondent-mother
allegedly attempted to kill herself and the juvenile. The
juvenile reported that Respondent-mother had given her a drink
that “tasted crappy[.]” The remains of a beverage containing
crushed pills were found at the scene, along with suicide notes,
empty bottles of Vicodin and Clonazepam, and insecticide.
Respondent-mother was found unconscious, and the juvenile was
found barely conscious. Respondent-mother was involuntarily
committed and hospitalized.
DSS additionally noted that it had been previously involved
with Respondents’ family dating back to November 2010, when
Respondent-father and the juvenile were involved in a hostage
standoff. As a result of the standoff, Respondent-father was
convicted of several charges, including assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill/inflicting serious bodily injury,
child abuse, burglary, and damage to property. Respondent-
father is expected to be incarcerated as a result of the charges
until at least 2020.
On 6 March 2013, prior to adjudication of the petition
alleging abuse and neglect, DSS filed a petition to terminate
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Respondents’ parental rights. DSS alleged that grounds existed
to terminate Respondents’ parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2013) (abuse and neglect) and (6)
(dependency). On the same day, DSS filed a motion to
consolidate the juvenile petition with the petition to terminate
both Respondent-mother’s and Respondent-father’s parental rights
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1102(c) (2013). On 17 April
2013, the trial court allowed the motion and the two matters
were consolidated. On 21 October 2013, the trial court entered
an order both (1) adjudicating the juvenile abused, neglected,
and dependent; and (2) terminating Respondents’ parental rights.
Respondents appeal.
Respondents’ sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court abused its discretion when it determined that it was in
the best interests of Nancy to terminate their parental rights.
We disagree.
Once statutory grounds for termination have been
established, the trial court is required to “determine whether
terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best
interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013). When
determining whether it is in the juvenile’s best interests to
terminate the parent’s rights, the trial court is required to
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make written findings regarding the relevant factors enunciated
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a):
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the
juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental
rights will aid in the accomplishment of the
permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the
parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between
the juvenile and the proposed adoptive
parent, guardian, custodian, or other
permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
We review a trial court’s order terminating parental rights to
determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact are
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether
those findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law. In re
Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2004). “We
review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights
for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 98,
564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted).
Here, in support of its conclusion that it was in the
juvenile’s best interest to terminate Respondents’ parental
rights, the trial court found as fact:
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3. That custody with relatives is not
appropriate, custody with a court approved
care taker is not appropriate, nor is
reunification. The dispositional option
that is in the best interests of this child
is adoption.
4. That based on [Nancy’s] improved
behaviors and continued therapy it is
increasingly likely that she will be
adopted. Termination of parental rights is
necessary to achieve adoption and free her
for adoption.
5. [Nancy] will be ten next week. She is
in foster care and has been so since
February 2013. She is not in a pre-adoptive
placement. She is adjusting nicely to her
foster care placement. She remains in
therapy[. . . .] As a result of that
therapy and her appropriate foster care
placement she has had an improvement in her
life circumstances. Her grades are
improving. Her meltdowns are decreasing in
severity, and her behaviors are improving.
6. That the Court finds that there is a
significant bond that [Nancy] has with her
mother and with her father. That her father
loves her, her mother loves her, and [Nancy]
loves and has in the past loved them. That
the bond that she has with both of her
parents is significantly negatively affected
by each incident: the shootout and poisoning
incidents of abuse by the Respondent-parents
and their being away from her by being
incarcerated and her being placed in foster
care as a result. That [Nancy] is already
demonstrating that she is able to improve in
a foster home where she has some measure of
stability and appropriate care. That based
on the evidence presented, including the
testimony from [Nancy’s] therapist,
visitation with either Respondent-parent at
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this time would negatively affect [Nancy’s]
recovery and continued stability, and thus
would be contrary to her best interests and
welfare.
Neither Respondent challenges the above findings of fact, and
they are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93,
97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Rather, Respondents argue that
these findings do not support the trial court’s conclusion that
termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of
Nancy.
Specifically, Respondents argue that the trial court should
not have terminated their parental rights because Nancy was not
in a pre-adoptive placement. We have held, however, that the
absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of
the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental
rights. See In re Norris, 65 N.C. App. 269, 275, 310 S.E.2d 25,
29 (1983) (stating that “[i]t suffices to say that such a
finding [of adoptability] is not required in order to terminate
parental rights.”), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315
S.E.2d 703 (1984). We nevertheless note that while the juvenile
may not have been in a pre-adoptive placement, the unchallenged
findings demonstrate that she is likely adoptable. Cf. In Re
J.A.O, 166 N.C. App. 222, 227-28, 601 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2004)
(finding an abuse of discretion where the juvenile suffered from
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“significant and life-long debilitating behaviors” which made
the likelihood of adoption remote and thus termination was not
in the juvenile’s best interest).
Respondents further assert that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that termination was in Nancy’s best
interest where the evidence and findings demonstrate that the
juvenile had a strong, loving bond with her parents. We note,
however, that the trial court also found as fact during the
termination hearing that neither Respondent had addressed their
mental health issues since the filing of the juvenile petition.
Given the serious nature of the abuse that led to the filing of
the petition, and considering Respondents’ failure to address
their mental health issues, we cannot agree that the trial
court’s conclusion that it was in the best interests of the
juvenile to terminate Respondents’ parental rights was
manifestly unsupported by reason. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Judge BRYANT and Judge STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
In re N.M.
Combined Opinion