Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 23 2013, 8:50 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GARY L. GRINER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Griner & Company Attorney General of Indiana
Michigan City, Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DENNIS KNIGHT, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A05-1208-CR-436
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jerome Frese, Judge
Cause No. 71D03-1108-FB-122
January 23, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
Ryan Holloway was working at a Family Dollar store in South Bend when Dennis
Knight walked in and, displaying a handgun, told Holloway to open the cash register.
Holloway opened two registers and gave Knight the money therein, whereupon Knight left
the store. The next day, Holloway was driving when he recognized Knight sitting on a bench
in front of the Trinity Towers. Holloway stopped, confronted Knight, and asked a security
guard to call the police. Knight fled but was soon apprehended. Knight was ultimately
convicted of Class C felony robbery and Class B felony possession of a firearm by a serious
violent felon (“SVF”), and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of twenty years.
Knight contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction
for Class C felony robbery, arguing that Holloway’s identification of him as the robber
cannot be credited. Concluding that Holloway’s identification of Knight as the robber is
sufficient to establish Knight’s identity, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Right before noon on July 20, 2011, Holloway was working alone at a Family Dollar
store in South Bend when he noticed a man, who Holloway later identified as Knight, walk
past the store, look inside, and then enter. Knight asked, “where’s the lady that’s working?”,
and Holloway replied that she was not working that day. Tr. p. 9. At that point, Knight
walked to a cash register and told Holloway to open it. As Holloway approached the register,
he noticed that Knight was holding a handgun underneath his shirt. After Holloway opened
and emptied two cash registers, Knight told him to go to the back of the store, and Knight
left.
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The next day, Holloway was driving through town when he saw Knight sitting on a
bench with a female in front of Trinity Towers. Holloway stopped and confronted Knight as
Knight was walking into Trinity Towers. When Holloway asked a security guard to call the
police, Knight pushed Holloway and fled. Police arrived and apprehended Knight.
On August 10, 2011, the State charged Knight with Class B felony robbery and Class
B felony SVF. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Knight guilty of robbery, and
after Knight stipulated that he had a prior robbery conviction, the trial court found him guilty
of SVF. The trial court ultimately entered convictions for Class C felony robbery and Class
B felony SVF and sentenced Knight to eight years of incarceration for robbery and twenty for
SVF, to be served concurrently.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Knight contends that Holloway’s identification of him as the robber is unworthy of
credit to the extent that it requires his acquittal due to insufficient credible evidence.1 “In
addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court must consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without weighing
evidence or assessing witness credibility, and determine therefrom whether a reasonable trier
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fajardo v. State,
1
Although Knight frames this argument solely in terms of his robbery conviction, the question of
identity is equally applicable to both of his convictions, and his stipulation during the SVF portion of his trial
was only that he had a prior robbery conviction, not that he was the person possessing the handgun in the
Family Dollar. We therefore treat Knight’s argument as applicable to both of his convictions.
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859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007) (citing Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (Ind.
2002)). “Appellate courts may, however, apply the ‘incredible dubiosity’ rule to impinge
upon a jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness.” Id. (citing Love v. State, 761
N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002)).
If a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is a
complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s conviction may be
reversed. This is appropriate only where the court has confronted inherently
improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony
of incredible dubiosity. Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be
applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently
improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.
Love, 761 N.E.2d at 810 (citations omitted).
The incredible dubiosity rule does not help Knight in this case. Holloway’s testimony
was neither inherently improbable, coerced, equivocal, nor wholly uncorroborated. Holloway
never wavered from his identification of Knight as his robber, testifying that “I don’t forget a
face[.]” Tr. p. 40. Moreover, the State introduced a video of the robbery, which showed the
robber, corroborating Holloway’s testimony to a great extent. Although the robber was
wearing a baseball cap and glasses, he is shown in profile several times, and his full body is
shown in several shots. We will not invade the province of the trial court to determine if the
person in the video was or was not the defendant sitting in the courtroom. Knight’s argument
is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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