NO. COA13-1328
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 June 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Cleveland County
Nos. 12 CRS 54858–60
GARRY JEROME JAMISON
Appeal by defendant from judgments and commitments entered
12 April 2013 by Judge J. Thomas Davis in Cleveland County
Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 April 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Patrick S. Wooten, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Paul M. Green, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Garry Jerome Jamison (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments
and commitments adjudging him guilty of first degree burglary,
assault inflicting serious bodily injury, and assault on a
female. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss the charges of assault inflicting
serious bodily injury and first degree burglary. Defendant also
contends that the trial court erred in allowing him to be
convicted of both assault inflicting serious bodily injury and
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assault on a female based on the same underlying conduct. For
the following reasons, we hold that the trial court properly
denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, but erred in convicting
and sentencing Defendant for both categories of assault.
I. Factual & Procedural History
The facts of Defendant’s case are not in dispute. Evidence
presented at trial showed the following.
In April or May of 2012, Defendant’s nine year relationship
with his then-girlfriend, Amber Price, ended. During their
relationship, Defendant and Ms. Price had two children together.
After their break-up, Defendant moved out and interacted with
Ms. Price only to arrange visitation with the children.
On 25 August 2012, however, Defendant telephoned Ms. Price
repeatedly in order to see her the following day, Ms. Price’s
birthday. Ms. Price refused to see Defendant and told him that
she was spending time at her parents’ house with the children.
That evening, while the children were with their grandparents,
Ms. Price went to celebrate her birthday at her best friend
Brittney Stevens’ house. In addition to Ms. Price and Ms.
Stevens, Ms. Stevens’ two children and the children’s father
were present at the home.
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Around 11:40 p.m., Defendant called Ms. Price demanding
that she come get him and spend time with him for her birthday.
Ms. Price again refused. Defendant told Ms. Price that if he
found out that she was not at home with the children, he would
kill her. While Ms. Price believed Defendant’s threat to be
credible, she remained at the party because she did not think
Defendant knew that she was at Ms. Stevens’ home. Ms. Price’s
testimony revealed, however, that she often celebrated her
birthday with Ms. Stevens, a fact that was well-known by
Defendant.
Sometime around midnight, Ms. Price heard a voice she
recognized as Defendant’s shouting profanities and making noise
outside of Ms. Stevens’ home. Upon hearing Defendant’s voice,
Ms. Price immediately attempted to close the front door to keep
Defendant out of the house. Testimony indicated that the screen
door was already closed, but not the front door itself. While
Ms. Price attempted to close the front door, Defendant forced
his way through the door and entered the home. Ms. Price,
fearful for her life, attempted to run from Defendant, but could
not escape. Defendant grabbed Ms. Price by the hair, knocked
her to the ground, and began to beat her.
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Meanwhile, Ms. Stevens took her two children and placed
them in her car, where they remained with their father during
the incident. While outside, Ms. Stevens heard Ms. Price
screaming for help. Ms. Stevens went back into the house and
attempted to place herself between Defendant and Ms. Price.
Defendant continued to kick and beat Ms. Price, but did not harm
Ms. Stevens. After the beating, Defendant told Ms. Stevens that
it was nothing against her or her family, but that Ms. Price was
a “lying bitch.” Thereafter, Defendant left the premises and
Ms. Stevens called the police. Defendant was subsequently
arrested on 6 September 2012.
On 11 and 12 April 2013, Defendant was tried in Cleveland
County Superior Court on charges of first degree burglary,
assault inflicting serious bodily injury, and assault on a
female. Defendant was convicted of all three crimes. The trial
court sentenced Defendant to an active sentence of 64–89 months
imprisonment for the first degree burglary. With respect to the
assault convictions, Defendant received an additional
consecutive sentence of 16–29 months imprisonment, which was
suspended by the trial court for 36 months of supervised
probation. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal in open
court.
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II. Jurisdiction
Defendant’s appeal from the superior court’s final
judgments lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 7A-27(b), 15A-1444(a) (2013).
III. Analysis
Defendant challenges the trial court’s judgments with three
arguments on appeal: (1) that there was insufficient evidence of
a “serious bodily injury” presented at trial to support the
charge of assault inflicting serious bodily injury; (2) that
there was insufficient evidence of a “breaking” to support the
charge of first degree burglary; and (3) that the trial court
erred in entering a judgment for assault inflicting serious
bodily injury and for assault on a female based on the same
underlying conduct. We address each of Defendant’s arguments in
turn.
A. Evidence Supporting a “Serious Bodily Injury”
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss the charge of assault inflicting serious
bodily injury because the evidence presented at trial was not
sufficient to show that Ms. Price, in fact, suffered a “serious
bodily injury.” We disagree.
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“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650
S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal,
the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged,
or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s
being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is
properly denied.’” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526
S.E.2d 451, 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430
S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890 (2000).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State
v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). “In
making its determination, the trial court must consider all
evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the
light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit
of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions
in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d
211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135 (1995).
The crime of assault inflicting serious bodily injury
requires a showing of two elements: “(1) the commission of an
assault on another, which (2) inflicts serious bodily injury.”
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State v. Williams, 150 N.C. App. 497, 501, 563 S.E.2d 616, 619
(2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Pertinent here,
the General Assembly has defined a “serious bodily injury” as a
“bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or that
causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or
protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or that results in prolonged hospitalization.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4 (2013). In interpreting this
statutory language, we have previously held that “the General
Assembly intended for N.C.G.S. § 14-32.4 to cover those assaults
that are especially violent and result in the infliction of
extremely serious injuries.” Williams, 150 N.C. App. at 503,
563 S.E.2d at 619. Thus, a “serious bodily injury” as set forth
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4 “requires proof of more severe
injury than the ‘serious injury’ element of other assault
offenses.” Id. at 503, 563 S.E.2d at 619–20.
Accordingly, our task in reviewing the record below is to
determine whether there is substantial evidence that Ms. Price
suffered an injury rising to this level of severity. However,
in making this determination, we do not consider the entire
definition set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4. Rather, “we
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are limited to that part of the definition set forth in the
trial court’s instructions to the jury.” Id. at 503, 563 S.E.2d
at 620. Here, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Serious bodily injury is injury that creates
or causes a permanent or protracted
condition that causes extreme pain or
permanent or protracted loss or impairment
of the functions of any bodily member or
organ.
“It is well settled that a defendant may not be convicted of an
offense on a theory of guilt different from that presented to
the jury.” Id. Thus, we limit our review to the evidence
presented at trial that supports the definition of “serious
bodily injury” given to the jury.
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light most
favorable to the State, we hold that there is substantial
evidence that Ms. Price suffered a “serious bodily injury” from
Defendant’s assault. Ms. Price testified that the beating left
her with broken bones in her face, a broken hand, a cracked
knee, and an eye so beat up and swollen that she still could not
see properly out of it at the time of trial. She indicated that
she had a footprint and other bruises on her face, as well as
bruises on her neck, stomach, and back. Ms. Price testified
that she had “been stomped everywhere.” She reported having to
go back to the hospital for a second time because of pain and
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dizziness. She indicated that her pain lasted for five to six
weeks after the attack and that she still had pain in her hand.
She stated, “my hand and my eye hurt all of the time.”
Photographs of Ms. Price’s injuries were also admitted into
evidence to supplement her testimony.
Brittney Stevens also testified concerning Ms. Price’s
injuries. Ms. Stevens indicated that the beating left Ms. Price
bloody at the scene of the crime. Ms. Stevens reported that Ms.
Price wore sunglasses for several weeks to hide bruising and
black eyes.
Ms. Price’s mother corroborated the testimony given by Ms.
Price and Ms. Stevens and added that Ms. Price had bloodshot
eyes and a tooth filling that came loose as a result of the
beating. The mother also stated that Ms. Price had trouble
writing with her injured hand. Joseph Mullen, Ms. Price’s
emergency room physician, characterized Ms. Price’s injuries as
“serious.”
We believe the foregoing evidence to be more than
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. This evidence,
particularly Ms. Price’s ongoing trouble with her hand and eye,
provides substantial evidence of a “permanent or protracted
condition that causes extreme pain” and a “permanent or
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protracted loss or impairment of the functions of a bodily
member or organ.” Accordingly, Defendant’s argument is without
merit.
B. Evidence Supporting a “Breaking”
Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that there was
insufficient evidence of a “breaking” presented at trial to
withstand a motion to dismiss on the charge of first degree
burglary.
Again, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on a
motion to dismiss, our task is to determine whether, when viewed
in a light most favorable to the State, there is substantial
evidence of each element of the offense charged. Fritsch, 351
N.C. at 378, 526 S.E.2d at 455.
To warrant a conviction for burglary the
State’s evidence must show that there was a
breaking and entering during the nighttime
of a dwelling or sleeping apartment with
intent to commit a felony therein. If the
burglarized dwelling is occupied it is
burglary in the first degree; if unoccupied,
it is burglary in the second degree.
State v. Wilson, 289 N.C. 531, 538, 223 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1976)
(internal citations omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51
(2013). Furthermore, “[i] f any force at all is employed to
effect an entrance through any usual or unusual place of
ingress, whether open, partly open, or closed, there is a
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breaking sufficient in law to constitute burglary, if the other
elements of the offense are present.” Wilson, 289 N.C. at 539,
223 S.E.2d at 316 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, uncontroverted testimony at trial established that
the screen door was closed and that Ms. Price was attempting to
close the front door when Defendant forced his way into the
home. Pursuant to Wilson, we hold that this testimony provides
substantial evidence that a “breaking” occurred.
Defendant acknowledges that this controlling precedent
warrants our holding on this issue. Nevertheless, Defendant
wishes to preserve this argument for a later appeal to our
Supreme Court. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial
court’s first degree burglary judgment and note Defendant’s
objection for purposes of later appellate review.
C. Judgments and Commitments for Two Categories of Assault
Defendant’s third argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred when it sentenced Defendant for assault inflicting
serious bodily injury and assault on a female based on the same
underlying conduct. Specifically, Defendant argues that the
plain language of our assault statutes mandates punishment only
for the more serious crime.
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At the outset, we acknowledge that “[i]n order to preserve
a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the
trial court with a timely request, objection or motion, stating
the specific grounds for the ruling sought if the specific
grounds are not apparent.” State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420,
402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1).
Here, Defendant admits that he did not object to the trial court
entering a consolidated judgment and commitment for both
assaults. However, “‘[w]hen a trial court acts contrary to a
statutory mandate, the defendant’s right to appeal is preserved
despite the defendant’s failure to object during trial.’” State
v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 177, 531 S.E.2d 428, 439 (2000)
(quoting State v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 13, 530 S.E.2d 807, 815
(2000)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001). Accordingly,
because Defendant contends that the trial court erred in its
interpretation and application of statutory provisions, we
review the merits of Defendant’s argument notwithstanding his
failure to object at trial.
“Issues of statutory construction are questions of law,
reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509,
511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010). “‘Under a de novo review, the
court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362
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N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens
of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319
(2003)).
Assault on a female is a statutory crime in North Carolina:
Unless the conduct is covered under some
other provision of law providing greater
punishment, any person who commits any
assault, assault and battery, or affray is
guilty of a Class A1 misdemeanor if, in the
course of the assault, assault and battery,
or affray, he or she:
. . . .
(2) Assaults a female, he being a male
person at least 18 years of age[.]
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c) (2013) (emphasis added). Defendant
argues that the plain language of the prefatory clause contained
in this statute, i.e., “[u]nless the conduct is covered under
some other provision of law providing greater punishment,”
reveals an intent by our General Assembly to limit a trial
court’s authority to impose punishment for assault on a female
when punishment is also imposed for higher class offenses that
apply to the same conduct. Here, because Defendant was also
convicted and sentenced for assault inflicting serious bodily
injury, a felony, Defendant argues that he should not be
punished for committing an assault on a female. Compare N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c) (classifying assault on a female as a
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Class A1 misdemeanor), with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4
(classifying assault inflicting serious bodily as a Class F
felony). We agree.
As our Supreme Court has stated,
[t]he intent of the Legislature controls the
interpretation of a statute. When a statute
is unambiguous, this Court will give effect
to the plain meaning of the words without
resorting to judicial construction.
[C]ourts must give [an unambiguous] statute
its plain and definite meaning, and are
without power to interpolate, or
superimpose, provisions and limitations not
contained therein.
State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297, 302, 698 S.E.2d 65, 68 (2010)
(second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Here, Defendant’s interpretation of the assault on a female
statute comports with its plain language. The prefatory clause
unambiguously bars punishment for assault on a female when the
conduct at issue is punished by a higher class of assault.
Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with previous
decisions of our appellate courts dealing with other statutes
that contain identical prefatory language. See, e.g., id. at
304–05, 698 S.E.2d at 69–70 (collecting cases).
Accordingly, because Defendant was convicted and sentenced
for both categories of assault in the court below, the trial
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court acted contrary to the statutory mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-33(c).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we arrest judgment in 12 CRS
54858 (assault on a female) and remand for resentencing in 12
CRS 54860 (assault inflicting serious bodily injury).
Otherwise, we find no error.
Judgment Arrested and Remanded in part; No Error in part.
Judges STROUD and DILLON concur.