An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .
NO. COA13-997
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 20 May 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Rockingham County
Nos. 11 CRS 817
11 CRS 50150
13 CRS 354
WOODROW JOSH CRADDOCK, JR.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 11 April 2013 by
Judge Edwin G. Wilson in Rockingham County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 February 2014.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan,
Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
David L. Neal for defendant-appellant.
DAVIS, Judge.
Woodrow Josh Craddock, Jr. (“Defendant”) appeals from a
judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of
attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill inflicting serious injury, and malicious assault in a
secret manner. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court
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erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication;
and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After
careful review, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial
free from error.
Factual Background
The evidence presented by the State at trial tended to show
the following: On the evening of 15 January 2011, Joel Craddock
(“Joel”), Defendant’s son, was celebrating his 36th birthday
with his wife and friends at the home of David Willoughby (“Mr.
Willoughby”). At approximately 9:00 p.m., Defendant arrived at
the birthday party and began drinking alcoholic beverages with
the other guests. While the record is unclear regarding the
exact amount of alcohol he consumed, Defendant was seen taking
several shots of tequila.
Sometime before midnight, Defendant and Joel got into a
heated discussion regarding finances, which escalated into a
physical altercation, requiring several of the other men at the
party to separate them. Defendant and Joel continued to argue
back and forth as Defendant was ushered out of the house and
told to leave. Defendant walked to his truck and drove away.
After Defendant left, he and Joel continued to send text
messages back and forth to each other. Joel told a friend,
Clyde Griffin (“Mr. Griffin”), that Defendant had sent him a
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text message stating that he was coming back to the party and
bringing a friend.
Approximately 45 minutes after he had left the party,
Defendant returned. Defendant sent Joel a text message telling
him to come outside. Mr. Griffin and Mr. Willoughby went
outside to ask Defendant to leave while Joel stayed inside the
house. Defendant stood by his truck in the road in front of the
house with his hands in his coat pockets. As Mr. Griffin and
Mr. Willoughby approached him, Defendant repeatedly warned them
not to “walk up” on him. Mr. Griffin testified that Defendant
then stated “he was going to leave Joel dead in the road.”
When Joel came outside, he and Defendant resumed their
argument, standing approximately a foot apart from one another.
Mr. Griffin was standing in between Defendant and Joel in an
attempt to keep them apart when he heard three gunshots. The
shots were fired from Defendant’s left-hand coat pocket.
Bullets struck Joel in his chest, upper leg, and hand. A
firearm analysis performed by the State Bureau of Investigation
(“SBI”) determined that the gun required a separate trigger pull
for each shot fired.
After firing the shots, Defendant calmly walked back to his
truck and drove to a bar approximately eight miles away.
Defendant later went to the home of a friend, Douglas Crawford
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(“Mr. Crawford”), and told Mr. Crawford what he had done. Mr.
Crawford drove Defendant to the police station to turn himself
in. Defendant admitted to police officers that he had shot Joel
and said that he felt bad about the incident.
A search warrant was obtained for Defendant’s truck, and
officers found a revolver in the vehicle. Testing conducted by
the SBI revealed that a bullet recovered from the crime scene
had been fired from the revolver found in Defendant’s truck. In
addition, gunshot residue was found on Defendant’s hands.
Defendant was indicted on charges of attempted murder,
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting
serious injury, and malicious assault in a secret manner. The
case proceeded to trial in Rockingham County Superior Court on 8
April 2013. Defendant was convicted by a jury on all three
charges and sentenced to a term of 180 to 225 months
imprisonment. Defendant appealed to this Court.
Analysis
I. Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a jury instruction on voluntary
intoxication. We disagree.
On appeal, arguments “challenging the trial court’s
decisions regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo by
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this Court.” State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466,
675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009). “The trial court must give a
requested instruction when supported by the evidence in the
case.” State v. Soles, 119 N.C. App. 375, 382, 459 S.E.2d 4, 9,
appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 655,
462 S.E.2d 523 (1995).
Before the trial court will be required to
instruct on voluntary intoxication,
defendant must produce substantial evidence
which would support a conclusion by the
trial court that at the time of the crime
for which he is being tried “defendant’s
mind and reason were so completely
intoxicated and overthrown as to render him
utterly incapable of forming a deliberate
and premeditated purpose to kill. In [the]
absence of some evidence of intoxication to
such degree, the court is not required to
charge the jury thereon.”
State v. Kornegay, 149 N.C. App. 390, 395, 562 S.E.2d 541, 545
(quoting State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 41, 361 S.E.2d 882,
888 (1987)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 355 N.C.
497, 564 S.E.2d 51 (2002). When determining whether the
evidence is sufficient to support an instruction on voluntary
intoxication, the evidence must be viewed “in the light most
favorable to defendant.” State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 348,
372 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1988).
Defendant relies on testimony by the State’s witnesses
tending to show that he was intoxicated and impaired to some
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degree on the night in question. Based on our review of the
record, we believe that while the evidence shows that Defendant
was intoxicated, the evidence falls short of showing that at the
time of the shooting, Defendant was intoxicated to such a degree
as to render him utterly incapable of forming the requisite
intent to commit the crimes. To the contrary, the record shows
that Defendant (1) returned to the residence with a loaded gun
after a physical altercation with Joel; (2) stated that “he was
going to leave Joel dead in the road”; (3) fired the gun three
times at point blank range; and (4) hit Joel with all three
shots. Moreover, after shooting Joel, Defendant was able to
recognize the gravity of what he had done, admitting to law
enforcement officers that he had shot his son and stating that
he felt bad for having done so.
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Defendant, we conclude that he failed to produce sufficient
evidence to show that at the time of the shooting, he was so
completely intoxicated that he was utterly incapable of forming
the requisite intent to commit the crimes for which he was
convicted. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing
to give an instruction on voluntary intoxication.
Defendant takes issue with the trial court’s statement that
it was not “convinced” that Defendant had demonstrated that he
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was utterly incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit
the crimes charged, arguing that the trial court usurped the
jury’s fact-finding role. Defendant contends that the trial
court need not itself be convinced that Defendant’s intoxication
rendered him utterly incapable of forming the requisite intent,
and that instead, the court need only determine whether there
was substantial evidence that Defendant was utterly incapable of
forming the requisite intent. However, in order to be entitled
to an instruction on voluntary intoxication, a defendant “must
produce substantial evidence which would support a conclusion by
the judge that he was so intoxicated that he could not form a
deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.” Mash, 323 N.C. at
346, 372 S.E.2d at 536 (emphasis added).
Therefore, we are satisfied the trial court did not err in
stating that it was not convinced that Defendant had met his
burden of production. Accordingly, Defendant’s argument on this
issue is overruled.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant next contends that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant’s argument is two-fold. He
first asserts that his trial counsel provided inadequate
representation by promising in his opening statement that the
jury would not hear any evidence of intent by Defendant to
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commit the crimes for which he was charged despite the existence
of ample circumstantial evidence of Defendant’s intent to kill
Joel. Defendant also argues that his counsel’s error was
compounded when counsel elicited testimony from Joel regarding
whether he believed Defendant was trying to kill him.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show: (1) “that counsel’s performance was
deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 562, 324 S.E.2d
241, 248 (1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our
Supreme Court has further explained that “[t]he fact that
counsel made an error, even an unreasonable error, does not
warrant reversal of a conviction unless there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have
been a different result in the proceedings.” Id. at 563,
324 S.E.2d at 248. “Thus, if a reviewing court can determine at
the outset that there is no reasonable probability that in the
absence of counsel’s alleged errors the result of the proceeding
would have been different, then the court need not determine
whether counsel’s performance was actually deficient.” Id. at
563, 324 S.E.2d at 249.
In light of the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt,
we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the
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outcome of Defendant’s trial would have been different had
defense counsel not engaged in the actions complained of by
Defendant. The evidence at trial showed that after a physical
altercation with Joel and being asked to leave the residence
where Joel was present, Defendant continued to send Joel
antagonistic text messages. Defendant then returned with a
loaded gun in his coat pocket and stated “he was going to leave
Joel dead in the road.” Defendant shot Joel three times at
point blank range and then calmly walked back to his truck and
drove away. Following the shooting, Defendant realized the
gravity of his actions and admitted to law enforcement officers
that he had shot Joel. Based on the abundant evidence of guilt
presented at trial, we conclude that Defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim lacks merit.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude that Defendant received a
fair trial free from error.
NO ERROR.
Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).