An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-1027
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 15 April 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
H.L.M., T.D.M. Caldwell County
Nos. 12 JT 146-47
Appeal by respondent mother from orders entered 26 June
2013 by Judge Mark L. Killian in Caldwell County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 March 2014.
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee father.
Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant mother.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Respondent mother appeals from the orders entered in this
private proceeding terminating her parental rights to two
children. On appeal, Respondent contends the trial court made
insufficient findings of fact to support both the grounds for
termination and the conclusion that termination of her rights
was in the juveniles’ best interests. We vacate the termination
order and remand the matter.
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Petitioner father and respondent are the biological parents
of the juveniles, who were born in 2001 and 2005. On 19
December 2011, the parties reached a consent agreement regarding
custody of the juveniles. The consent order provided that
petitioner would have primary custody of the juveniles, that
neither party would be required to pay child support, and that
respondent would have visitation with the juveniles, subject to
mutually agreeable conditions.
On 3 October 2012, petitioner filed petitions to terminate
respondent’s parental rights alleging she had willfully
abandoned and failed to support the juveniles. The matter came
on for hearing on 1 May 2013 in Caldwell County District Court’s
juvenile division. On 26 June 2013, the trial court entered
orders terminating respondent’s parental rights to both
juveniles. After making findings of fact, the trial court
concluded that grounds existed to support termination and that
it was in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. Respondent gave timely notice of
appeal in writing on 25 July 2013.
Respondent’s first two arguments on appeal are that the
trial court’s findings of fact do not support its conclusions
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that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. We
agree.
At the adjudicatory stage of a termination of parental
rights hearing, the burden is on the petitioner to prove by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at least one ground
for termination exists. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2013);
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908
(2001). Review in the appellate courts is limited to
determining whether clear and convincing evidence exists to
support the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288,
291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal dismissed, disc. review
denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).
“For this Court to exercise its appellate function, the
trial court must enter sufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law to reveal the reasoning which led to the
court’s ultimate decision.” In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733,
736, 643 S.E.2d 77, 79 (2007). “When a trial court is required
to make findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact
specially.” In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d
334, 337 (2003) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, 52(a)(1)
(2001)). A termination order that omits findings of fact
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necessary to support the grounds for termination must be
reversed. See In re C.N.C.B., 197 N.C. App. 553, 558, 678
S.E.2d 240, 243 (2009).
In this case, the trial court’s findings of fact do not
adequately support the grounds for termination. The grounds for
termination are identified in one vague finding of fact in each
order:
5. The Respondent, the mother of the minor
child, is not a fit and proper person to
have custody of the minor child involved
herein and that the mother’s parental rights
in and to the said minor child should be
terminated on the grounds that:
The mother has willfully abandoned the child
for at least six consecutive months
immediately [sic] filing of the petition.
[Respondent], the child’s mother, has not
seen the child or provided support for the
minor child for the last six (6) months.
The trial court’s orders sufficiently recite the statutory
grounds for terminating parental rights enumerated in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2013). See In re L.M.T., ___ N.C. ___,
___, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013) (“The trial court’s written
findings must address the statute’s concerns, but need not quote
its exact language.”). However, we hold that the trial court’s
findings of fact do not shed light on the reasoning supporting
either ground. In fact, the trial court’s orders are devoid of
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any findings describing respondent’s specific actions or
omissions that support its conclusion that respondent willfully
abandoned the juveniles or failed to provide adequate support
for the children. Instead, the trial court made only a few
findings describing the history of the case, and then set forth
its ultimate findings related to the grounds for termination.
These findings are insufficient to permit appellate review of
the termination orders. Accordingly, we vacate the termination
orders and remand the matter so that the trial court may, if
supported by sufficient evidence, enter new adjudication and
disposition orders containing sufficient findings of fact.
Because we vacate the adjudication of both grounds
supporting termination and remand the matter, we need not
address respondent’s argument pertaining to disposition.
However, we note that the trial court is required to make
findings addressing the relevant factors set out in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2013).
VACATED and REMANDED.
Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).