NO. COA11-548-2
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 April 2014
MICHAEL A. GREEN and DANIEL J.
GREEN,
Plaintiffs,
v. Guilford County
No. 2006-CVS-12622
JACK L. FREEMAN, JR., CORINNA W.
FREEMAN, PIEDMONT CAPITAL
HOLDING OF NC, INC., PIEDMONT
EXPRESS AIRWAYS, INC., PIEDMONT
SOUTHERN AIR FREIGHT, INC., AND
NAT GROUP, INC.,
Defendants,
v.
LAWRENCE J. D’AMELIO, III,
Third-Party Defendant.
Appeal by defendant Corinna Freeman and cross-appeal by
plaintiffs from order entered 8 July 2010 and judgment entered 2
June 2010 and by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court,
Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 November
2011. By opinion entered 4 September 2012, this Court affirmed
the trial court’s orders. By opinion entered 8 November 2013,
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed this Court’s opinion
and remanded for consideration of additional issues.
Thomas B. Kobrin, for plaintiff-appellants.
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Forman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T. Keith Black, Gavin J.
Reardon, and Elizabeth Klein, for defendant-appellant
Corinna Freeman.
STROUD, Judge.
This case comes to us on remand from the North Carolina
Supreme Court, which reversed this Court’s prior opinion and
remanded for us to consider the issue of agency. We affirm the
trial court’s order allowing defendant Corinna’s motion for
directed verdict on the issue of agency.
I. Background
The relevant background facts have been laid out by our
Supreme Court in Green v. Freeman, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 749 S.E.2d
262, 265-67 (2013) (Green I), and we will not repeat them here.
The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs’ evidence on breach of
fiduciary duty was insufficient as a matter of law, but remanded
for this Court to consider whether the trial court erred in
allowing defendant Corinna Freeman’s motion for directed verdict
on an agency theory of liability and piercing the corporate
veil. Id. at ___, 749 S.E.2d at 271.
II. Agency and Piercing the Corporate Veil
To hold Corinna personally liable for the actions of the
corporation,
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plaintiffs must present evidence of three
elements:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete
stock control, but complete domination,
not only of finances, but of policy and
business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction
had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetrate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or a
dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of [a] plaintiff’s legal
rights; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of
duty must proximately cause the injury
or unjust loss complained of.
Id. at ___, 749 S.E.2d at 270 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
The Supreme Court has already held that plaintiffs
presented sufficient evidence on the first element. It remanded
to this Court for us to consider whether plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence on the other two elements. The only
remaining issue to be considered is that of agency. Plaintiffs
argue that the trial court erred in allowing defendant Corinna’s
motion for directed verdict on an agency theory because there
was evidence that Jack Freeman, her son, was her agent.
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We conclude that, even assuming the 2001 letter created an
agency relationship, it was an agency relationship between the
Piedmont companies and Jack, not between Corinna and Jack.
Although the Supreme Court held that it was proper to pierce the
corporate veil, plaintiffs only argue that Jack was Corinna’s
personal agent, not that he was an agent of the corporation, and
that piercing the corporate veil therefore makes Corinna liable
for his acts. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order
directing verdict on the issue of agency.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review of directed verdict
is whether the evidence, taken in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, is
sufficient as a matter of law to be
submitted to the jury. When determining the
correctness of the denial for directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the question is whether there is
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury
verdict in the non-moving party’s favor or
to present a question for the jury.
Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322-23, 411 S.E.2d 133,
138 (1991) (citations omitted).
B. Analysis
Agency, like piercing the corporate veil, is not itself a
cause of action; it is “the relationship that arises from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
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shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act.” Outer Banks Contractors, Inc. v.
Daniels & Daniels Const., Inc., 111 N.C. App. 725, 730, 433
S.E.2d 759, 762 (1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“Agency is a fact to be proved as any other, and where
there is no evidence presented tending to establish an agency
relationship, the alleged principal is entitled to a directed
verdict.” Albertson v. Jones, 42 N.C. App. 716, 718, 257 S.E.2d
656, 657 (1979); Outer Banks Contractors, Inc., 111 N.C. App. at
730, 433 S.E.2d at 762 (“The presence of a principal-agent
relationship is a question of fact for the jury when the
evidence tends to prove it; a question of law for the trial
court if the facts lead to only one conclusion.”).
To establish an agency relationship, “[t]he principal must
intend that the agent shall act for him, the agent must intend
to accept the authority and act on it, and the intention of the
parties must find expression either in words or conduct between
them.” Ellison v. Hunsinger, 237 N.C. 619, 628, 75 S.E.2d 884,
891 (1953) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “An agency
can be proved generally, by any fact or circumstance with which
the alleged principal can be connected and having a legitimate
tendency to establish that the person in question was his agent
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for the performance of the act in controversy.” Munn v. Haymount
Rehabilitation & Nursing Center, Inc., 208 N.C. App. 632, 637-
38, 704 S.E.2d 290, 295 (2010) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
An agency relationship can impose vicarious liability on a
principal for the torts committed by an agent when he “is acting
within the line of his duty and exercising the functions of his
employment.” King v. Motley, 233 N.C. 42, 45, 62 S.E.2d 540, 543
(1950). “If the act of the employee was a means or method of
doing that which he was employed to do, though the act be
unlawful and unauthorized or even forbidden, the employer is
liable for the resulting injury . . . .” Wegner v. Delly-Land
Delicatessen, Inc., 270 N.C. 62, 66, 153 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1967).
Here, the claims against Jack—the purported agent—were fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair and deceptive business
practices.
Plaintiffs argue that Corinna made Jack her agent by
writing and signing the following letter, dated 30 November 2001
and entitled “RE: CORPORATE RESOLUTION”:
Dear Jack:
As of this date, November 30, 2001, please
be advised that I am delegating
responsibility and authority for making all
corporate, financial, operational, and
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administrative decisions for the company to
you.
You are free to delegate further in any area
of the business to persons you decide are
appropriate and qualified to insure the
smooth and successful operation of the
company.
Sincerely,
[signature]
Corinna Freeman
Chairperson
Although we agree that this letter and the other evidence
could establish an agency relationship, plaintiffs misidentify
the principal. This evidence, in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, shows that Corinna appointed Jack a general agent on
behalf of “the company” in her capacity as “Chairperson.” He was
empowered to make “all corporate, financial, operational, and
administrative decisions for the company.” Nothing in the 2001
letter—and no other evidence presented at trial—indicates that
Corinna appointed Jack as her personal agent or that she
intended to empower him to act on her own behalf in any way
other than as the corporate “chairperson.” If Jack was the
corporation’s agent, not Corinna’s, then the corporation, not
Corinna, would normally be liable for the torts committed within
the scope of his duties. See Green I, ___ N.C. at ___, 749
S.E.2d at 270 (“The general rule is that in the ordinary course
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of business, a corporation is treated as distinct from its
shareholders.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Holleman
v. Aiken, 193 N.C. App. 484, 504, 668 S.E.2d 579, 592 (2008)
(stating that “a principal is liable for the torts of its agent
which are committed within the scope of the agent’s authority”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Legally, there is a distinction between Jack’s actions on
behalf of the corporation and his actions purportedly as
Corinna’s agent, and it appears that this is the distinction
which the Supreme Court directed us to address:
In other words, if the trial court properly
dismissed plaintiffs’ agency claims, it is
irrelevant whether Corinna exercised
domination and control over the Piedmont
companies. On the other hand, if the trial
court erred in dismissing the agency claims,
the question remains whether plaintiffs may
recover against Corinna on those claims
through the piercing the corporate veil
doctrine. Therefore, we reverse and remand
to the Court of Appeals for a determination
of whether the trial court erred in granting
Corinna’s motion for a directed verdict on
plaintiffs’ agency claims for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty.
Green I, ___ N.C. at ___, 749 S.E.2d at 271.
Because the parties’ original briefs failed to address this
distinction, we ordered that the parties submit supplemental
briefing to address the issues on remand from the Supreme Court.
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They did so, but plaintiffs made no argument that Corinna is
liable for Jack’s actions as a corporate agent through piercing
the corporate veil, or on any other theory. It is not the duty
of this Court to construct arguments for appellants. Foster v.
Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162, 638 S.E.2d 526, 533, cert. and
disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 567, 650 S.E.2d 602 (2007).
Therefore, we address only the argument presented—that Jack was
Corinna’s personal agent empowered to act on her behalf. For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was insufficient
evidence that Jack was Corinna’s personal agent, acting under
actual authority.
Plaintiffs also argue that even if Jack did not have actual
authority to act as Corinna’s personal agent, he had apparent
authority to do so. “Apparent authority is that authority which
the principal has held the agent out as possessing or which he
has permitted the agent to represent that he possesses.” Pet,
Inc. v. University of North Carolina, 72 N.C. App. 128, 135, 323
S.E.2d 745, 750 (1984) (citation, quotation marks, and ellipses
omitted). Plaintiffs introduced no evidence that Corinna ever
made any representations to them, let alone any representations
that Jack had authority to act on her behalf. Plaintiffs failed
to show that Corinna otherwise acted in such a way as to convey
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to plaintiffs the idea that Jack had authority to act on her
behalf. Jack’s out-of-court representations about his authority
to act for Corinna are irrelevant. See Dailey v. Integon General
Ins. Corp., 75 N.C. App. 387, 399, 331 S.E.2d 148, 156 (noting
that “the general rule is that neither the fact nor the extent
of an agency relationship can be proved by the out-of-court
statements of an alleged agent.”), disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C.
664, 336 S.E.2d 399 (1985); Munn, 208 N.C. App. at 639, 704
S.E.2d at 296 (“The scope of an agent’s apparent authority is
determined not by the agent’s own representations but by the
manifestations of authority which the principal accords to him.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Sturgill, 121
N.C. App. 629, 638, 469 S.E.2d 557, 563 (1996) (“Apparent
authority arises when a principal intentionally or by want of
ordinary care causes or allows a third person to believe that an
agent possesses authority to act for that principal.” (citation,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (emphasis added)).
Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to establish Jack’s
apparent authority to act as a personal agent of Corinna.
We conclude that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient
evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, that
Jack was Corinna’s personal agent empowered with either actual
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or apparent authority to sustain a jury verdict in their favor
on that theory. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not
err in granting defendant Corinna’s motion for directed verdict
on the theory of agency.
III. Exclusion of Deposition
Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court erred in
excluding the deposition of Corinna that they attempted to
introduce at trial under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 32.
Defendant Corinna objected on the basis that she was present and
available to testify, and that therefore reading the deposition
was unnecessary.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 32(a)(3) (2007), “[t]he
deposition of a party . . . may be used by an adverse party for
any purpose, whether or not the deponent testifies at the trial
or hearing.” Here, the trial court excluded the portions of
Corinna’s deposition offered by plaintiffs because
[i]t just stands in the face of reason that
you would have three co-defendants sitting
here in court and that you could get their
testimony just by introducing the
deposition, with no attempt at that point
for them to be cross examined.
It further sustained the objection under Rule 403 on the basis
that the evidence would confuse the jury, reasoning that there
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were multiple defendants and that the jury might be tempted to
use one defendant’s admissions against the others.
First, we conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of
Rule 32 was error. The plain language of the rule permits the
use of a deposition of a party by an adverse party for any
purpose, regardless of “whether or not the deponent testifies.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 32(a)(3). Indeed, this Court has
specifically held that a party’s presence at trial is not a
reason to prevent an adverse party from introducing her
deposition. Stilwell v. Walden, 70 N.C. App. 543, 547-48, 320
S.E.2d 329, 332 (1984). Therefore, the presence of defendant at
trial or her availability as a witness is wholly immaterial to
the issue of whether her deposition may be used against her.
Moreover, for purposes of Rule 32, it is irrelevant that
there were multiple defendants at trial. Rule 32(a) specifically
permits the use of a deposition “against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who
had reasonable notice thereof.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
32(a); see Floyd v. McGill, 156 N.C. App. 29, 40, 575 S.E.2d
789, 796 (holding that admission of one defendant’s deposition
was proper where she was present at the deposition, even though
she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her co-
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defendants), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 163, 580 S.E.2d 364
(2003). There is no dispute that all of the co-defendants
received adequate notice that her deposition would be taken and
that all were represented at the taking of Corinna’s deposition.
Cf. Craig v. Kessig, 36 N.C. App. 389, 400, 244 S.E.2d 721, 727
(1978) (noting that a party’s deposition can be used against
him, even if his co-defendants were not present when the
deposition was taken, and that were such a situation to arise in
a jury trial the proper remedy would be appropriate limiting
instructions), aff’d, 297 N.C. 32, 253 S.E.2d 264 (1979). We
conclude that the trial court erred in excluding the proffered
portions of Corinna’s deposition under Rule 32. Further, we
note, as there was some confusion on this point at trial, that
“there is no distinction between a discovery deposition and a
trial deposition[] under Rule 32.” Robertson v. Nelson, 116 N.C.
App. 324, 327, 447 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1994). If the trial court
had allowed plaintiff to use Corinna’s deposition testimony,
defendant would have had the opportunity to raise objections to
portions of the deposition testimony and the trial court could
have ruled upon those objections.
Second, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
the offered portions of Corinna’s deposition under the North
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Carolina Rules of Evidence, Rule 403. Under Rule 403, otherwise
admissible evidence may nonetheless be excluded if its probative
value “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice [or] confusion of the issues.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1,
Rule 403 (2007). We review a trial court’s application of Rule
403 for an abuse of discretion. Warren v. Jackson, 125 N.C. App.
96, 99, 479 S.E.2d 278, 280, disc. rev. denied, 345 N.C. 760,
760, 485 S.E.2d 310, 310-11 (1997). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision was unsupported by reason
and could not have been a result of competent inquiry.” Leggett
v. AAA Cooper Transp., Inc., 198 N.C. App. 96, 101, 678 S.E.2d
757, 761 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the only possible confusion raised by defendants was
the risk that the jury might use the information contained in
one defendant’s deposition against the other two defendants. The
questions and answers in the portions of Corinna’s deposition
offered by plaintiffs all concerned her role in the Piedmont
companies, her awareness of Jack’s actions, and her training and
experience in the cargo aviation business. We fail to see any
possible reason that admission of this evidence would lead the
jury to confuse the issues.
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The only possible confusion raised by defendants was that
the evidence given by Corinna might be used against her co-
defendants. But it is common sense that this is exactly the
reason that the plaintiffs would want to use the evidence, and
such use is explicitly permitted under Rule 32 when the co-
defendant was represented at the deposition which an adverse
party seeks to admit. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 32(a);
Craig, 36 N.C. App. at 400, 244 S.E.2d at 727. It is clear that
the trial court made its decision under a misapprehension of the
applicable law and not based upon the actual content of the
portions of the deposition which plaintiffs sought to admit.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding the proffered portions of Corinna’s
deposition under Rule 403.
Having concluded that the trial court erred in excluding
Corinna’s deposition, we must consider whether this error
requires reversal. “The exclusion of evidence constitutes
reversible error only if the appellant shows that a different
result would have likely ensued had the error not occurred. The
burden is on the appellant not only to show error, but to show
prejudicial error.” Latta v. Rainey, 202 N.C. App. 587, 603, 689
S.E.2d 898, 911 (2010) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses
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omitted). We hold that plaintiffs have failed to show that the
trial court’s error here was prejudicial.
First, the deposition testimony does not change the fact
that “[b]ecause plaintiffs never became shareholders, Corinna
could not have owed them, as shareholders, fiduciary duties.”
Green I, ___ N.C. at ___, 749 S.E.2d at 269. Second, Corinna’s
deposition does not indicate that she had any contact with
plaintiffs or that “they relied on or trusted in her when they
chose to invest in the Piedmont companies.” Id. Therefore, the
inclusion of the deposition would have had no effect on
plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claims. See id. Finally,
the inclusion of this deposition would have had no effect on the
agency theory of liability, given our discussion above. Nothing
in the deposition indicates that Corinna authorized Jack to act
on her behalf in a personal capacity. The deposition does
include additional evidence that Corinna continued to be
involved in the Piedmont companies after her 2001 letter and
that she delegated to Jack all of her corporate
responsibilities. But this evidence has no bearing on her intent
to make Jack a personal agent.
We conclude that plaintiffs have failed to show “that a
different result would have likely ensued had the error not
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occurred.” Latta, 202 N.C. App. at 603, 689 S.E.2d at 911. As a
result, we hold that although the trial court erred in excluding
Corinna’s deposition under Rule 32 of the North Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure and under Rule 403 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence, that error was not prejudicial.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s
order allowing defendant Corinna Freeman’s motion for directed
verdict on the issue of agency. We further conclude that
plaintiffs have failed to show that the trial court’s error in
excluding Corinna’s deposition was prejudicial.
AFFIRMED; NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Judges BRYANT and CALABRIA concur.