NO. COA13-263
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 7 January 2014
EMBARK, LLC and DAVID B. WHEELER,
Plaintiffs,
v. Mitchell County
No. 12 CVS 49
1105 MEDIA, INC.,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 17 October 2012 by
Judge C. Philip Ginn in Mitchell County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 28 August 2013.
Adams, Hendon, Carson, Crow and Saenger, P.A., by Robert C.
Carpenter, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Heather
Whitaker Goldstein, Larry McDevitt and David M. Wilkerson,
for defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
Defendant 1105 Media, Inc. appeals from an order (1) denying
its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to
plaintiff David B. Wheeler's claims and (2) deferring ruling on
its motion to dismiss as to plaintiff Embark, LLC's claims.
Because the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact support
its conclusion that (1) the exercise of personal jurisdiction
satisfies the requirements of our State's long arm statute, N.C.
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Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4 (2011), and (2) 1105 Media had sufficient
minimum contacts with the State to satisfy the requirements of due
process, we affirm the trial court's order as to Wheeler's claims.
We further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in deferring any ruling as to Embark's claims pending additional
discovery.
Facts
Plaintiff Wheeler is the president, founder, and sole
employee of plaintiff Embark, an event planning company organized
in Illinois on 25 September 2007. Defendant 1105 Media is a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
California. Neal Vitale is the president and Chief Executive
Officer of 1105 Media. David Myers is the Vice President of Event
Operations at 1105 Media.
On 29 March 2011, Wheeler, Embark, and 1105 Media entered
into a contract as a result of which Embark became a division of
1105 Media and Wheeler became an employee of 1105 Media and the
head of "Embark Events, a division of 1105 Media." The contract
became effective 1 April 2011 and was terminable by either party
after 1 January 2012 with 12 months notice. 1105 Media terminated
the contract on 31 August 2011 without providing Wheeler or Embark
any reason for the termination and refused to pay Wheeler's salary
or other benefits after 31 August 2011.
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Wheeler and Embark filed an action for breach of contract
against 1105 Media on 9 March 2012 in Mitchell County Superior
Court. 1105 Media moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction on 30 April 2012. On 17 October 2012, the trial court
entered an order denying 1105 Media's motion to dismiss as to the
claims of Wheeler, but withheld ruling on the motion to dismiss as
to the claims of Embark.
In support of its decision, the trial court made the following
findings of fact. Wheeler, the president and founder of Embark,
was a resident of Mitchell County, North Carolina, and had been
since August 2010. 1105 Media was at all relevant times a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in California.
Prior to entering into a contract with 1105 Media, Wheeler,
on multiple occasions, told Mr. Vitale, Mr. Myers, and other 1105
Media employees that he lived in and operated Embark from North
Carolina. He also provided 1105 Media with Embark business cards
that listed Embark's North Carolina address.
The contract between Wheeler, Embark, and 1105 Media was
negotiated via email and telephone communications, and Wheeler
wrote many of the emails and placed most of the telephone calls
from North Carolina. Although Wheeler invited Mr. Myers and Mr.
Vitale to North Carolina on several occasions, no officers or
agents of 1105 Media ever came to North Carolina to meet with
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Wheeler or for any other purpose related to the contract. The
contract was signed by the parties in Washington, D.C.
The contract was an employment contract between Wheeler and
1105 Media. The trial court found that it was unclear how the
contract affected Embark, but, at Mr. Vitale's suggestion, Embark
operated as a division of 1105 Media headed by Wheeler. The name
of the division, coined by Mr. Myers, was "Embark Events, a
Division of 1105 Media, Inc."
During his employment with 1105 Media, Wheeler lived and
worked in Mitchell County, North Carolina, where he performed 75%
of his duties for 1105 Media. All of his travel originated from
North Carolina, and he did not perform any of his duties for 1105
Media at any of their other offices. He maintained an office and
home phone number with a North Carolina area code, paid income and
property taxes in North Carolina, and maintained a personal North
Carolina checking and savings account. He received health care in
North Carolina that was covered by 1105 Media's health insurance
plan.
1105 Media paid for the rent and telephone bill for Wheeler's
office in Mitchell County, and, at Wheeler's request, shipped his
work computer to the North Carolina office. 1105 Media paid a
monthly allowance of $450.00 for Wheeler's car, which was titled
in North Carolina. 1105 Media directly deposited Wheeler's
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paycheck into his North Carolina checking account, paid North
Carolina payroll taxes, and had an "employer account number" with
the North Carolina Employment Security Commission. No one at 1105
Media ever brought up any concerns about Wheeler living and working
in North Carolina.
1105 Media marketed Embark Events and Wheeler as part of the
1105 Media brand and operation. It created specific 1105 Media
thank you cards for Wheeler that he sent to 1105 Media clients.
The cards contained Wheeler's name, the Embark Events logo, and
listed the company name as "Embark Events, a division of 1105
Media, Inc." The only address on the card was the North Carolina
office address.
Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that North
Carolina had jurisdiction over Wheeler's claims against 1105 Media
pursuant to North Carolina's Long Arm Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1-75.4(5), and that 1105 Media had sufficient minimum contacts
with North Carolina such that it had purposefully availed itself
of the jurisdiction of North Carolina.
The trial court also concluded that it was unclear whether
the court had jurisdiction over 1105 Media with respect to Embark's
claims. The order, therefore, denied 1105 Media's motion to
dismiss as to Wheeler's claims, but withheld ruling as to Embark's
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claims until the parties completed discovery. 1105 Media appealed
the order to this Court.1
I
"In order to determine whether North Carolina courts have
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court must
apply a two-step analysis: 'First, the transaction must fall within
the language of the State's "long-arm" statute. Second, the
exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.'"
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 193 N.C. App.
35, 39, 666 S.E.2d 774, 777 (2008) (quoting Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben
Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 364, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986)).
"The standard of review to be applied by a trial court in
deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) depends upon the procedural
context confronting the court." Banc of Am. Secs. LLC v. Evergreen
Int'l Aviation, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 690, 693, 611 S.E.2d 179, 182
(2005). When, as here, both the defendant and the plaintiff submit
affidavits addressing personal jurisdiction issues, "'the court
1Although the order denying 1105 Media's motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (2011) because 1105 Media
argued that it lacked minimum contacts with North Carolina. See
Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982)
("[T]he right of immediate appeal of an adverse ruling as to
jurisdiction over the person, under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–277(b)],
is limited to rulings on 'minimum contacts' questions, the subject
matter of Rule 12(b)(2).")
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may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective
parties, . . . [or] the court may direct that the matter be heard
wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.'" Id. at 694,
611 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e)). "If the trial
court chooses to decide the motion based on affidavits, '[t]he
trial judge must determine the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence [presented in the affidavits] much as a juror.'" Id.
(quoting Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 51 N.C. App. 363, 367, 276 S.E.2d
521, 524 (1981)).
The standard of review for this Court is "'whether the
findings of fact by the trial court are supported by competent
evidence in the record[.]'" Miller v. Szilagyi, ___ N.C. App.
___, ___, 726 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2012) (quoting Bell v. Mozley, ___
N.C. App. ___, ___, 716 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011), disc. review
denied, 365 N.C. 574, 724 S.E.2d 529 (2012)). Here, neither party
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court's findings of fact, and therefore, they are "'presumed to be
supported by competent evidence and [are] binding on appeal.'"
Id. at ___, 726 S.E.2d at 877 (quoting Bell, ___ N.C. App. at ___,
716 S.E.2d at 871).
A. Long Arm Statute
1105 Media first argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that jurisdiction was proper pursuant to North
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Carolina's Long Arm Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(5), which
states, in relevant part, that jurisdiction is proper in any action
which:
a. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to
the plaintiff or to some third party for
the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant
to perform services within this State or
to pay for services to be performed in
this State by the plaintiff; or
b. Arises out of services actually performed
for the plaintiff by the defendant within
this State, or services actually
performed for the defendant by the
plaintiff within this State if such
performance within this State was
authorized or ratified by the defendant;
or
c. Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to
the plaintiff or to some third party for
the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant
to deliver or receive within this State,
or to ship from this State goods,
documents of title, or other things of
value; . . .
1105 Media argues that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1-75.4(5)(b) were not met because that section requires that any
services actually performed in North Carolina be "authorized or
ratified by the defendant." According to 1105 Media, since the
trial court made no findings as to whether 1105 Media authorized
or ratified Wheeler's performance in North Carolina, the trial
court's conclusion is not supported by its findings of fact.
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However, based on our review of the order, the trial court
did make sufficient findings supporting the conclusion that
Wheeler's performance was "authorized or ratified." The court
found that 1105 Media paid for Wheeler's North Carolina office
space, directly deposited Wheeler's paycheck into his North
Carolina checking account, paid North Carolina payroll taxes,
never brought up any concerns about Wheeler living and working in
North Carolina, created specific 1105 Media thank you cards with
Wheeler's North Carolina address for him to send to 1105 Media
clients, paid the telephone bill for Wheeler's North Carolina
office, and shipped a computer to his office. These findings are
more than enough to support the conclusion that Wheeler's
performance of services in North Carolina for 1105 Media was
authorized and ratified by 1105 Media.
In any event, although 1105 Media does not address N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(a) or (c), the trial court's findings of fact
also establish that the requirements for those subsections of the
statute are satisfied. As provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
75.4(5)(a), 1105 Media promised to pay Wheeler for the services
Wheeler was to perform under his employment contract in North
Carolina. Likewise, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-75.4(5)(c) is met by the
trial court's finding that 1105 Media shipped to Wheeler's North
Carolina office a work computer and directly deposited Wheeler's
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salary into his North Carolina bank account. Both the computer
and paychecks are "things of value." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
75.4(5)(c). See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Caccuro, 212 N.C.
App. 564, 567, 712 S.E.2d 696, 700 (finding payments sent from
employer to employee during employment relationship constituted
"thing of value" for purposes of long arm statute), appeal
dismissed and disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 367, 719 S.E.2d 623
(2011).
The trial court, therefore, properly concluded that
jurisdiction existed under North Carolina's long arm statute.
B. Minimum Contacts
Under the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if there exists
"sufficient 'minimum contacts' between the nonresident defendant
and our state 'such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 122, 638 S.E.2d 203,
210 (2006) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945)). More
specifically, "[i]n each case, there must be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws; the unilateral activity
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within the forum state of others who claim some relationship with
a non-resident defendant will not suffice." Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at
365, 348 S.E.2d at 786. Instead, the "relationship between the
defendant and the forum must be 'such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.'" Id. (quoting World–
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d
490, 501, 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980)).
"There are two types of personal jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction exists when the defendant's contacts with the state
are not related to the cause of action but the defendant's
activities in the forum are sufficiently 'continuous and
systematic.' Specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action
arises from or is related to defendant's contacts with the forum."
Skinner, 361 N.C. at 122, 638 S.E.2d at 210 (internal citation
omitted). Here, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss as
to Wheeler's claims based on specific jurisdiction.
For specific jurisdiction, the focus is on "the relationship
among the defendant, this State, and the cause of action." Tom
Togs, 318 N.C. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. In determining whether
minimum contacts exist, our courts examine several factors: "'(1)
the quantity of the contacts; (2) the quality and nature of the
contacts; (3) the source and connection of the cause of action to
the contacts; (4) the interests of the forum state, and (5) the
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convenience to the parties.'" Cambridge Homes of N.C. Ltd. P'ship
v. Hyundai Constr., Inc., 194 N.C. App. 407, 412-13, 670 S.E.2d
290, 295-96 (2008) (quoting Cooper v. Shealy, 140 N.C. App. 729,
734, 537 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (2000)). "'A contract alone may
establish the necessary minimum contacts where it is shown that
the contract was voluntarily entered into and has a 'substantial
connection' with this State.'" Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App.
at 696, 611 S.E.2d at 184 (quoting Williamson Produce, Inc. v.
Satcher, 122 N.C. App. 589, 594, 471 S.E.2d 96, 99 (1996)).
In Better Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App. 498, 499,
462 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1995), this Court held that there was personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants for breach of a contract
to purchase a North Carolina business. The plaintiff in Better
Business was a "Florida corporation with an office and place of
business in Forsyth County, North Carolina." Id. It sold an
operating division of its company, which had sales offices in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Roanoke, Virginia, to a Virginia
corporation owned by the defendants. Id. After the merger, the
North Carolina sales office "continued to do all of the
administrative work necessary to service the Winston-Salem
operation," and generated half of the company's sales. Id. at
501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.
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In its due process analysis, this Court noted that the "active
negotiations to purchase a North Carolina business, some of which
were conducted in North Carolina, demonstrate a purposeful attempt
by defendants to avail themselves of the privilege of conducting
business in this State." Id. at 500, 462 S.E.2d at 834. The Court
found it insignificant that one of the individual defendants had
never stepped foot in North Carolina or personally conducted or
managed any of the North Carolina activities, concluding instead
that "jurisdiction here is based on the benefits received by
defendants from the underlying contract which has a substantial
connection with North Carolina." Id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.
We believe that the facts here parallel those in Better
Business. The trial court's findings show that 1105 Media
voluntarily entered into a contract whereby it created a division
of its company that had an office and head of operations in North
Carolina. 1105 Media negotiated the contract knowing that Wheeler
was a resident of North Carolina and that Embark was operated out
of North Carolina.2 1105 Media's proposal to make Embark a division
of 1105 Media and hire Wheeler to head the division "demonstrate[s]
2Defendant argues that the trial court made no findings as to
1105 Media's knowledge that Wheeler resided in and operated Embark
from North Carolina. We disagree. The trial court's finding of
fact that Wheeler told 1105 Media's officers that he lived in North
Carolina and operated Embark from this State is a sufficient
finding regarding 1105 Media's knowledge of those facts.
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a purposeful attempt by [1105 Media] to avail [itself] of the
privilege of conducting business in this State." Id. at 500, 462
S.E.2d at 834.
Additionally, 1105 Media's performance during the course of
the contract further demonstrates that the contract at issue in
this case is materially indistinguishable from the one in Better
Business that this Court concluded had a substantial connection
with North Carolina. 1105 Media treated the North Carolina
operation as part of itself: it paid for the North Carolina office
rent and telephone and created 1105 Media thank you cards for
Wheeler to send to 1105 Media clients that identified "Embark
Events, a Division of 1105 Media, Inc." as having a North Carolina
address. As in Better Business, "jurisdiction here is based on
the benefits received by defendants from the underlying contract
which has a substantial connection with North Carolina." Id. at
501, 462 S.E.2d at 834.
Defendant attempts to distinguish Better Business on the
bases that (1) Embark was incorporated in Illinois and not North
Carolina; (2) no events were produced, performed, or contemplated
in North Carolina; and (3) no significant revenue was generated
from any operations of Embark Events. None of these purported
distinctions is material.
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Better Business focused not on the purchased business' state
of incorporation, but rather on the location of its offices and
where it did business. Id. at 500-01, 462 S.E.2d at 834. In this
case, after entering into the contract with Wheeler and Embark,
1105 Media established a division office in North Carolina and 75%
of Wheeler's services for 1105 Media were performed in North
Carolina. Compare id. ("After the purchase, Graphics Supply's
Winston-Salem office continued to do all of the administrative
work necessary to service the Winston-Salem operation, including
purchasing, shipping, bookkeeping, accounting, and accounts
receivable."). Where the events Wheeler arranged for Embark
actually took place -- as opposed to where Wheeler's services were
rendered -- is no more material than where the Better Business
clients were located or where their products where shipped.
Finally, although the Court noted in Better Business that the
defendants did financially benefit from the Winston-Salem office,
id. at 501, 462 S.E.2d at 834, the Court did not hold that a
generation of revenues was necessary. The focus was on "the
benefits received by defendants from the underlying contract."
Id. Here, those benefits were Wheeler's services, 75% of which
were rendered in North Carolina. Accordingly, under Better
Business, the trial court properly concluded that 1105 Media had
sufficient minimum contacts with respect to Wheeler's claims. See
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also Brickman v. Codella, 83 N.C. App. 377, 384, 350 S.E.2d 164,
168 (1986) (finding personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendant where defendant's contacts with State "were
'purposefully directed' toward [plaintiff] in order to obtain his
financial assistance with a new business venture whereby
[defendant] sought personal commercial benefit" (emphasis added)).
Moreover, where the cause of action is a breach of contract,
the substantial performance of the contract by the plaintiff in
the forum state with the defendant's knowledge, permission, or
endorsement is a factor weighing in favor of a finding of specific
jurisdiction over the defendant. Here, 1105 Media employed Wheeler
as the head of a division of its company and marketed Wheeler and
Embark as part of the 1105 Media brand and operation. With 1105
Media's knowledge and, therefore, its permission, Wheeler
performed 75% of his duties under the contract from North Carolina.
See Chapman v. Janko, U.S.A., Inc., 120 N.C. App. 371, 373, 462
S.E.2d 534, 536 (1995) (finding jurisdiction over non-resident,
non-domesticated corporation in action for breach of contract for
consultation services by resident plaintiff where plaintiff
performed substantial services for corporation in North Carolina
and corporation listed plaintiff as a "'U.S.A. sales rep'" on its
own letterhead, even though employer had no employees residing in
North Carolina, only contacted plaintiff through telephone,
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letter, or outside North Carolina, and contacts involved
negotiations only); Dataflow Cos. v. Hutto, 114 N.C. App. 209,
213, 441 S.E.2d 580, 582-83 (1994) (finding personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants for breach of contract where supplies
were shipped to defendants from plaintiff's North Carolina office,
plaintiff spent considerable time engineering and designing
computer system in North Carolina, and defendants sent payments to
North Carolina office).
However, 1105 Media vigorously argues that Wheeler was simply
a telecommuting employee and that this Court should adopt the
reasoning of other courts that have held that when a telecommuting
employee brings suit against his out-of-state employer in an action
related to the employment relationship, the employer's withholding
of state payroll taxes and payment of unemployment insurance to
the forum state, alone, is not enough to establish purposeful
availment or minimum contacts with that state. In support of this
argument, defendant cites Slepian v. Guerin, 172 F.3d 58, 1999 WL
109676, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 1999)
(unpublished).3
31105 Media also cites Waldron v. Atradius Collections, Inc.,
No. 1:10-cv-551, 2010 WL 2367392, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145275 (D.
Md. June 9, 2010), another unpublished opinion. The district
court, however, declined to decide the question of personal
jurisdiction and instead simply transferred venue from Maryland to
Illinois. 2010 WL 2367392, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145275,
at *9-*10.
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In Slepian, the Court, in considering a telecommuting
employee's lawsuit, held it did not have personal jurisdiction
over the defendant employer because the defendant's actions toward
the forum state amounted to nothing more than an "accommodation of
[the plaintiff's] choice of residence." 1999 WL 109676, at *2,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371, at *7. Here, however, the circumstances
do not involve a mere telecommuting employee and, therefore, we
need not consider whether North Carolina should adopt the Slepian
reasoning.
In this case, the trial court found that Wheeler did not
simply work from home, but rather worked out of his "1105 Media
office" in Mitchell County, North Carolina -- an office paid for
by 1105 Media and constituting a traditional work site of 1105
Media. See Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill., 240 S.W.3d 220,
225 (Tenn. 2007) ("An employee telecommutes when he or she takes
advantage of electronic mail, internet, facsimile machines and
other technological advancements to work from home or a place other
than the traditional work site.").
More importantly, the trial court's findings establish that
1105 Media's actions were not merely an accommodation to Wheeler's
choice of residence, but rather a result of 1105 Media's own
initiative to create an operating division and office in North
Carolina in an ongoing and mutually beneficial business
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relationship. See Sheets v. Integrated Info. Util. Sys., Inc.,
No. CIV. 98-1328-KI, 1999 WL 417274, at *1, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9719, at *2-*3 (D. Or. June 17, 1999) (declining to follow lower
court's recommendation in Slepian and finding jurisdiction over
out-of-state corporation in action for breach of employment
contract of telecommuter where employer initiated contact with
employee, and employee's residence in forum state was, at least in
part, for convenience of employer due to employer's financial
concerns and inability to pay for employee's relocation).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing
to make a finding as to which party initiated contact. While this
is a relevant factor to the minimum contacts analysis, our Supreme
Court has noted that "[n]o single factor controls, but they all
must be weighed in light of fundamental fairness and the
circumstances of the case." B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Tire King of
Greensboro, Inc., 80 N.C. App. 129, 132, 341 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1986).
Additionally, "Rule 52(a)(1) [of the Rules of Civil Procedure]
does not require the trial court to recite all of the evidentiary
facts; it is required only to find the ultimate facts, i.e., those
specific material facts which are determinative of the questions
involved in the action and from which an appellate court can
determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence and,
in turn, support the conclusions of law reached by the trial
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court." Mann Contractors, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith
Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 772, 774, 522 S.E.2d 118, 120-
21 (1999).
In this case, the fact that Wheeler sent out the first email
was not a determinative factor in the minimum contacts analysis.
The trial court made sufficient findings of 1105 Media's contacts
with the State to support its exercise of jurisdiction. The court
was not then required to make findings of fact on issues that would
not alter the conclusion. The trial court could reasonably
determine that the question of whom initiated the contact was not
material in light of the facts of this case, where the parties
engaged in a balanced negotiation, the ultimate structure of their
business relationship was proposed by 1105 Media, and 1105 Media
entered into a contract with the North Carolina plaintiffs
knowingly, voluntarily, and for their own economic benefit. We,
therefore, hold that the trial court did not err in concluding
that 1105 Media had purposeful minimum contacts with North
Carolina.
Once a court finds that a defendant has established minimum
contacts with the forum State, it must consider those contacts in
light of (1) the interests of North Carolina and (2) the
convenience of the forum to the parties. We note, however, that
"once the first prong of purposeful minimum contacts is satisfied,
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the defendant will bear a heavy burden in escaping the exercise of
jurisdiction based on other factors." Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C.
App. at 701, 611 S.E.2d at 187.
With respect to North Carolina's interest, "[i]t is generally
conceded that a state has a 'manifest interest' in providing its
residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries
inflicted by out-of-state actors." Tom Togs, 318 N.C. at 367, 348
S.E.2d at 787. Here, Wheeler, a resident of North Carolina, has
been injured by 1105 Media's alleged breach of contract, the
damaging effect of which is felt in this State. See Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. Barnett, 76 N.C. App. 605, 609, 334 S.E.2d 91, 94 (1985)
(finding that damaging effect of tort felt in North Carolina was
a factor supporting exercise of jurisdiction).
As for the convenience of the parties, litigating in North
Carolina would not be convenient for 1105 Media, but, by the same
token, litigation in another state would not be convenient for
Wheeler. The record does "not indicate that any one State would
be more convenient to all of the parties and witnesses than
another." Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at 700, 611 S.E.2d at
186. See Climatological Consulting Corp. v. Trattner, 105 N.C.
App. 669, 675, 414 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1992) (holding that although
three of defendant's material witnesses were located in
Washington, D.C., "this fact is counterbalanced by the fact that
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plaintiff's materials and offices are located here[,]" and "North
Carolina is a convenient forum to determine the rights of the
parties").
Finally, with respect to the fairness of this State's
exercising jurisdiction, "[i]t is well settled that a defendant
need not physically enter North Carolina in order for personal
jurisdiction to arise." Better Bus., 120 N.C. App. at 501, 462
S.E.2d at 834. Moreover, 1105 Media has not "pointed to any
disparity between plaintiff[s] and itself which might render the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over it unfair." Tom Togs, 318
N.C. at 368, 348 S.E.2d at 787.
We, therefore, hold that the contacts in this case rose to
the level satisfying the constitutional minimum under the Due
Process Clause necessary in order to justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over 1105 Media. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court's order denying 1105 Media's motion to dismiss
Wheeler's claims.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in limiting
its ruling to Wheeler's claims and withholding ruling on 1105
Media's motion to dismiss with respect to Embark's claims.
Defendant points out that the jurisdictional analysis does not
consider a plaintiff's contacts with North Carolina, but rather
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"the relationship among the defendant, this State, and the cause
of action." Id. at 366, 348 S.E.2d at 786. It argues that, as a
result, the analysis as to Wheeler should apply equally to 1105
Media.
While under this reasoning, our holding in this opinion would
result in the conclusion that 1105 Media's motion to dismiss should
have been denied as to both plaintiffs, we do not agree with 1105
Media's analysis. The trial court did not defer ruling as to
jurisdiction over Embark's claims because of any confusion over
Embark's contacts with North Carolina, but rather because it was
unclear about the nature of Embark's cause of action. For specific
jurisdiction, the sole basis for personal jurisdiction in this
case, the focus is on "the relationship among the defendant, this
State, and the cause of action." Id. (emphasis added). Defendant
has not cited any authority suggesting that it was error for the
trial court to defer ruling when it had insufficient information
regarding the nature of Embark's cause of action. See also
Cambridge Homes of N.C., 194 N.C. App. at 412-13, 670 S.E.2d at
295-96 (holding that trial court, in determining minimum contacts,
should consider, among other factors, "'the source and connection
of the cause of action to the contacts'" (quoting Cooper, 140 N.C.
App. at 734, 537 S.E.2d at 858)).
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In federal court, deferral of a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction pending discovery is within the discretion
of the trial court. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir.
1989) ("If the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual
questions, the court may resolve the challenge on the basis of a
separate evidentiary hearing, or may defer ruling pending receipt
at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional question.").
This standard of review is consistent with this Court's holding
that a trial court may choose either to hear a motion to dismiss
for lack of minimum contacts based on affidavits or "'the court
may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.'" Banc of Am. Secs., 169 N.C. App. at
694, 611 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 43(e)).
Because the trial court was unable to determine based on the
affidavits and pleadings the precise nature of Embark's cause of
action, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in deciding that the motion to dismiss as to Embark
should be heard based on deposition testimony that more fully
fleshes out that cause of action. Consequently, we also affirm
the trial court's order to the extent that it defers ruling on the
motion to dismiss as to Embark's claims.
Affirmed.
Judges ROBERT C. HUNTER and McCULLOUGH concur.