FOR PUBLICATION FILED
Sep 20 2012, 9:22 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JULIE P. VERHEYE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Mishawaka, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
NICOLE M. SCHUSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DARIUS JIGGETTS, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A03-1202-CR-59
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John M. Marnocha, Judge
Cause No. 71D03-0911-FB-00133
September 20, 2012
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Darius Jiggetts (“Jiggetts”) appeals the trial court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences following the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In February 2010, Jiggetts pleaded guilty to Class B felony burglary after
committing a home invasion. The following month, the trial court sentenced him to a
six-year suspended sentence with three years on probation. In July 2010, Jiggetts
violated the conditions of his probation, and the trial court sentenced him to six months
incarceration. When he was released, Jiggetts was returned to probation.
In July 2011, Jiggetts robbed a bank. As a result of the robbery, the State filed a
petition to revoke his probation a second time. In September 2011, Jiggetts was
convicted in federal court for the bank robbery. The federal court sentenced him for the
bank robbery conviction on January 9, 2012. Tr. p. 40. On January 20, 2012, the State
held an evidentiary hearing on the second petition to revoke probation. Following the
hearing, the trial court revoked Jiggetts’ probation, imposed the balance of his burglary
sentence, and ordered the burglary sentence to run consecutive to the bank robbery
sentence. Jiggetts appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
Jiggetts argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him. Specifically, his sole
contention is that the trial court improperly ordered the burglary sentence to run
consecutive to the bank robbery sentence. Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d), which
provides as follows, is dispositive:
If after being arrested for one (1) crime, a person commits another crime:
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(1) before the date the person is discharged from probation, parole, or a
term of imprisonment imposed for the first crime . . .
the terms of imprisonment for crimes shall be served consecutively
regardless of the order in which the crimes are tried and the sentences are
imposed.
Here, Jiggetts was on probation for the burglary conviction when he committed
the bank robbery. Under these circumstances, pursuant to the statute, the terms of
imprisonment for the two offenses must be served consecutively.
We addressed this issue in Harris v. State, 598 N.E.2d 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992),
trans. denied. There, Harris pleaded guilty to burglary in March 1991 and was placed on
probation for two years. Two months later, Harris committed another burglary and was
sentenced to fifteen years. After Harris was sentenced for the second burglary, the State
filed a petition to revoke his probation for the first offense. In January 2002, the trial
court revoked his probation and ordered that his sentence for the first offense be served
consecutively to the fifteen-year sentence for the second offense. Id.
On appeal, Harris argued that the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to run
consecutively. This Court explained that the “statutory mandate is plain, and it is simple.
When the circumstances described in [the statute] occur, the sentences of the offenses
shall be served consecutively.” Id. at 640. We further explained that “because sentence
was imposed upon the second offense before Harris’[s] probation had been revoked for
the earlier offense, the court was not only authorized, it was required, upon revoking the
probation to require that the sentences be served consecutively.” Id. The statute speaks
only to commission of another “crime” while on probation or parole, or during the term
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of imprisonment for the “first crime.” The language makes no distinction between a
federal conviction and a state conviction, and we see no logical reason to do so.
Here, as in Harris, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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Darius Jiggetts v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion