Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Aug 17 2012, 9:16 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
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APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
RONALD WILLIAMS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JODI KATHRYN STEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RONALD WILLIAMS, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1110-CR-616
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, Judge
Cause No. 49G03-9807-CF-123641
August 17, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Ronald Williams appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous
sentence. We affirm.
Issue
Williams raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Facts
In 1999, the trial court sentenced Williams to fifty-five years for murder, enhanced
by twenty years for his status as an habitual offender. Our supreme court affirmed
Williams’s conviction on direct appeal. See Williams v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1139, 1140-
41 (Ind. 2001). Williams then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-
conviction court denied. On appeal, we affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. See
Williams v. State, No. 49A04-0409-PC-482 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2005).
In October 2011, Williams filed a pro se motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Williams argued that one of the predicate offenses used to confirm his status as an
habitual offender was actually ineligible because it was his one and only drug offense.
The trial court summarily denied Williams’s motion, and he now appeals.
Analysis
Williams argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to correct
erroneous sentence. When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to correct
an erroneous sentence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and review such a
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decision for an abuse of discretion. See Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). An abuse of discretion will be found only when the trial court’s decision is
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. However, the
trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed under a de novo standard of review. Id.
The State provides three reasons to affirm the trial court’s decision. We agree
with all three. First, Williams’s claim may not be raised in a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. An inmate who believes he or she has been erroneously sentenced may file a
motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when
the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct
sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum
of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original
sentence.
A motion to correct erroneous sentence is appropriate when the sentence is “erroneous on
its face.” Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Robinson v. State,
805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004)). Other sentencing errors must be addressed via direct
appeal or post-conviction relief. Id. Furthermore, a motion to correct erroneous sentence
may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the formal
judgment of conviction, not from the abstract of judgment. Id. If a county does not offer
formal judgments of conviction, such as in Marion County where Williams was
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sentenced, then the abstract of judgment may act as an appropriate substitute for purposes
of making a claim. Id.
The abstract of judgment in Williams’s case is not facially erroneous. Williams
relies upon Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8(d)(3)(C), which provides that:
(d) A conviction does not count for purposes of this section as
a prior unrelated conviction if:
*****
(3) all of the following apply:
*****
(C) The total number of unrelated convictions that the person
has for:
(i) dealing in or selling a legend drug under I.C.
§ 16-42-19-27;
(ii) dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug (I.C.
35-48-4-1);
(iii) dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled
substance (I.C. 35-48-4-2).
(iv) dealing in a schedule IV controlled
substance (I.C. 35-48-4-3); and
(v) dealing in a schedule V controlled substance
(I.C. 35-48-4-4);
does not exceed one (1).
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Williams claims that his 1998 predicate offense of Class C felony possession of cocaine
was his lone drug offense and according to the foregoing provision, its use was prevented
as a predicate felony conviction for purposes of the habitual offender enhancement.
The abstract of judgment provides no insight into Williams’s claim. To prove
Williams’s claims, one would need to research his criminal history, which is not apparent
from the abstract of judgment. The narrow confines of the procedure for a motion to
correct erroneous sentence are to be strictly applied, and any required review of a
criminal history is not included within the purview of a motion to correct erroneous
sentence. See Hoggatt v. State, 805 N.E.2d 1281, 1282-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
the use of motion to correct erroneous sentence improper where the sentencing error was
not evident on the face of the abstract of judgment), trans. denied.
Second, Williams pled guilty to being a habitual offender and admitted both to the
factual basis and to his status as an habitual offender. Williams, 749 N.E.2d at 1141.
Therefore, Williams may not directly challenge his habitual offender enhancement. “A
person who pleads guilty is not permitted to challenge the propriety of that conviction on
direct appeal.” Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004).
Finally, the subsection on which Williams relies was enacted in 2001. Williams
pled guilty to the habitual offender enhancement in 1999. “Subsequently enacted
ameliorative statutes are available only if the statute becomes effective before
sentencing.” Polk v. State, 822 N.E.2d 239, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
Subsection (d)(3) of the habitual offender statute does not apply to Williams.
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For all of the aforementioned reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Williams’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.
Conclusion
The trial court properly denied Williams’s motion to correct erroneous sentence.
We affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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