Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
FILED
May 09 2012, 9:27 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DEBORAH MARKISOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MARK BAILEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1110-CR-541
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Shatrese M. Flowers, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49G14-1107-FD-46546
May 9, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Mark Bailey appeals his conviction for Class D felony possession of cocaine.
Bailey contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because the State
failed to prove that he had either actual or constructive possession of the cocaine. The
State sufficiently proved the elements of possession of cocaine, including actual
possession. We therefore affirm Bailey’s conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
On June 29, 2011, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers Wanda
Perry and Justin Musser received a dispatch of a robbery in progress at 4505 South
Harding Street. They were advised that the suspect was leaving the scene in a red and
white pick-up truck with a silver stripe accompanied by another male. Officers Perry and
Musser responded, and when they arrived at the location, they observed a pick-up truck
leaving the scene that they thought matched the description. They stopped the vehicle
and approached with their weapons drawn. They ordered the three occupants of the truck
to raise their hands. The driver and female passenger complied, but Bailey, who was
sitting in the passenger’s seat, did not. Officer Musser continued to order Bailey to raise
his hands until Bailey finally complied.
Officer Perry ordered the driver and the female passenger out of the truck, after
which she handcuffed them and sat them on the curb. Officer Musser ordered Bailey to
exit the passenger’s side, but Bailey could not get the door open. Officer Musser told
Bailey that he was going to have to climb out the window and that once he did, Officer
Musser was going to put him straight on the ground. Officer Musser checked the area to
2
make sure there was nothing present that could injure Bailey, and he saw nothing on the
ground.
After Bailey came out of the window, Officer Musser handcuffed him and patted
him down for weapons. Officer Musser then rolled Bailey onto his left side; after he
rolled Bailey over, he saw a clear plastic baggie containing a white powdery substance on
the ground where Bailey had been laying. The white substance was later tested and
determined to be 0.2864 grams of cocaine.
The State charged Bailey with Class D felony possession of cocaine. A jury trial
was held, and at trial, Officer Musser testified that he actually saw the bag of cocaine fall
from Bailey’s clothing when he rolled him over. Tr. p. 71. Bailey was found guilty as
charged. The trial court sentenced Bailey to 1000 days at the Indiana Department of
Correction.
Bailey now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. In
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court does not reweigh the evidence
or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 923 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable
to the verdict and the reasonable inferences draw therefrom and affirm if the evidence
and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the
verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when a reasonable trier of fact would not be
able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
3
Class D felony possession of cocaine occurs when the defendant “without a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s
professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine (pure or adulterated) .
. . .” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a). A conviction for possession of contraband may rest upon
proof of either actual or constructive possession. Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280,
288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical
control over the substance, Walker v. State, 631 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and that
actual possession does not need to exist at the exact time as the law enforcement’s
discovery of the contraband, Wilburn v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ind. 1982).
Constructive possession, on the other hand, occurs when the defendant has both (1) the
intent and (2) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the subject
contraband. Atwood v. State, 905 N.E.2d 479, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Bailey contends that the State failed to show that he had either actual or
constructive possession of the cocaine. Finding that the State provided sufficient
evidence of Bailey’s actual possession of cocaine, we disagree.
At trial, Officer Musser testified that he checked the ground before Bailey was
removed from the truck and the area was clear. After Officer Musser rolled Bailey onto
his side, he saw the bag of cocaine on the ground where Bailey had been laying. Tr. p.
54. On cross-examination, Officer Musser also testified that he saw the cocaine fall from
Bailey’s clothing onto the ground. Id. at 71. Taking this evidence together, the jury
could reasonably infer that the cocaine found came from Bailey’s clothing and was
therefore in his actual possession.
4
This evidence is sufficient to support Bailey’s conviction for possession of
cocaine. We affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
5