Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
Apr 04 2012, 9:29 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Plainfield, Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
RACHEL ANN RUCH, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 57A03-1111-CR-498
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE NOBLE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert E. Kirsch, Judge
Cause No. 57D01-1105-FA-17
April 4, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rachel Ann Ruch appeals the sentence imposed upon her convictions of dealing in
methamphetamine, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 (2006), and possession of
paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3 (2003). We affirm.
ISSUE
Ruch raises one issue, which we restate as: whether her sentence is inappropriate.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ruch lived with her boyfriend, Kevin Ballard, in an apartment in Kimmell,
Indiana. On May 1, 2011, officers went to the apartment building to serve an arrest
warrant on Ruch. The officers found Ballard in his apartment and found Ruch hiding in
her car in the parking lot. The police found four bottles being used to make
methamphetamine in the car where Ruch was hiding, and a search of Ruch’s purse
revealed a device used for smoking methamphetamine. Subsequently, the police
obtained a search warrant for Ruch and Ballard’s apartment and found paraphernalia
associated with the production of methamphetamine.
The State charged Ruch with dealing in methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a
family housing complex, a Class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1; maintaining a
common nuisance, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13 (2001); possession of
methamphetamine, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 (2006); and possession of
paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3. Ruch pleaded guilty to
manufacturing methamphetamine as a Class B felony and possession of paraphernalia.
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Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Ruch to an aggregate term of fifteen years, with
five years suspended to probation. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Ruch’s sentencing challenge is governed by Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which
provides, in relevant part, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after
due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In
making this determination, we may look to any factors appearing in the record. Calvert
v. State, 930 N.E.2d 633, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A defendant must persuade the
appellate court that the sentence meets the inappropriateness standard of review.
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
We first look to the statutory ranges established for the classes of the offenses.
The statutory range for a Class B felony is between six and twenty years, with the
advisory sentence being ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5 (2005). Furthermore, a
defendant convicted of a Class A misdemeanor may not be imprisoned for more than one
year. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2 (1977). Ruch received a sentence of fifteen years for
dealing in methamphetamine, with five years suspended to probation. In addition, she
was sentenced to one year for possession of paraphernalia, to be served concurrently with
her sentence for dealing in methamphetamine.
We next look to the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender. The
nature of the offenses is found in the details and circumstances of the commission of the
offense and the defendant’s participation. See Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 642
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(Ind. 2010) (noting that the defendant’s crimes were “horrific and brutal”). The character
of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life and conduct. See Lindsey
v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 241-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (reviewing the defendant’s
criminal history, probation violations, and history of misconduct while incarcerated),
trans. denied.
Our review here of the nature of the offenses shows that Ruch, together with her
boyfriend, manufactured methamphetamine in her apartment and in her car.
Manufacturing methamphetamine is a dangerously explosive process. A state trooper
testified at Ruch’s sentencing that fifteen percent of the methamphetamine labs he has
investigated in the past three years have involved fires. Thus, Ruch endangered the other
residents of the apartment building.
Our review here of the character of the offender shows that Ruch, who was thirty-
three years of age at sentencing, has a lengthy, if not particularly severe, criminal history.
Since 2002, Ruch has accumulated one Class D felony conviction for fraud, two Class A
misdemeanor convictions for check deception, two class A misdemeanor convictions for
conversion, one Class A misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, two Michigan misdemeanor convictions for retail fraud, and one Michigan
misdemeanor conviction for larceny. These convictions are different from her current
convictions, but they demonstrate that Ruch refuses to follow the law. In addition, Ruch
has been placed on probation five times and has had her probation revoked on four
occasions.
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Ruch argues that she is a methamphetamine addict and that she manufactured the
drug for personal use only. The offense to which she pleaded guilty does not differentiate
between manufacturing methamphetamine to sell and manufacturing methamphetamine
for personal use, so her claim is unavailing. Ruch also argues that a shorter sentence,
followed by a longer period of probation, would allow her to get treatment for her
addiction. At her sentencing, Ruch conceded that she had previously attended court-
ordered drug treatment, but she ultimately abandoned her treatment and returned to using
methamphetamine. Given Ruch’s prior failure to respond positively to probation and
court-ordered drug treatment, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to choose to
impose a longer executed sentence. Ruch has failed to persuade us that her enhanced
sentence is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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