FILED
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Mar 30 2012, 9:41 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. of the supreme court,
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tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KURT A. YOUNG GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
IAN McLEAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DERRICK L. MYERS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1106-CR-508
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge
The Honorable Michael Jensen, Magistrate
Cause No. 49G20-0911-FA-94191
March 30, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Derrick Myers appeals the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 7, 2010, the trial court sentenced Myers to six years after he pled guilty to
Class B felony dealing in cocaine.1 Myers was to serve one year on work release, with the
other five years suspended, and two years on probation. Although Myers has not included his
Conditions of Probation in his Appendix, he does not contest that document required him to
refrain from criminal activity during his probationary period.
On February 16, 2011, the probation department filed a notice of probation violation
alleging Myers had been charged with one count of Class D felony intimidation2 and two
counts each of Class B misdemeanor harassment3 and Class A misdemeanor invasion of
privacy.4 On May 19, the trial court heard testimony from the victim, Richard Crawford, who
was the stepfather of Myers’ former girlfriend, April. The trial court found Myers committed
the acts alleged, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his
suspended sentence incarcerated.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature, and thus the State must prove a
violation by only a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e). The decision
to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952,
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.
2
Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1).
3
Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a).
4
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1.
2
956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. When
reviewing sufficiency of evidence supporting a probation revocation, we neither reweigh
evidence nor judge credibility of witnesses, but look at the evidence most favorable to the
State. King v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1389, 1393 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). If there is substantial
evidence of probative value demonstrating the probationer violated probation, revocation is
appropriate. Id.
Class D felony intimidation requires the State prove Myers communicated a threat to
another person with the intent that (1) the other person engage in an act against his will or (2)
the other person be placed in fear for a prior lawful act. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a). The
offense is a Class D felony if the threat is to commit a forcible felony. Ind. Code § 35-45-1-
1(b). Crawford testified Myers, during a barrage of calls Myers made to Crawford requesting
April’s phone number and payment of an alleged debt, said he “was going to slash the tires
on [Crawford’s vehicles], set them on fire and fill [Crawford’s] house full of holes with [an
automatic weapon] that [Myers] had.” (Tr. at 18.)
Class B misdemeanor intimidation requires the State prove Myers, with the intent to
“harass, annoy or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate communication”
made a telephone call to Crawford. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(1). Crawford testified Myers
called him 231 times over a course of five days, including fifty-five times in one hour on
January 5, 2011. When Crawford answered the phone, Myers would ask for April’s phone
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number or inquire about an alleged debt Crawford or April owed Myers. Crawford and April
repeatedly asked Myers to stop calling.
Regarding the intimidation charge, Myers argues the State did not prove his alleged
statement “was in retaliation for a prior lawful act, to cause another to perform an act against
his will, or to cause the evacuation of a structure or vehicle” pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-45-2-
1(a). Further, Myers claims the State did not prove he called Crawford repeatedly for an
illegitimate reason as required by Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2(a)(1). Myers’ arguments to the
contrary are invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. See King v. State,
642 N.E.2d at 1393. As the State presented sufficient evidence Myers committed two
criminal acts while on probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked
Myers’ probation and ordered him to serve his sentence incarcerated. See Hubbard v. State,
683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (“Proof of a single violation of the conditions of a
defendant’s probation is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke probation.”).
Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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