Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JILL M. DENMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Matheny, Hahn, Denman & Nix, L.L.P. Attorney General of Indiana
Huntington, Indiana
AARON F. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
FILED
Indianapolis, Indiana
Mar 20 2012, 9:28 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
JONATHAN R. STEPHENS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 85A05-1108-CR-446
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WABASH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Robert R. McCallen III, Judge
Cause No. 85C01-1103-FD-218
March 20, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCH, Judge
Jonathan R. Stephens (“Stephens”) pleaded guilty to theft1 as a Class D felony and
was sentenced to three years with one year suspended to probation for a total of two years
executed. Stephens appeals, raising the following issue: whether his sentence was
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the early morning hours of February 25, 2011, Stephens was in Blooey‟s bar in
Wabash, Indiana. At approximately two in the morning, Stephens noticed a laptop
computer sitting by the bar, and he “placed it underneath [his] jacket and walked out.”
Tr. at 28. The laptop belonged to the owner of Blooey‟s. After discovering that his
computer was missing, the owner reviewed the surveillance tapes, which showed a man,
later identified as Stephens, twice use the ATM in the bar and then take the laptop. Due
to Stephens‟s theft, the victim was left without access to his laptop for approximately five
months, and Stephens erased the memory on the computer and changed its operating
system. The victim used the laptop to run his business and, even after it was returned, he
could not use his backup external hard drive since Stephens reformatted the computer.
The State charged Stephens with theft as a Class D felony. During sentencing, the
trial court found that Stephens‟s criminal history and repeated unsuccessful attempts at
probation were aggravating factors and that his guilty plea was the sole mitigating factor.
Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the trial court
1
See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).
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sentenced Stephens to three years with one year suspended to probation for a total of two
years executed in the Department of Correction. Stephens now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
“This court has authority to revise a sentence „if, after due consideration of the
trial court‟s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.‟” Spitler v. State, 908 N.E.2d 694,
696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)), trans. denied. “Although
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) does not require us to be „extremely‟ deferential to a trial
court‟s sentencing decision, we still must give due consideration to that decision.”
Patterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1058, 1062-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Rutherford v.
State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). We understand and recognize the
unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. at 1063. The
defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his sentence is inappropriate. Id.
Stephens argues that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. He contends that his sentence should be
revised based on the facts that he was not the worst offender and that this was not the
most heinous offense. Stephens claims that this was not a particularly heinous theft as
there was no illegal entry, no threat of violence, and the laptop was returned to the owner.
He further asserts that, while he had a criminal history, his offenses were primarily drug
and alcohol related, and he has agreed to stop consuming drugs.
The nature of the offense is that Stephens stole a laptop computer belonging to the
owner of Blooey‟s bar. Because of this theft, the victim was without the laptop, which he
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used in order to run his business, for approximately five months. After he stole the
computer, Stephens erased the laptop‟s memory and reformatted the computer with a new
operating system. In doing this, he rendered the victim‟s backup hard drive unusable
upon its return. The victim estimated that it would take 120 hours of labor to restore the
computer, including manually creating two years‟ worth of business records and
inventories, restoring the original operating system, and reinstalling software. Stephens‟s
actions after stealing the laptop created a significant burden for the victim.
As to Stephens‟s character, the evidence showed that, since the age of fifteen, he
has almost continuously engaged in criminal acts. As a juvenile, Stephens was
adjudicated delinquent for committing theft. He was charged with four felonies and
twelve misdemeanors, which resulted in two felony convictions and six misdemeanor
convictions. Further, Stephens‟s criminal history shows that, when placed on probation
as a juvenile, he twice violated the terms of such probation, and as an adult, he violated
his probation four times. We therefore conclude that Stephens‟s three-year sentence with
one year suspended to probation was not inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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