Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MICHAEL V. LANE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Feb 06 2012, 9:10 am
IN THE
CLERK
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
MICHAEL V. LANE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1108-CR-462
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins, Judge
Cause No. CR-86-080E
February 6, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Michael V. Lane, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct
erroneous sentence. Because Lane alleged a sentencing error that requires consideration
of matters beyond the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous
sentence was not the appropriate vehicle for Lane to use. Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court properly denied Lane’s motion.
Facts and Procedural History
In 1987, Lane and his codefendant, Ricky Robey, were convicted of Class A
felony rape, Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, and three counts of Class A felony
kidnapping in Marion Superior Court. The trial court sentenced Lane to 100 years. Lane
and Robey appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court. Lane argued, among other things,
that his sentence was “manifestly unreasonable.” The Supreme Court did not reach the
issue, instead finding “that the trial court’s statement in support of the imposition of
enhanced sentences was insufficient.” Robey v. State, 555 N.E.2d 145, 151 (Ind. 1990).
The Supreme Court therefore remanded the case “to the trial court with instructions to
enter more specific findings, if any, to support the enhanced sentence or to reduce Lane’s
sentences to the statutory standard.” Id.
On remand in 1992, the trial court found aggravating circumstances and sentenced
Lane to 100 years. Appellant’s App. p. 8.
In 1997, Lane filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction
court denied. Id. at 19, 26. Lane appealed, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction
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court’s judgment in a memorandum decision. Lane v. State, No. 49A02-9804-PC-301
(Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1998), reh’g granted in part and denied in part, trans. denied.
In July 2011, Lane, pro se, filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence. He
argued that on remand the trial court “failed to comply with the Indiana Supreme Court’s
expressed statutory authority when resentencing [him] on individual and specific findings
supporting an increased sentence on aggravating factors beyond the thirty (30) year
presumptive.” Appellant’s App. p. 47. The trial court denied Lane’s motion to correct
erroneous sentence.
Lane now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Lane contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct erroneous
sentence. The State responds that because this alleged sentencing error is not clear from
the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous sentence is the wrong
vehicle in which to bring this claim.
An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to
correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not
render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written
notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his
counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion
to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of
law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15; see also Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008). The
purpose of this statute “is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal
process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State,
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805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a motion to correct
sentence may only be filed to address a sentence that is “erroneous on its face.” Neff, 888
N.E.2d at 1251 (citing Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786). Claims that require consideration
of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion
to correct sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Sentencing errors that are not facially
apparent must be addressed via direct appeal or post-conviction relief. Neff, 888 N.E.2d
at 1251. In addition, a motion to correct erroneous sentence may only arise out of
information contained on the formal judgment of conviction, and not from the abstract of
judgment. Id. However, if the particular county does not issue judgments of conviction
(at the time of the opinion in Neff only Marion County qualified), then the trial court’s
abstract of judgment will serve as an appropriate substitute for purposes of making the
claim. Id.
Here, Lane argues in his motion to correct erroneous sentence that on remand the
trial court erred in identifying aggravating factors. See Appellant’s App. p. 47
(specifically referencing trial court’s use of deadly weapon to enhance sentence).
Resolution of this issue requires us to go beyond the face of the abstract of judgment.
See Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 786-87 (noting that a claim that the trial court imposed the
maximum sentence in partial reliance upon improper aggravators was not appropriate for
a motion to correct sentence). Because the motion to correct erroneous sentence was not
the appropriate vehicle for Lane to use, the trial court properly denied Lane’s motion to
correct erroneous sentence.
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Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
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Michael v. Lane v. State of Indiana
Combined Opinion