Mummau, O. v. Mohler, J.

J-S48032-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

O. HOWARD MUMMAU, RAE W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MUMMAU, GERALDINE M. ZIMMERMAN, PENNSYLVANIA
AND ELI ZIMMERMAN,

Appellants

v.

JEFFREY D. MOHLER AND CLYMER &
MUSSER, P.C. CLAIR S. MUMMAU,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY IN FACT FOR IVA K.
MUMMAU, LAWRENCE N. MUMMAU,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF
IVA K. MUMMAU, I. BERNICE TAMKIN
AND GALEN S. SPICKLER,

Appellees No. 161 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order December 30, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No.: CI-06-04412

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2014

Appellants, O. Howard Mummau, Rae W. Mummau, Geraldine M.

Zimmerman, and Eli Zimmerman, appeal from the order of December 30,

second amended complaint with prejudice. After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S48032-14

December 30, 2013, supplemented as necessary for our review by the

family farm and the estate of Iva K. Mummau. Owen and Iva Mummau,

husband and wife, had eight children and owned a broiler chicken farm in

Mount Joy Township, Pennsylvania. Each of their children owned a 3.8%

their children re-conveyed their interests back to Owen and Iva. (See

Complaint, 12/19/06, at 6 ¶ 26, 7-8 ¶¶ 41-43). The other two siblings, O.

Howard Mummau and Geraldine M. Zimmerman, refused to re-convey their

interests. (See id. at 9-10 ¶ 52).

. Howard Mummau,

subdividing a portion of the farm zoned for residential use.1 (See id. at 6 ¶¶

30-32). On February 11, 1997, he received a notice letter terminating his

power to act as See id. at 16-17 ¶ 95).

fact, executed an agreement between him and his wife and Owen and Iva to

____________________________________________

1

record, O. Howard Mummau is also an attorney-at-law, who represents
himself and the other Appellants in this appeal.

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J-S48032-14

purchase the farm, with advice from attorney Jeffrey D. Mohler of the law

firm Clymer and Musser, P.C. (See id. at 4 ¶ 13-14). In January 1999,

Owen and Iva executed new wills which eliminated a marital bypass trust

from their previous wills. (See id. at 3 ¶ 17; see also Petition to Extend

Time in Which to File Complaint, 9/21/06, at 2-3 ¶ 10-11). In his new will,

estate to Iva, whom he appointed executor.

Owen died on March 13, 1999. The subdivision of the residential lots

was completed shortly thereafter. On May 23, 2000, Iva executed a codicil

to her will, assisted by Clair Mummau as attorney in fact and Jeffrey D.

Mohler. On February 22, 2000, Mohler filed a Petition for Partition of Real

a resolution to the fractional interests

in the farm and lots[ and to] reunit[e] the farm and lots into a single

partition action was filed in order to remove O. Howard Mummau and

Geraldine Zimmerman as record owners of the farm and residential lots due

to their respective 3.8% interests that they did not re-convey back to Owen

in 1985. (See Complaint, 12/19/06, at 26-27 ¶¶ 159-61). Appellants

demanded consideration for their interests in the farm, claiming that the

was to achieve the ultimate objective to effect a disinheritance of

[Appellants] by Iva Mummau and the acquisition of the farm by Clair at a

price he ha

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J-S48032-14

Complaint, 7/14/08, at 31 ¶ 179). Appellants did not attend a settlement

conference scheduled in February 2004. (See Complaint, 12/19/06, at 37 ¶

167(z)).

Eventually, Mohler, as representative for Iva K. Mummau, Clair

Mummau, family friend Galen Spickler, O. Howard Mummau, and Geraldine

in the farm and residential lots, and provided that Clair would buy the farm

for $402,000.00, thus settling their respective interests in the lots and the

farm. (See id. at 38-39 ¶ 168(j)). As a result, the partition action was

withdrawn, and in 2004, the farm was conveyed to Clair and Jean Mummau,

and then to their son, Kevin and his wife Stacey. (See id. at 39 ¶ 168(o)).

Appellants claim the sale price was well below fair market value. (See id. at

38-39 ¶ 168(j)).

Iva died on August 8, 2006. (See id. at 3 ¶ 7). Her sons Lawrence

Mummau and Clair Mummau were appointed executors of the estate. (See

id.

on September 16, 2006. (See Petition to Extend Time in Which to File

Complaint, 9/21/06, at Exhibit I).

pellants continued to

litigate this action. Eventually, on May 29, 2010, all eight children and six

grandchildren of Owen and Iva entered into a settlement agreement which

resolved all the objections and caveats raised by Appellants in their

challenges to See

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J-S48032-14

In re Estate of Iva K. Mummau, No. 1382 MDA 2013, unpublished

memorandum at Exhibit B, page 7 (Pa. Super. filed May 12, 2014)). The

settlement included a tortfeasor release and provided that

estates did not include the farm. (See id. at *2).

writ of summons in the instant case on May 4, 2006. (See Trial Ct. Op.,

12/30/13, at 1). As stated by Appellant O. Howard Mummau:

The gravamen of this case arises from . . . an underlying

Court brought by [Appellees Jeffrey D. Mohler and Clymer &
Musser, P.C.] as counsel in the name of Iva [K]. Mummau, but
initiated by Clair Mummau as her attorney in fact, against
[Appellants] in connection with the purported settlement of the
estate [of] Owen E. Mummau, Deceased, who was the father of
[Appellant], O. Howard Mummau.

(Petition to Extend Time in Which to File Complaint, 9/21/06, at 2 ¶ 6).

malicious use of process, abuse of process, tortious interference with

contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress by

outrageous conduct, and unjust enrichment/constructive trust, and

requested compensatory and punitive damages. (See generally Complaint,

12/19/06). Appellees filed preliminary objections. On January 26, 2007,

im for

another set of preliminary objections, and on June 25, 2008, the trial court

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J-S48032-14

dismissed with prejudice the intentional infliction of emotional distress count

in the amended complaint, granting Appellants leave to amend this claim

within twenty days. (See Order, 6/25/08, at unnumbered pages 1-3). On

July 14, 2008, Appellants filed a second amended complaint claiming fraud,

Appellees filed preliminary objections, and Appellants responded with

preliminary objections of their own. (See Second Amended Complaint,

7/14/08, at 35). Appellants then filed a motion to discontinue against all

defendants except Jeffery Mohler and Clymer & Mussler, PC, which the court

denied on November 4, 2009. (See Order, 11/04/09). Eventually, on

and sustained those of Appellees, dismissing the complaint. (See Order,

12/30/13). Appellants timely appealed.2

Appellants raise three questions for our review:

I.
second amended complaints when it granted, then revoked,
a complaint where
damages to be claimed are dependent upon an underlying case
now on appeal to this Court, where it made no finding in
disposing of preliminary objections that [Appellants] failed to
state a cause or causes of action, and failed to dispose of
preliminary objections for more than five years, without
explanation, claiming that [Appellants] were required to appeal
interlocutory orders within thirty days of entry?

____________________________________________

2

statement on February 18, 2014. The trial court entered a Rule 1925(a)
opinion on April 2, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P 1925.

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J-S48032-14

II.
discontinue their action against all defendants named except
Jeffrey D. Mohler and Clymer & Mussler, P.C., in 2009 where the
defendants whose discontinuance was requested were

of the action in its final order, inter alia, was its claim that the
case was a family dispute which it could not understand?

III.
reversed where it engaged in a pattern of procedural
manipulation in conjunction with the underlyin
case (on appeal in the Superior Court) including, inter alia, an ex
parte
defendants Mohler and Clymer & Musser, P.C. prior to disposition
of preliminary objections, denial of discovery requested by

as to defendants other than Mohler and Clymer & Mussler, P.C.,
while failing to dispose of preliminary objections for more than
five years without explanation in violation of the judicial code?

-5).

In their first issue, Appellants argue, inter alia, that the trial court

their complaints. (See -51). However, Appellants fail

to develop with citation to the record or relevant authority their assertion

that the trial court erred in revoking their extension of time to file their initial

complaint. (See -15, 17); see also Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a)-(c). Therefore, to the extent that we can discern the first issue as a

Our standard of review is as follows:

When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint
based upon preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer, we treat as true all well-pleaded material,
factual averments and all inferences fairly deducible

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J-S48032-14

therefrom. Where the preliminary objections will
result in the dismissal of the action, the objections
may be sustained only in cases that are clear and
free from doubt. To be clear and free from doubt
that dismissal is appropriate, it must appear with
certainty that the law would not permit recovery by
the plaintiff upon the facts averred. Any doubt
should be resolved by a refusal to sustain the

decision for an abuse of discretion or an error of law.

Further, this Court has noted the following with regard to review
on to sustain preliminary objections.

decision to sustain preliminary objections, we
examine the averments in the complaint, together
with the documents and exhibits attached thereto, in
order to evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred.
The impetus of our inquiry is to determine the legal
sufficiency of the complaint and whether the
pleading would permit recovery if ultimately proven.

regarding preliminary objections only where there
has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

, 924 A.2d 675, 679-80 (Pa. Super.

2007) (citations omitted).

This Court, during review of an order granting a demurrer,
may not supply a fact missing in the complaint. We are also
precluded from considering any conclusions of law or inferences
which are not supported by the factual allegations contained in
the complaint. This includes argumentative allegations or
expressions of opinion. And while it is true that allegations of
malice, intent and other conditions of the mind may be pled
generally, see Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b), such characterizations of
conduct, without supporting factual allegations, are insufficient.

, 647 A.2d 542, 552-53 (Pa. Super. 1994), affirmed, 676

A.2d 222 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted).

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J-S48032-14

First, Appellants assert that the court erred in dismissing their claims

for wrongful use of civil proceedings and malicious use of process regarding

the partition actio

was a termination

at 18, 22 (emphasis in

original); see id. at 17-40). We disagree.

Mi-

Lor, Inc. v. DiPentino, 654 A.2d 1156, 1157 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation

omitted).

A person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or
continuation of civil proceedings against another is subject to
liability to the other for wrongful use of civil proceedings:

(1) he acts in a grossly negligent manner or without
probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that
of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or
adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
based; and

(2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person
against whom they are brought.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351(a).

The burden of proof is prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8354 as follows:

In an action brought pursuant to this subchapter the
plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly
raised, that:

(1) The defendant has procured, initiated or continued the
civil proceedings against him.

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J-S48032-14

(2) The proceedings were terminated in his favor.

(3) The defendant did not have probable cause for his
action.

(4) The primary purpose for which the proceedings were
brought was not that of securing the proper discovery,
joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim on which the
proceedings were based.

(5) The plaintiff has suffered damages as set forth in
section 8353 (relating to damages).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8354.

Here, Appellants contend that the partition action was a wrongful use

of civil proceedings against them. It is well-

effect of a partition is to give each of [the] joint owners the possession he is

entitled to o Ramsey v. Taylor, 668 A.2d 1147,

1150 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Bernstein v. Sherman, 902 A.2d 1276, 1278 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, Appellants argue that they stated a prima facie

the partitio

partition action ended in withdrawal, constituting termination in favor of

that they retained two 3.8% interests in the farm, and that the litigation was

commenced in order

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J-S48032-14

(Second Amended Complaint, 7/14/08, at 31 ¶ 178). Thus, Appellees had a

right to partition, and probable cause to bring the partition action. See

Bernstein, supra at 1278. Because Appellees had probable cause,

Appellants cannot state a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8354(3); Mi-Lor, Inc., supra at 1157. Accordingly, the trial

court did not err in dismissing this claim.

the defendant instituted proceedings without probable cause, with malice,

De Salle

v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 398 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 1979) (citation

and footnote omitted). As previously discussed, Appellees did not lack

probable cause to bring the partition action, and thus Appellants could not

recover on this claim. See Burgoyne, supra at 679-80. Thus, the court

did not err in dismissing this claim.

Next, Appellants assert that the court erroneously dismissed their

part of [Appellees] whose purposes were not the legitimate object of a

Abuse of civil process is concerned with the perversion of a
process after it is issued. The Restatement (Second) of Torts

process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for
which it is not designed. To establish a claim for abuse of
process, it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a legal
process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a

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J-S48032-14

purpose for which the process was not designed, and (3) harm
has been caused to the plaintiff
the tort of abuse of process has been interpreted broadly and
encompasses the entire range of procedures incident to the
litigation process.

* * *

. . . [A]n essential element of the tort of abuse of process[ is]
that the process was used primarily for a purpose for which the
process was not designed. It is not enough that the process
employed was used with a collateral purpose in mind.

A cause of action for abuse of process requires some
definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or
aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the
process . . .[;] there is no liability where the
defendant has done nothing more than carry out the
process to its authorized conclusion, even though
with bad intentions.

Hart, supra at 551-52 (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in

original).

As previously discussed, Appellees initiated the partition action in

general allegation that Appellees

only actual, specific assertion of use of the litigation process against them is

s signature to the Petition

Id.). Rule

1023 was rescinded April 22, 2002, effective July 1, 2002, and thus we are

unable to discern what Appellants intend in arguing bad faith on this basis.

See Pa.R.C.P. 1023; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b). This claim does not merit relief.

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J-S48032-14

Next, Appellants contend that they stated a cause of action in fraud

fraudulently and unduly by said fraud induced her to become engaged in

litigation against [Appellants] and to change her testamentary instruments

Brief, at 40). We disagree.

To state a claim for fraud, Appellants must show:

(1) A representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at
hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or
recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent
of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance
on the misrepresentation; and, (6) the resulting injury was
proximately caused by the reliance.

Weston v. Northampton Pers. Care, Inc., 62 A.3d 947, 960 (Pa. Super.

2013), appeal denied

mistake sh

prima facie case of fraud, the recipient of the

misrepresentation must be the one to reasonably rely upon the

misrepresentation and to be damaged as a proximate cause of that

Joyce v. Erie Ins. Exch./Erie Ins. Co., 74 A.3d 157, 167 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Here, Appellants aver

Appellants were damaged as a result. (See Appellan -41).

allege that the recipient of the misrepresentation was the individual or entity

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J-S48032-14

damaged as a proximate cause of reasonable reliance upon the

misrepresentation Joyce, supra at 167. Thus, the court did not err in

dismissing this claim.

Next, Appellants allege that they have stated a cause of action for

concerning the actions of [Appellees] f

wrongful and tortious conduct Iva would have included Howard and

res

judicata from pursuing this claim.

The fundamental principle upon which [res judicata] is
based is that a court judgment should be conclusive as between
the parties and their privies in respect to every fact which could
properly have been considered in reaching the determination and
in respect to all points of law relating directly to the cause of
action and affecting the subject matter before the court. The
essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues
have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the present
parties had an opportunity to appear and assert their rights.

Chada v. Chada, 756 A.2d 39, 43-44 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation and

emphasis omitted).

A judgment upon the merits bars a subsequent suit upon the
same cause, though brought in a different form of action, and a
party therefore cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting
a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated.

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J-S48032-14

Dempsey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 653 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa. Super. 1995),

appeal denied, 663 A.2d 684 (Pa. 1995) (citation omitted).

the ultimate and controlling issues,

Appellants availed themselves of the opportunity to appear and assert their

rights. (See In re Estate of Iva K. Mummau, No. 1382 MDA 2013 (Pa.

Super. filed May 12, 2014)). Furthermore, a panel of this Court affirmed the

inter alia,

Appellants and the other Mummau children, which agreed that the family

relevant part:

WHEREAS, all the parties to this Agreement believe it will be in
the best interest of all parties hereto that all of the claims and
causes of action, either actual or potential, between and among
the parties to this Agreement be forever settled and resolved.

* * *

8. O. Howard Mummau and Geraldine M. Zimmerman shall
execute a joint tortfeasor release in the civil action filed by O.
Howard Mummau and Geraldine M. Zimmerman to No. CI-06-
04412 and currently pending in Lancaster County releasing Clair
S. Mummau, Laurence N. Mummau, Bernice Tamkin, Galen
Spickler, Kevin Mummau, Stacy Mummau and Clair S. Mummau
and Laurence N. Mummau in their capacity as personal
representatives of the Estate of Owen E. Mummau, Laurence N.
Mummau in his capacity as personal representative of the Estate
of Iva K. Mummau, and Clair S. Mummau in his capacity as
attorney-in-fact for Iva K. Mummau.

9. Each and every party to this Agreement, on behalf of
himself or herself and his or her heirs, executors and assigns do

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J-S48032-14

forever release, acquit, discharge and hold harmless each other
individually and collectively for any and all actions, causes of
action, claims, demands, damages, costs, losses, expenses and
compensation, on account of or in any way growing out of any
and all known or unknown claims, either actual or potential,
between and among each other which have arisen or may have
occurred at any time heretofore. . . .

(Id. at *3, Exhibit A, at 2 ¶¶ 8, 9; see also id. at Exhibit A, at 2 ¶ 10).

Thus, Appellants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims related

tortfeasor release of the relevant parties. See Chada, supra at 43-44.

Therefore, we will not permit this issue to be twice-litigated, and conclude

that it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Dempsey, supra at

682. Appellants cannot state a claim for tortious interference with an

inheritance.3

[t]hird [p]arty [b]eneficiaries against [Appellees] Mohler and Clymer &

____________________________________________

3
Appellees
persuaded Iva K. Mummau to transfer the farm to Clair Mummau at a
diminished price, does not state a claim for tortious interference with an

of inter vivos transfers alleged to diminish an eventual bequest. Rather, we
have limited the parameters of potential . . . claims to instances involving
demonstrable interference with the testamentary scheme the decedent had
Estate of
, 859 A.2d 472, 477 (Pa.
Super. 2004), appeal denied, 876 A.2d 396 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).
Appellants have not asserted that Appellees prevented Iva from changing
her will in favor of Appellants. Therefore, even if Appellants had not
released Appellees from tortfeasor liability, their claim would not merit
inter vivos transfer to Clair.

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J-S48032-14

ey

they would have standing to make claims as third party beneficiaries,

Id. at 45).

As previously discussed, Appellants failed to state a claim for tortious

interference.

Furthermore, their claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, in

that they have already been given the opportunity to be heard on their

claims against the perpetuation of Iva K. Mummau See Chada,

supra at 43-44; (see also In re Estate of Iva K. Mummau, No. 1382

MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed May 12, 2014)). Thus, this claim would not

merit relief.

cause of actio

Brief, at 47). We disagree.

There remains some question as to whether the courts of
this Commonwealth recognize a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. However, our Supreme Court
has indicated that in order for a plaintiff to prevail on such a
claim, he or she must, at the least, demonstrate intentional
outrageous or extreme conduct by the defendant, which causes
severe emotional distress to the plaintiff.

Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

show physical injury or harm in order to

Fewell v. Besner, 664 A.2d 577, 582 (Pa. Super. 1995) (emphasis added;

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J-S48032-14

Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, 527 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa.

1987) (stating that claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

i

See id.

They claim, in pertinent part:

301.

fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger,
chagrin, disappointment, worry, depression.

302. uct has been the direct and proximate

health care and medical professionals.

(First Amended Complaint, 1/26/07, at 8 ¶¶ 301-02). Appellants fail to aver

hysical illness requiring the services of

Id. at 8 ¶ 302).

Thus, they failed to aver sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. See Kazatsky, supra at 995; Fewell,

supra at 582. The court did not err in dismissing this claim. See

Burgoyne, supra at 679-

merit.

were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and in violation of the

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J-S48032-14

urt Estate of Iva K.

Id.

Id. at 52).

of various canons of the Judicial Code of Conduct, effective July 1, 2014, and

the duties of judges under the Pennsylvania Constitution Article V, Section

Id. at 54; see also id. at 53).4 These issues are waived.

a self-serving and speculative history

at 56; see also id. at 51-56). They cite only to general case law and

canons of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct to assert that the court

5
(Id. at 53); see also Lakatosh, supra at
____________________________________________

4
Appellants also raise a second sub-
permitted
fail to develop this assertion with citations to the record or relevant

see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b); Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1381
(Pa. Super. 1995).
5
Appellants later repeat this assertion, claiming that, pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Druce
the Judicial Code of Conduct . . . combined with evidence of bias or prejudice
-57). Druce is inapposite,

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S48032-14

argument section pertaining to these issues consists of general statements

unsupported by any citation of authority. The argument portion of an

appellate brief must include a pertinent discussion of the particular point

omitted). Thus, they have waived these claims. See Lakatosh, supra at

1381.

stated that four of its prior orders were interlocutory and suggested that the

appeal deadlines fell thirty days after their respective entries. (See Trial

assertion that these orders were interlocutory and not appealable until a

final order was entered, but nevertheless determine that Appellants are

entitled to no relief on this claim.

_______________________
(Footnote Continued)

a criminal case did not violate judicial canons or codes of conduct, and does
no
fail to indicate that they ever properly filed a petition to recuse, and thus,
have waived this claim on this ground as well. See Coulter v. Ramsden,
2014 Pa. Super. Lexis 1192, at *21 (Pa. Super. 2014) -settled
that a party seeking recusal or disqualification must raise the objection at

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J-S48032-14

It is well-settled that an appeal may be taken as of right from any final

order of a lower court. See Pa.R.A.P. 341. Rule 341(b) provides that a

(2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or (3) is entered as a

final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). Id.

n, the orders at issue were interlocutory, (see

Trial Court Opinion, 4/02/14, at unnumbered page 2), and based on our

all parties, or were entered as final orders pursuant to Rule 341(c): the

November 29, 2006 order required Appellants to file a complaint within

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; the October 2, 2008 order

was a scheduling order and did not dispose of any claims or issues; and the

except Jeffery D. Mohler and Clymer & Mussler, and therefore did not

dispose of the parties or claims. Thus, the orders were interlocutory and

unappealable until the court entered the final order of December 30, 2013,

from which Appellants properly appealed.

Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA v.

Fin. Software Sys., Inc., 2014 Pa. Super. Lexis 2319, at *6 (Pa. Super.

relief based on the substance of those prior orders lack merit or have been

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J-S48032-14

waived on

relief.

In their third issue, Appellants obje

matter solely with respect to [Appellees] Jeffrey D. Mohler and Clymer &

-58). We disagree.

First, Appellants fail to develop or cite any authority for their

Id. at 57). Thus, this contention is

waived. See Lakatosh, supra at 1381.

Court, they should be permitted to pursue their claims against Appellees

Jeffrey D. Mohler and Clymer & Musser, P.C. (See -

59). This claim is also waived for failure to cite to any relevant or

persuasive authority. See Lakatosh, supra at 1381. Moreover, as

In re Estate

of Iva K. Mummau, No. 1382 MDA 2013 (Pa. Super. filed May 12, 2014),

-party beneficiary claims against Appellees are barred by res

judicata

issue does not merit relief.

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J-S48032-14

Order affirmed.

Donohue, J., joins the memorandum.

Jenkins, J., concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/9/2014

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