NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEP 09 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD DANIEL COX, No. 11-57154
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01174-GAF-SS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
L. S. MCEWEN, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 26, 2014
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,
District Judge.**
California state prisoner Richard Daniel Cox (Cox) appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.
1. The California Court of Appeal’s determination that there was
sufficient evidence to support Cox’s convictions for fatal assault on a child under
the age of eight (child homicide), in violation of California Penal Code § 273ab,
and first degree torture murder, in violation of California Penal Code § 187(a), was
not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979), and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Based upon the surrounding circumstances, the state court
reasonably determined that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt
the “care or custody” element of the crime of child homicide. See Cal. Penal Code
§ 273ab (requiring that the person being charged have “care or custody” of the
child victim). These circumstances include Cox admitting that he took care of the
victim, disciplined the victim, and treated an injury to the victim’s foot, all of
which tend to show that Cox assumed the role of caregiver. See People v. Perez,
164 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1469-72 (2008).
The state court reasonably determined that a rational juror could find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Cox aided and abetted both crimes. Among the facts the
state court reasonably found probative of Cox’s willingness to assist in the crimes
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are that Cox was present yet failed to intercede while his roommate and close
friend tortured the child victim to death and, through his acts and statements,
helped cover up the crimes. The state court also reasonably determined that a
rational juror could infer from Cox’s willingness to aid and abet his friend in
serving the child victim dog food and beer that Cox aided and abetted in inflicting
physical injuries on the child victim. See People v. Battle, 198 Cal. App. 4th 50,
84-85 (2011) (discussing aiding and abetting factors).
2. The state court’s rejection of Cox’s prosecutorial misconduct claim —
premised on the prosecution’s arguing allegedly inconsistent theories of culpability
during closing summation at the separate trials of Cox and his co-defendant — was
not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Darden v. Wainright, 477 U.S.
168, 181 (1986) (addressing objectionable comments by the prosecutor during
closing argument). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In summarily denying this claim, the
state court reasonably could have found the theories advanced by the prosecution
in the separate trials of Cox and his co-defendant not fundamentally inconsistent or
irreconcilable. See Nguyen v. Lindsey, 232 F.3d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
in an AEDPA case that it is not “shocking or even unusual” that evidence comes in
“somewhat differently at each trial”).
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3. Finally, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cox’s request for a free trial transcript,
or in denying a continuance in order to file a motion for a new trial, was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and
was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d). Cox has not identified a Supreme Court case holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state to provide an indigent defendant with a free transcript
for the purpose of filing a motion for a new trial. In any event, the state court
reasonably determined that counsel had other means to obtain the information
needed to support a motion for a new trial. See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487, 495-96 (1963). Considering that Cox was granted multiple continuances and
had adequate time to file a motion for a new trial, the California Court of Appeal
reasonably determined that the trial court’s denial of another continuance was not
so arbitrary as to violate due process. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1983).
AFFIRMED.
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