UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4981
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DOUGLAS G. TAYLOR, a/k/a Bo Taylor,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00316-LMB-1)
Submitted: August 27, 2014 Decided: September 11, 2014
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
Bryant, Appellate Attorney, W. Todd Watson, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Mark D. Lytle, Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Douglas G. Taylor appeals from his twenty-four-month
sentence imposed after he pled guilty to one count each of wire
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012), and filing a
false individual income tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1) (2012). The case arose from allegations that Taylor
schemed to defraud the Remington Volunteer Fire and Rescue
Department (“RVFD”), where he was the Chief, and the Prince
William County Schools, where he was employed. On appeal,
Taylor asserts that his sentence is unreasonable because the
district court miscalculated his Guidelines range and ultimately
issued an erroneous restitution order when it: (1) included as
relevant conduct in calculating his loss amount conduct
pertaining to dismissed charges; (2) failed to subtract from the
loss amount the value of the work Taylor contributed to the
RVFD; and (3) failed to address Taylor’s argument that the tax
loss was overstated. Taylor also asserts that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied the parties’ joint
motion to continue sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.
Taylor challenges the reasonableness of his sentence,
which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Cobler, 748 F.3d 570, 581 (4th Cir. 2014), pet. for cert. filed,
__ S. Ct. __ (U.S. July 10, 2014) (No. 14-5307). The first step
in our review of a sentence mandates that we ensure that the
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district court committed no significant procedural error, “such
as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
“In assessing whether a sentencing court has properly
applied the Guidelines, we review factual findings for clear
error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Llamas,
599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States v.
Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330, 341 (4th Cir.) (noting that loss
attributable to fraud is a factual finding that is reviewed for
clear error), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2747 (2013). A sentence
within or below the applicable Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir.
2012). We have considered the parties’ arguments and have
reviewed the record and discern no reversible error in the
district court’s sentencing determinations. Accordingly, we
affirm Taylor’s twenty-four-month variant sentence.
We reject Taylor’s assertion that the district court
committed reversible error when it denied the parties’ joint
motion for a continuance of his sentencing hearing. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(b)(1) provides that “[t]he court must impose
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sentence without unnecessary delay.” Thus, “a trial court’s
denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion;
even if such an abuse is found, the defendant must show that the
error specifically prejudiced her case in order to prevail.”
United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 739 (4th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see United
States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 531 (4th Cir.) (“In light of
the fact that Copeland’s . . . sentencing had been scheduled for
over three months, the district court’s denial of additional
time for preparation was neither unreasoning nor arbitrary.”),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013).
We will only vacate a sentence when the denial of a
continuance was arbitrary and the denial “substantially impaired
the defendant’s opportunity to secure a fair sentence[.]”
United States v. Speed, 53 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1995). We
must, however, be mindful of “possible Sixth Amendment
implications concerning the ability of counsel for the defendant
to provide effective assistance” at sentencing. Id. at 645.
A review of the district court record establishes that
it was unlikely that a continuance would have resulted in any
agreement on loss amount by the parties. To the contrary,
despite multiple attempts by the parties to agree on appropriate
loss amounts, neither Taylor nor the Government was willing to
concede on an amount. Moreover, it is apparent from the
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district court’s order denying the motion for a continuance that
the district court was legitimately concerned about Taylor’s
lead attorney leaving the Federal Public Defender’s Office. And
since Taylor’s lead attorney was involved in Taylor’s case from
early on and, thus, intimately aware of the details of Taylor’s
case, there is no indication that Taylor was denied his Sixth
Amendment rights because of the district court’s denial of his
motion for a continuance. Accordingly, we find the district
court’s denial of additional time for preparation to be neither
unreasoning nor arbitrary.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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