13-270
Mosley v. City of Rochester
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
12th day of September, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
ROBERT D. SACK,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Greta E. Mosley,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 13-270
City of Rochester, Joseph Mustico,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Greta E. Mosley, pro se, Rochester, NY (Christina
A. Agola, Christina A. Agola, PLLC, Brighton, NY,
filed a brief on behalf of Appellant before being
relieved).
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Spencer Lee Ash, for Robert J. Bergin, Corporation
Counsel, City of Rochester, Rochester, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York (Telesca, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Greta Mosley, proceeding pro se, appeals from a December 18, 2012
judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (Telesca, J.), which
granted summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees the City of Rochester and Joseph Mustico
on Mosley’s claims for unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of race under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New
York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290–301. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues presented
for review.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, resolving all
ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Wrobel
v. Cnty. of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate only where
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We analyze employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII, § 1981, and
the NYSHRL under the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.
2010). Under that framework, if a plaintiff puts forth a prima facie case of discrimination and the
defendant then provides a nondiscriminatory justification for its actions, the burden shifts back to
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the plaintiff to show that the proffered justification is pretextual. McDonnel Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802–04.
In this case, we conclude that Mosley has failed to show that the defendants’ proffered
nondiscriminatory justification for Mosley’s termination was pretextual, for substantially the
reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned decision and order dated December 17,
2012. See Mosley v. City of Rochester, No. 10-CV-6415, 2012 WL 6569400 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
2012). Mosley was laid off when her position, along with a dozen others, was eliminated as part
of a cost-saving consolidation of three City departments, which was ordered by the mayor and
implemented by the three department heads and a thirteen-member subcommittee. The
terminated employees were of various races, and all, including Mosley, were placed on a
preferred list for open positions at or below their current salaries. The record contains no
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mosley was treated differently as a result
of her race or was targeted for termination as a result of her alleged prior complaint of
discrimination.
We have considered all of Mosley’s remaining arguments and find them to be without
merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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