UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4314
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FELIPE SANCHEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00029-RWT-1)
Submitted: September 5, 2014 Decided: September 12, 2014
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elita C. Amato, LAW OFFICE OF ELITA C. AMATO, Arlington,
Virginia, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosentein, United States
Attorney, Nicolas A. Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Felipe Sanchez appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence of six
months in prison and no further supervised release. On appeal,
he argues that his sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). In exercising such
discretion the court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy
statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as well as the
statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).” Id. at 641. While a district
court must explain its sentence, the court “need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it
must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the statutory maximum and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. In
this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for Guidelines sentences. United States
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v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if we find
the sentence unreasonable must we decide whether it is plainly
so. Id. at 657. We presume a sentence within the Chapter Seven
policy statement range is reasonable. Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that
Sanchez’s sentence is both reasonable and within the statutory
maximum. The district court correctly calculated his Chapter
Seven policy statement range as three to nine months and
reasonably determined a sentence in the middle of the range was
appropriate. On appeal, Sanchez contends that the court failed
to adequately explain the sentence and that it is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We disagree.
Sanchez had previously had his probation revoked for
violating his release conditions. The district court explained
that it was concerned that he was back before the court again on
more violations and was not taking his obligations seriously,
and the court found the goals of the sentencing statute would
not be served by granting his request to serve home confinement
on weekends. The court further found that a sentence at the low
end of the policy statement range would not be appropriate based
on his repeated violations, but a sentence in the middle of the
range was reasonable. It was appropriate for the court to take
into account not only the severity of the violations but also
their number and his pattern of refusing to abide by his release
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conditions, see Moulden, 478 F.3d at 658, and Sanchez has not
rebutted the presumption that his sentence is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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