J-S42005-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LOUIS RICE
Appellant No. 1125 WDA 1013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 18, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0004804-2012
CP-02-CR-0004805-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014
Appellant, Louis Rice, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
on January 18, 2013, by the Honorable Edward J. Borkowski, Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County. After careful review, we affirm.
Rice committed a series of armed robberies. In one, he held a knife to
a woman’s neck; in another, he fired a shot inside the store he was robbing.
There are more examples of such behavior in the record. See N.T., Guilty
Plea Hearing, 10/12/12, at 9-20. He committed most of the robberies with
accomplices. Rice ultimately entered a guilty plea to, among other things,
22 counts of robbery. The trial court sentenced Rice to an aggregate term of
25 to 50 years’ incarceration—a result of running several of the robbery
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sentences consecutively. This timely appeal follows. On appeal, Rice’s sole
claim is that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.
Rice challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. A challenge
to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for
permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.
See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004).
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
[We] conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate
under the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(quotation marks and some citations omitted).
Here, Rice filed a timely appeal and challenged his sentence in a post-
sentence motion. Rice’s appellate brief also contains the requisite 2119(f)
concise statement, in which he argues that the trial court’s cumulative
sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration was unreasonable and so
manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Appellant’s
Brief at 10. He also claims that the trial court failed to properly consider his
rehabilitative needs. See id.
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“[A] sentencing court generally has discretion to impose multiple
sentences concurrently or consecutively, and a challenge to the exercise of
that discretion does not ordinarily raise a substantial question.”
Commonwealth v. Raven, ___ A.3d ___, ____, 2014 WL 3907103, *6
(Pa. Super., filed August 12, 2014) (citation omitted). “[T]he key to
resolving the preliminary substantial question inquiry is whether the decision
to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears
upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at
issue in the case.” Id. (citation omitted). Rice fails to raise a substantial
question as to the consecutive nature of his sentence in this case. We need
only look at the sheer breadth of Rice’s robbery spree and the number of
people terrorized by his criminal acts to find that the sentence is not
excessive.
As for his claim that the trial court failed to properly consider his
rehabilitative needs and his claims elsewhere in his brief that the trial court
failed to adequately consider other mitigating factors, we note that such
claims do not raise a substantial question for our review. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Indeed, the trial court in this case had a pre-sentence investigation
report. Where the trial court had the benefit of reviewing a pre-sentence
report, we must
presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant's character and weighed
those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A
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pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for itself.
In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of
engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that
sentencers are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any
extended or systematic definitions of their punishment
procedure. Having been fully informed by the pre-sentence
report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed.
This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where
it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of
awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will
presume also that the weighing process took place in a
meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the
position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to
apply them to the case at hand.
Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citing
Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988)).
As the trial court in this case did have the benefit of a pre-sentence report,
we must presume that he considered all relevant sentencing factors. At
sentencing, the trial court thoroughly discussed what it was taking into
consideration in sentencing Rice. See N.T., Sentencing Hearing, 1/18/13, at
15-21.
In short, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in sentencing
Rice.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/12/2014
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