Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Sep 15 2014, 8:59 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KURT A. YOUNG GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Nashville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DESMOND J. SANDERS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1401-CR-42
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins, Judge
Cause Nos. 49G05-1209-FC-67032 and 49G05-1203-FD-16217
September 15, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Desmond Sanders appeals his convictions for battery, as a Class C felony, and
carrying a handgun without a license, as a Class C felony, following a bench trial.
Sanders presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to disprove his self-
defense claim.
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
carrying a handgun without a license conviction.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 19, 2012, Sanders and his girlfriend, Levern Howard, were
attending a youth football game in Indianapolis when Howard began arguing with Reva
Vance, Sanders’ former girlfriend. Sanders got involved in the argument and ultimately
struck Vance in the head with a handgun. As Sanders left the scene, he fired one or two
shots into the air. A police officer arrived and found Vance, who was bleeding from
wounds on her head and had several loose teeth. Two eyewitnesses, Ashley Dancy and
Richard Watford, were able to describe the incident to the police.
In Cause Number 49G05-1209-FC-067032 (“FC-067032”), the State charged
Sanders with nine counts, including battery, as a Class C felony, carrying a handgun
without a license, as a Class C felony, and carrying a handgun without a license, as a
Class A misdemeanor. The trial court found Sanders guilty of those three charges, but
acquitted him on the remaining charges. The trial court entered judgment of conviction
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only on the two Class C felony charges and sentenced Sanders to concurrent seven-year
sentences with three years suspended to probation.
In Cause Number 49G14-1203-FD-016217 (“FD-016217”), the State charged
Sanders with violating the terms of his probation on a conviction for possession of
marijuana, as a Class D felony. Following his convictions in FC-067032, the trial court
found that Sanders had violated the terms of his probation and ordered that he serve the
remainder of his sentence in the Department of Correction. This consolidated appeal
ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issue One: Self-defense
Sanders first contends that the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim with
respect to his battery conviction. As our supreme court has explained:
A valid claim of defense of oneself or another person is legal justification
for an otherwise criminal act. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a); Wallace v. State,
725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000). In order to prevail on such a claim, the
defendant must show that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be;
(2) did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and
(3) had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. McEwen v. State,
695 N.E.2d 79, 90 (Ind. 1998). When a claim of self-defense is raised and
finds support in the evidence, the State has the burden of negating at least
one of the necessary elements. Id. If a defendant is convicted despite his
claim of self-defense, this Court will reverse only if no reasonable person
could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable
doubt. Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999). . . . The standard
of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of
self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence
claim. Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). We neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. If there is
sufficient evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier
of fact, then the [judgment] will not be disturbed. Id.
Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 800-01 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added).
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We agree with the State that Sanders’ self-defense claim fails because he did not
present evidence that he: (1) was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not
provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear
of death or great bodily harm. See id. The only evidence Sanders points to in support of
his self-defense claim is Watford’s testimony that Sanders intervened in the argument
between Vance and Howard in an effort to “stop them from fighting.” Tr. at 56. Sanders
maintains that that testimony supports a reasonable inference that he was “acting in
defense of another” under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2(c). Appellant’s Br. at 8. But
Sanders does not direct us to any evidence in the record that satisfies any of the three
elements he was required to show as set out in Wilson. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err when it rejected Sanders self-defense claim. The State presented sufficient
evidence to support his battery conviction.
Issue Two: Carrying a Handgun Without a License
Sanders next contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support
his conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. Again, in considering the
sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor
judge the credibility of witnesses. Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. If there is sufficient
evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the
judgment will not be disturbed. Id.
To prove that Sanders carried a handgun without a license, as a Class C felony, the
State was required to show that he carried a handgun on or about his body without a
license and that he has a prior conviction for carrying a handgun without a license. I.C.
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§§ 35-47-2-1(a), (e). Sanders’ sole contention on this issue is that it is “nearly
impossible” to reconcile the testimony of the State’s witnesses regarding his possession
of a handgun. Appellant’s Br. at 11. And Sanders points out several alleged
inconsistencies in two eyewitnesses’ testimony. Sanders concludes that, “[a]t some point,
. . . conflicts in evidence, no matter whether the result of one witness’ testimony or
several, must itself serve to inject reasonable doubt of a defendant’s guilt simply because
it has made the State’s evidence as a whole incredibly dubious.” Id.
But Sanders’ reading of the eyewitness’ testimony on this issue is too narrow.
Dancy testified that she saw Sanders holding a silver and black handgun, and she saw
Sanders fire the handgun into the air. Watford testified that he saw Sanders hit Vance
with a silver handgun, and then he saw Sanders fire the handgun into the air. The alleged
inconsistencies between Dancy’s and Watford’s testimony are insignificant. Sanders’
contentions on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will
not do. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Sanders’ conviction for
carrying a handgun without a license. Because we affirm Sanders’ convictions in FC-
067032, we also affirm the trial court’s revocation of his probation, based on those
convictions, in FD-016217.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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