[Cite as State v. Maynard, 2014-Ohio-3978.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 13CA0045-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JAMIE L. MAYNARD COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 13 CR 0106
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 15, 2014
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Jamie Maynard, appeals the judgment of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} This matter arises out of Maynard’s unauthorized use of a credit card belonging to
her mother and stepfather. Maynard admitted to law enforcement that her illicit use of the card
stemmed from an issue with substance abuse. On February 14, 2013, the Medina County Grand
Jury indicted Maynard on one count of receiving stolen property. After initially pleading not
guilty to the charge, Maynard appeared for a change-of-plea hearing and entered a plea of no
contest. The trial court found Maynard guilty and requested a presentence investigation report.
The trial court subsequently sentenced Maynard to a ten-month term of incarceration.
{¶3} On appeal, Maynard raises one assignment of error.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO
ADEQUATELY CONSIDER REQUIRED STATUTORY SENTENCING
FACTORS IN IMPOSING A PRISON SENTENCE OF TEN (10) MONTHS ON
THE DEFENDANT, WHERE DEFENDANT COOPERATED IN THE
INVESTIGATION, SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH THE CREDIT CARD
COMPANY TO REPAY THE FUNDS, AND SUCH PRISON TERM WAS
NOT MANDATORY FOR HER NON-VIOLENT FELONY OF THE FIFTH
DEGREE OFFENSE.
{¶4} In her sole assignment of error, Maynard argues that the trial court erred by not
adequately considering the statutory sentencing factors prior to sentencing her to a ten-month
term of incarceration. Although Maynard does not contest that the trial court considered the
sentencing factors, she emphasizes that the trial court did not amply account for the fact that she
admitted to the illegal use of the credit card, cooperated with authorities, and signed a financial
responsibility form with CapitalOne causing the approximately $2000 in charges to be
transferred from her mother and stepfather’s account to her own account. This Court disagrees.
{¶5} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]rial courts have full discretion to
impose a prison sentence within the [applicable] statutory range[.]” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio
St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, paragraph seven of the syllabus. “This Court continues to recognize
that a trial court, after proper adherence to applicable rules and statutes, retains discretion in the
imposition of sentences.” State v. Jordan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26598, 2013-Ohio-4172, ¶ 30,
citing State v. Weems, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26532, 2013-Ohio-2673, ¶ 18-19. In exercising that
discretion, “‘[a] court must carefully consider the statutes that apply to every felony case[,] * * *
includ[ing] R.C. 2929.11, which specifies the purposes of sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which
provides guidance in considering factors relating to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism
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of the offender.’” State v. Davison, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009803, 2011-Ohio-1528, ¶ 12,
quoting State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 38.
{¶6} Maynard was convicted of receiving stolen property, a felony of the fifth degree.
Accordingly, she was eligible for a prison term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve
months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). The trial court imposed a ten-month term of incarceration. While
Maynard notes that a prison sentence was not mandatory, she does not dispute that her sentence
falls within the applicable statutory range. Instead, she argues that the trial court failed to give
adequate consideration to R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, and R.C. 2929.13.
{¶7} The trial court stated in its judgment entry that it considered the record, oral
statements by the parties, the victim impact statement, “as well as the principles and purposes of
sentencing under [R.C.] 2929.11.” The trial court further stated that it weighed the seriousness
and recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B), that a prison sentence was consistent with
the purposes of sentencing, and that Maynard was not amendable to an available community
control sanction. Moreover, the sentencing transcript reveals that the trial court reviewed the
presentence investigation report, and expressed concern that Maynard had already been
convicted of multiple felonies as an adult and served prison time. The trial court also noted that
when asked why she had previously missed scheduled drug tests, Maynard laughed and told
ACS lab personnel, “Yeah, I wasn’t doing all that.” When asked when she would be able to pay
the $100 she owed in back drug testing fees, Maynard responded, “Good luck with that.”
Maynard further remarked that she did not want to deal with the trial judge anymore, and that she
preferred to deal with the probation department “[b]ecause they are pushovers.” While Maynard
admitted to the criminal conduct and took the steps necessary to ensure that her mother and
stepfather were not financially responsible for her transgressions, there were numerous additional
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considerations lending credence to the conclusion that prison time was appropriate. It follows
that Maynard’s assertion that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the relevant
statutory factors is without support in the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a ten-month term of incarceration.
{¶8} This assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶9} Maynard’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
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BELFANCE, P. J.
HENSAL, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH F. SALZGEBER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.