constituted an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and different
from those raised in his previous petition. 2 See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS
34.810(2). Appellant's petition was procedurally barred absent a
demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1);
NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically
pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable
presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).
First, appellant claimed that he had good cause to overcome
the procedural bars because the district court did not have jurisdiction to
enter an amended judgment of conviction. Appellant claimed that this
court had not yet issued the remittitur from the decision regarding the
appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus which also included a limited remand to correct a clerical error in
the judgment of conviction. This claim was previously raised and rejected
by this court. Hermanski v. State, Docket No. 64951 (Order of Affirmance,
June 12, 2014). Therefore, this claim was barred by the doctrine of law of
the case. Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16, 535 P.2d 797, 78-79 (1975).
Second, appellant claimed that he had good cause to overcome
the procedural bars because his attorney during his re-sentencing hearing
2Hermanski v. State, Docket No. 47011 (Order of Affirmance and
Limited Remand to Correct Judgment of Conviction, July 13, 2006).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
recently argued in his own criminal case that he suffered diminished
capacity because of a head injury he received in 1991. Appellant failed to
demonstrate good cause. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel
actually suffered diminished capacity. Further, all of his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel arguments raised in the instant petition were
rearguments of claims this court already rejected, and he failed to
demonstrate how counsel's supposed diminished capacity would have
affected our determination of those claims in his previous petition. See
Hermanski v. State, Docket No. 47011 (Order of Affirmance and Limited
Remand to Correct Judgment of Conviction, July 13, 2006).
Finally, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132
S. Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant argued that he had good cause because he
was not appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. We
conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel
was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see NRS
34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.
Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to
Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel,
Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Thus, the
failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decisionS in Martinez
would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the petition as
procedurally barred, and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AF'FIRMED. 3
Hardesty
)0,74
J.
Douglas
, J.
—C6a
Cherry
3Appellant also appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider.
Because no statute or court rule permits an appeal from an order denying
a motion to reconsider, we lack jurisdiction. Castillo v. State, 106 Nev.
349, 352, 792 P.2d 1133, 1135 (1990).
We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in
proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude
that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent
that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those
submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings
below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) I947A
cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
Gregory Scott Hermanski
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
5
(0) 1947A
Hermanski (Gregory) v. State
Combined Opinion