demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1);
NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3).
Relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct.
1309 (2012), appellant argued that ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel excused his procedural defects. Ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case because the
appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction proceedings was not
statutorily or constitutionally required. Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293,
303, 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159, 164, 912
P.2d 255, 258 (1996). Further, this court has recently held that Martinez
does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures, see Brown
v. McDaniel, Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014),
and thus, Martinez does not provide good cause for this late and successive
petition.
Appellant also appeared to claim that ineffective assistance of
trial and appellate counsel would provide good cause to overcome the
procedural bars. Appellant's argument did not demonstrate good cause
because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is itself
procedurally barred cannot be good cause to excuse a procedural defect.
Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252-53, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003).
Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the petition as
procedurally barred, and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
-16.4 etert.4* j.
Hardesty
J. J.
SUPREME COURT
Douglas Cherry
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A .94P)4
cc: Hon. Elissa F. Cadish, District Judge
David Van Duke
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A e