J-A18021-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PITNEY ROAD PARTNERS, LLC T/D/B/A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
REDCAY COLLEGE CAMPUSES I PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
MURRAY ASSOCIATES ARCHITECTS, P.C.
Appellee No. 2253 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered on November 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No.: Cl-06-01429
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014
Pitney Road Partners, LLC t/d/b/a Redcay College Campuses I
motion for summary judgment filed by Murray Associates Architects, P.C.
held that an arbitration decision between Pitney and a third party, Warfel
a matter of law under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. After careful
review, we affirm.
November 19, 2013:
This litigation arises as a result of the construction of a building
on the Lancaster campus of [Harrisburg Area Community College
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discussions with Warfel to construct a classroom building on land
owned by Pitney and leased to HACC. Warfel contracted with
Murray, an architectural firm that had worked with HACC in the
past, to provide the architectural services for constructing the
new building. Under the [oral] agreement, Murray was to
prepare plans, drawings and specifications for the project known
as the Phase II Expansion Project.
Pitney met with Warfel and Murray numerous times in 2003
during which Pitney claims it told them that the new building
should be identical to the existing building on the property.
Pitney alleged Warfel and Murray represented that the new
building would look the same, a representation upon which
Pitney claims it relied.
plans about the design of the new building were false and
misleading and, as a result, a significant number of changes had
to be made which greatly increased the cost to Pitney.
Specifically, Pitney claims over 50 windows, brick banding, and a
notch for a stairwell had to be added to the new building to
make it conform to the design of the existing building.
Pitney also alleges Warfel and Murray falsely represented that
the HVAC system was complete and would fit in the building as it
was designed. In fact, crucial pieces of equipment were omitted
and there was not enough space left under the trusses of the
roof to fit the equipment. As a result, [] substantial reworking of
the roof and duct work was required. Pitney further claims that
could be constructed with brick, but it needed steel support
beams to keep from collapsing.
Pitney alleges Warfel and Murray knew Pitney relied upon the
plans prepared by Murray in determining its budget for the
project was
delayed[,] resulting in lost rental income, and Pitney incurred
additional costs to correct the problems with the design.
-3 (footnote and record
citations omitted).
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Pitney refused to pay Warfel because of the construction delays, and
Warfel could not pay its subcontractors. Warfel filed suit against Pitney to
recover the amounts owed, and Pitney filed a counterclaim to recover its
increased costs due to the design errors made by Murray, including the
HVAC system, the facade, and the windows and brick banding. Id. at 3-4.
Warfel and Pitney proceeded to binding arbitration, and after ten days
of testimony, on May 12, 2006, the arbitration panel rendered an award in
favor of Warfel for $5,971,010.
and setoffs of Pitney Road Partners, LLC t/d/b/a Redcay College Campuses I,
are denied in their entirety. . . . The award is in full settlement of all claims
and counterclaims submitted to this Arbitration. All claims not expressly
Pitney filed motions to vacate or modify or correct the arbitration
award. Additionally, on June 21, 2006, Pitney filed the instant complaint
against Warfel, HACC, and Murray. Meanwhile, on February 9, 2007, the
because, in its complaint, Pitney had failed to state a cause of action against
HACC. Pitney did not appeal this determination or amend its complaint to
state a claim against HACC. On August 17, 2007, the parties entered into a
formal settlement agreement by which Pitney dismissed its claims in the
On November 26, 2007, Pitney discontinued this action against Warfel.
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On March 22, 2013, Murray, the remaining defendant, filed a motion
for summary judgment in which Murray a
precluded by collateral estoppel and barred by the settlement agreement
between Pitney and Warfel. Pitney responded on June 24, 2013, and on
judgment, concluding that Murray was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because Pitney was collaterally estopped from relitigating the claims that
were settled by the arbitration award. Pitney timely appealed on December
19, 2013, and filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on January 10, 2014. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On February 6, 2014, the trial court entered its Rule
the
1925(a) Opinion, 2/06/2014, at 4.
Pitney raises the following two issues for our review, which we have
reordered for ease of disposition:
1. Statement of Matters
issues Pitney is raising on appeal with sufficient specificity?
2. Whether the trial court erred in applying collateral estoppel
and, specifically, in holding that the issue
design errors was adjudicated by the arbitrators and essential to
their decision in the Warfel v. Pitney Arbitration, thus
precluding Pitney from litigating the issue in the Pitney v.
Murray Lawsuit and resulting in the granting of Murr
summary judgment motion?
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deeming the issues waived on appeal because Pitney failed to identify its
issues with sufficient specificity in its Rule 1925(b) statement. We agree
with Pitney that its issues are not waived.
Failure to comply with a Rule 1925(b) order may be considered
by the appellate court as a waiver of all objections to the order,
ruling or other matter complained of. Regarding vague or overly
broad statements, this Court has also stated:
When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is
appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.
When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise
manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the
trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis
which is pertinent to those issues.
In other words, a Concise Statement which is too vague to
allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is
the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all.
While [Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa.
1998)] and its progeny have generally involved situations
where an appellant completely fails to mention an issue in
his Concise Statement, for the reasons set forth above we
conclude that Lord should also apply to Concise
Statements which are so vague as to prevent the court
from identifying the issue to be raised on appeal.
Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super. 2006) (most citations
is . . . tantamount to a conclusion of
Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936
A.2d 1058, 1059 (Pa. 2007); see also McKeeman v. Corestates Bank,
N.A.,
Appellate Procedure apply to criminal and civil cases alike, the principles
enunciated by Lord
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Here, Pitney raised the following three issues in its Rule 1925(b)
concise statement:
a. The [c]ourt erred in holding that there was no genuine
issue of material fact concerning whether Murray made errors
and omissions in its design for the project at Harrisburg Area
b. The [c]ourt erred in holding that Pitney was collaterally
estopped from litigati
errors and omissions in the present lawsuit based upon the
outcome in the Warfel v. Pitney Arbitration.
c. The [c]ourt erred in holding that Murray met all five
requirements necessary for invoking the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, specifically: (1) that the issue decided in the prior case
is identical to the one presented in the later case, (2) that there
was a final judgment on the merits, (3) that the party against
whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party
in the prior case, (4) that the party or person privy to the party
against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding, and (5)
that the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to
the judgment.
Rule 1925(b) Statement, 1/10/2014, at 1-2. Pitney therefore identified its
collateral estoppel to grant
summary judgment to Murray. Furthermore, even after finding waiver, the
trial court was able to conduct an alternative analysis, in which it stated:
on appeal is set out in the opinion and order of November 19,
Murray were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, there
was no need to determine whether an issue of material fact
existed as to Murr
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Lineberger, 894 A.2d at 148.
Accordingly, the
Lynn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 70
A.3d 814, 823 (Pa. Super. 2013). Therefore, because Pitney has not waived
remaining issue.
motion becau Warfel v. Pitney
Our standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is an
abuse of discretion. Summary judgment as a matter of law may
be had where there are no genuine issues of material fact as to a
cause of action. Pa.R.[C].P. 1035.2. Summary judgment is
properly granted on grounds of res judicata and/or collateral
estoppel if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on
file and supporting affidavits disclose that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Robbins v. Buck, 827 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. 2003) (case citations
omitted). Here, the trial court determined that Pitney was collaterally
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estopped from raising claims of alleged design error by Murray because of
cision in favor of Warfel on May 12, 2006.
The decision to allow or to deny a prior judicial determination to
collaterally bar relitigation of an issue in a subsequent action
historically has been treated as a legal issue. As such, this Court
is not bound
draw our own conclusions from the facts as established.
Meridian Oil & Gas Enters., Inc. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 614 A.2d 246, 250
(Pa. Super. 1992).
Collateral estoppel applies if (1) the issue decided in the prior
case is identical to one presented in the later case; (2) there was
a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the
plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior
case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against whom
the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior proceeding and (5) the determination in
the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.
Collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclusion,
operates to prevent a question of law or an issue of fact which
has once been litigated and adjudicated finally in a court of
competent jurisdiction from being relitigated in a subsequent
suit.
Kituskie v. Corbman, 682 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations
omitted).
In the instant case, Pitney challenges the first and fifth elements of the
issue has been adjudicated and is essential to the judgment in a prior
proceeding
were several legitimate bases by which the arbitrators could have reached
their decision [in Warfel v. Pitney] without having to even consider, let
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alone decide, the issues concerning Murra Id.
Thus, our task is to determine whether the trial court erred in determining
decision. See Kituskie, 682 A.2d at 382.
adjudicated in the arbitration. In its complaint in the instant litigation,
Pitney raises one count of negligent misrepresentation against Murray,
alleging that Murray violated section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts1
Complaint, 8/08/2006, at 10 ¶ 44; see id. at 9-10 ¶¶ 38-45. Specifically,
misrepresentations that its design would match the existing building and
____________________________________________
1
§ 552 Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of
Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1).
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example, the design did not match the existing building, the front entrance
lacked sufficient structural support, the truss design would not accommodate
the HVAC equipment, and the plans, if followed, would have created student
Id. at 33.
In its arbitration brief, Pitney argued as follows:
Many of the more costly problems resulted from poor
coordination between the project architect, Murray, and Warfel.
For example, despite the fact that all parties understood that the
new academic building was to be substantially similar to the
existing building, Murray did not include plans for windows. The
windows in the first academic building were in plain view and
obvious even to a casual onlooker. The failure to notice that
windows were not in the architectural plans added significant
costs to the project. . . .
occurred during the construction phase of the academic building.
The height of the penthouses was incorrect, and, therefore, duct
work could not be installed. The roof trusses had to be
redesigned to accommodate the HVAC equipment. This caused
delays in the roof installation. As a result, the drywall and
insulation were in place before the roof was finished. This
caused leaks which resulted in mold damage.
-8.
finalized design drawings and specifications for
The penthouse area was poorly designed as the rooms were not
designed to accommodate the [HVAC] equipment that was
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designed, and that the roof truss system would have to be
redesigned, if possible, to accommodate this equipment.
There were design problems with the entrance. It became very
obvious that there was an error made on the structural steel as
far as accommodating the brick that was to go up over the
entrance, over the peak. There was nothing there to carry it,
which led to subsequent discussions with Murray . . . , and there
had to be a redesign of the front steel.
Id. at 11-12 (quotation marks and record citations omitted).
Finally, the proposed verdict slip that Pitney submitted to the
arbitration panel included the following queries:
5. Was Murray negligent or did Murray breach its agreement
with Warfel in its design of the Phase II class building in any of
the following respects?
A. In designing the penthouse, HVAC systems and duct
work in the penthouse;
B. In designing the front entrance to the building;
C. In designing the building without all appropriate
windows and brick banding.
6. Set forth the amount of damage that [Pitney] suffered as a
Suggested answer: $558,209.72.
-3. Therefore, the record demonstrates
that Pitney presented to the arbitrators its allegations that Murray
negligently designed the building with respect to the HVAC system, roof
trusses, façade, and failure to match the first academic building. See id.
design errors alleged by Pitney . . .
are identical to those presented at the arbitration between Warfel and
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is
Kituskie, 682 A.2d at 382.
Second, Pitney challenges whether these issues were essential to the
let alone adjudicate, the issu
Warfel v. Pitney
claims that, if accepted by the arbitrators, would h
Id. We disagree.
When determining whether an issue is essential to the final judgment,
our Courts have looked to the context of the claim and whether it affected
the decision or damages rendered in the prior proceeding. See, e.g.,
, 618 A.2d 945, 955 (Pa. Super.
1992) (collaterally estopping insurance company from relitigating issue of
Meridian Oil &
Gas Enters., 614 A.2d at 252 (collaterally estopping litigation where
question of contract rights were essential in prior
dimensions of the ballast that Meridian had purchased under the contract
Incollingo v.
Maurer, 575 A.2d
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fifth requirement has also been met as it was essential for the panel to
determine damages as well as liability since the arbitration award was based
But
John J. Spencer Roofing, Inc., 565 A.2d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 1989)
granted the non-
non-suit was n -
Here, in the arbitration, Pitney sought a determination of whether
unanticipated costs for which Pitney withheld pay from Warfel. See
from Warfel construction due to the improper accounting, the
mismanagement of the project which caused unnecessary costs, and the
award of the arbitrators to Warfel
Redcay College Campuses I, are denied in their entirety. . . . The award is
in full settlement of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this
Award of Arbitrators, 5/12/2006, at 3.
was essential for the panel to determine damages. See Stidham, 618 A.2d
at 955; Meridian Oil & Gas Enters.
assertion that the arbitration award could have been determined on
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Brief at 18, the arbitration p
cf.
their entirety, the arbitration panel was required to consider and decide the
See Incollingo, 575 A.2d at 941.
Thus, the fifth element of the collateral estoppel test was satisfied because
the determination in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment.
See Kituskie
prove the first and fifth elements of the collateral estoppel test lacks merit.
Accordingly, because Murray satisfied all five elements of collateral
estoppel, Meridian Oil & Gas Enters., Inc., 614 A.2d at 250, the trial
court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining that Murray was
entitled to summary judgment in the instant litigation as a matter of law.
Robbins, 827 A.2d at 1214.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/18/2014
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