"The purpose of a Faretta canvass is to apprise the defendant
fully of the risks of self-representation and the nature of the charged crime
so that the defendant's decision is made with a clear comprehension of the
attendant risks." Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 54, 176 P.3d 1081, 1084
(2008) (quotation marks omitted). "This court 'has rejected the necessity
of a mechanical performance of a Faretta canvass," Hymon v. State, 121
Nev. 200, 212, 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (quoting Graves v. State, 112
Nev. 118, 125, 912 P.2d 234, 238 (1996)), and "the district court certainly
does not have an obligation to give the defendant specific warnings or
advisements about every rule or procedure which may be applicable,"
Harris v. State, 113 Nev. 799, 803, 942 P.2d 151, 154-55 (1997). The
record demonstrates that the district court conducted a "specific,
penetrating and comprehensive inquiry," SCR 253(1), and Wiesner was
apprised of the risks of self-representation. Therefore, we deny this claim.
Second, Wiesner claims that the district court erred by
denying her motion for self-representation on an invalid basis. We agree.
"[B]efore allowing a defendant to waive counsel and represent
[her)self, the trial court must ensure that the defendant is competent and
that the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." Hymon,
121 Nev. at 212, 111 P.3d at 1101. Although a person who is deemed
competent to stand trial will generally be competent to waive the right to
counsel, see id., the United States Supreme Court has held that "the
Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for
those competent to stand• trial under Dusky but who still suffer from
severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct
trial proceedings by themselves," Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178
(2008). The choice for self-representation "can be competent and
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intelligent even though the accused lacks the skill and experience of a
lawyer, but the record should establish that the accused was made aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation." Vanisi v. State,
117 Nev. 330, 338, 22 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2001) (quotation marks omitted).
Wiesner was deemed competent to stand trial. Although the
district court found that Wiesner was not competent to choose self-
representation under Hymon and mentioned that Wiesner is delusional,
the record does not support a conclusion that the court found that Wiesner
was• unable to conduct the trial proceedings as a result of severe mental
illness. Rather, the record demonstrates that the district court denied the
motion for self-representation based on Wiesner's lack of legal knowledge.
In denying Wiesner's motion, the district court found that she was "unable
to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel" and she
"did not have the requisite legal knowledge to understand the significance
of the waiver of counsel and the risks of self-representation." The court
specifically noted that "[d]uring the Faretta canvass and other law and
motion calendars, [Wiesner] constantly confused criminal and civil law
when she addressed the Court." At the Faretta canvass, the judge stated
that he believed representing herself was against Wiesner's best interest
and he was "trying [his] hardest to protect [VViesner's] rights and [ best
interest." And during trial, the judge told Wiesner: "You see, that's why I
didn't want to let you represent yourself. You mix up a lot of the law."
This was an improper basis for denying the motion for self-representation.
"The relevant assessment examines the accused's competence to choose
self-representation, not [her] ability to adequately defend [her]self."
Harris, 113 Nev. at 802, 942 P.2d at 153.
[Ili' a defendant willingly waives counsel and
chooses self-representation with an understanding
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of its dangers, including the difficulties presented
by a complex case, he or she has the right to do so.
We discern no Faretta exception where a
defendant's assertion of the right to self-
representation would be especially unwise.
Vanisi, 117 Nev. at 341-42, 22 P.3d at 1172.
Because the record as a whole demonstrates that the district
court relied on an improper basis for denying the motion for self-
representation and denial of the right to self-representation "is per se
reversible error," Hymon, 121 Nev. at 212, 111 P.3d at 1101, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction REVERSED AND
REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with
this order. 2
.e.42.,
Hardesty
Douglas 11"1 Cherry
2 Wiesner also claims that insufficient evidence supports her
convictions. We disagree. The record on appeal reveals sufficient evidence
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational
trier of fact. See NRS 199.120; NRS 239.330; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979); Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d
1378, 1380 (1998); Zweifel v. State, 89 Nev. 242, 510 P.2d 872 (1973)
(holding that the terms "false" and "forged" as used in NRS 239.330 are
not synonymous and presenting a genuine instrument containing a false
statement constitutes offering a false writing).
We have considered all proper person documents filed or received in
this matter. We conclude that Wiesner is only entitled to the relief
described herein.
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cc: Hon. Douglas Smith, District Judge
Coyer & Landis, LLC
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
Deann Wiesner
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