pleas to the contrary as well as admissions they made in the course of
those pleas. This was proper impeachment. See United States v. King,
505 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir. 1974) (explaining that the introduction of a co-
conspirator's guilty plea is permissible to impeach trial testimony or to
reflect on a witness' credibility, but may not be used as substantive
evidence of the defendant's guilt). To the extent appellant argues that the
State inappropriately used the pleas as substantive evidence against him,
we conclude that any error was harmless because Corbin testified that
appellant ordered the women to take her pipe or her money, and although
Sarah and Angela testified otherwise, they were thoroughly impeached.
See NRS 178.598; Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1189, 196 P.3d 465, 476
(2008) ("If the error is not of constitutional dimension, we will reverse only
if the error substantially affects the jury's verdict.")."
Second, appellant contends that the district court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence that Sarah and Angela declined to speak
with police officers regarding the case, because the fact that a witness
exercised her right to silence "has no probative value; and when that
witness' credibility is central to the outcome of the case, the prejudice from
allowing such questioning is enormous." Because appellant objected on a
different ground below, and only regarding Angela's testimony, we review
this contention for plain error. See Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95.
Appellant fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the admission of
this evidence. The prejudice that results from the admission of such
evidence is that the jury will equate silence with guilt, see Doyle v. Ohio,
'We also conclude that the district court did not err by failing to give
a limiting instruction regarding this evidence sua sponte.
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426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976), but here, the jury was informed that Sarah and
Angela had pleaded guilty. We conclude that appellant fails to
demonstrate that the district court plainly erred by admitting this
evidence. To the extent appellant argues that the preclusion against
commenting on a defendant's post-arrest silence should also include
witnesses, we decline to extend the rule.
Third, appellant contends that the district court abused its
discretion by permitting a police officer to testify regarding Corbin's
statement that appellant ordered the women to take her money. We
conclude that this contention lacks merit because appellant did not object
and fails to demonstrate that the district court plainly erred by admitting
the testimony. See Green, 119 Nev. at 545, 80 P.3d at 95.
Fourth, appellant contends that the district court abused its
discretion by instructing the jury regarding flight. Because appellant did
not object, we review this contention for plain error. - See Green, 119 Nev.
at 545, 80 P.3d at 95. A jury may receive a flight instruction so long as it
is supported by evidence that the defendant left the scene "with a
consciousness of guilt, for the purpose of avoiding arrest." Weber v. State,
121 Nev. 554, 582, 119 P.3d 107, 126 (2005). Here, evidence was
presented that appellant, Angela, and Sarah ran from Corbin's hotel room
after the incident, took an elevator down to the lobby, then ran from the
casino in different directions. Based upon this evidence, appellant fails to
demonstrate that the district court plainly erred.
Fifth, appellant contends that insufficient evidence supports
the enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. We disagree. Although
Corbin was struck with the handle of the pocketknife, a rational trier of
fact could have found that the knife constituted a deadly weapon. See
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NRS 193.165(6)(a); Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d
1378, 1380 (1998); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Sixth, appellant contends that the district court was without
jurisdiction to adjudicate him as a habitual offender. Appellant concedes
that our recent opinion in LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. „ 321 P.3d
919 (2014), does not support his position, and he urges us to revisit
LaChance. We decline to do so and conclude that this contention lacks
merit.
Seventh, appellant contends that cumulative error entitles
him to relief. Because we have only found one error, there are no errors to
cumulate. See United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
We conclude that no relief is warranted, and we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
/ LA J.
Hardesty
Douglas
C
Cherry
J.
cc: Hon. Connie J. Steinheimer, District Judge
Richard F. Cornell
Suzanne M. Lugaski
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
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