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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
IN RE: ESTATE OF WADE WALTER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
STANLEY, JR., DECEASED, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
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APPEAL OF: JILL SPRIGGS : No. 834 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Order May 7, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Washington County,
Orphans’ Court at No. 63-11-0592
BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2014
Jill Spriggs (“Spriggs”) appeals from the order entered on May 7, 2013
by the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Orphans’ Court
Division, removing Spriggs as the administratrix of the estate of Wade
Walter Stanley, Jr. (“the Decedent”), appointing Marci Stanley (“Marci”) and
Jeffrey Wade Stanley (“Jeffrey”) as co-administrators of the estate, and
ordering Spriggs to turn all estate assets and documentation over to Marci
and Jeffrey. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history in this case are as follows.
On March 3, 2011, the Decedent, who was unmarried at the time, died
intestate. At the time of his death, the Decedent was survived by his sister,
Spriggs, and brother, Jack D. Stanley (“Jack”). The Decedent was also
survived by his two grandchildren, Marci and Jeffrey. Marci and Jeffrey are
the children of the Decedent’s late son, Wade Walter Stanley, III (“Wade
III”), who died on October 2, 2008 in Arizona.
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On May 3, 2011, Spriggs applied for a grant of letters of administration
for the Decedent’s estate with the Register of Wills of Washington County.
In her petition, Spriggs listed only herself and Jack as the Decedent’s heirs,
even though she was aware that the Decedent had two surviving
grandchildren, Marci and Jeffrey, who were living in Florida. Included with
this petition was a document executed by Jack renouncing any right to
administer the Decedent’s estate and disclaiming any interest in that estate.
That same day, the Register of Wills granted the letters of administration to
Spriggs. Spriggs proceeded to transfer property from the Decedent’s estate
into her and her husband’s name, signed a gas lease for that property with
Range Resources in which she received an upfront payment of $39,000, and
deposited that money into a personal bank account.
On February 16, 2012, after receiving notice of their grandfather’s
death from another relative, Marci and Jeffrey filed a petition to revoke
Spriggs’ letters of administration. On July 23, 2012, the trial court, sua
sponte, decided that the petition to revoke was a matter for the Register of
Wills to decide. The trial court also directed the Register of Wills to
determine whether venue was proper in Washington County, as the record
indicated that the Decedent was a resident of Somerset County. On October
15, 2012, the parties consented to venue in Washington County.
On December 5, 2012, the Register of Wills held a hearing to
determine whether it would remove Spriggs as the administratrix of the
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Decedent’s estate. On December 18, 2012, the Register of Wills removed
Spriggs as administratrix of the Decedent’s estate and granted letters of
administration to Marci and Jeffrey, finding them to be the grandchildren and
sole heirs of the Decedent.
On December 27, 2012, Spriggs appealed the decision of the Register
of Wills to the orphans’ court. The orphans’ court conducted a de novo
review of the Register of Wills’ decision. On May 7, 2013, following hearings
on April 17, 2013 and May 3, 2013, the orphans’ court found that sufficient
grounds existed to remove Spriggs as administratrix of the Decedent’s
estate and to grant letters of administration to Marci and Jeffrey.
On May 15, 2013, Spriggs filed a notice of appeal. On August 16,
2013, the trial court ordered Spriggs to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure. On August 29, 2013, Spriggs timely filed her Rule
1925(b) statement.
On appeal, Spriggs raises the following issues for our review:
A. Did the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt err in admitting new
evidence when reviewing the grant of [l]etters
of [a]dministration by the Register of Wills?
B. Did the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt err in relying upon
an Arizona death certificate as proof of
lineage?
C. Did the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt err in affirming the
grant of [l]etters of [a]dministration by the
Register of Wills where [Marci and Jeffrey]
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failed to meet their burden of proof that they
are [the] grandchildren and heirs of [the
Decedent]?
Spriggs’ Brief at 4.
We begin by acknowledging our standard of review of an orphans’
court decision:
Our standard of review of an orphans’ court’s
decision is deferential. When reviewing an orphans’
court decree, this Court must determine whether the
record is free from legal error and whether the
orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the
record. Because the orphans’ court sits as the finder
of fact, it determines the credibility of the witnesses
and, on review, this Court will not reverse its
credibility determinations absent an abuse of
discretion. However, this Court is not bound to give
the same deference to the orphans’ court conclusions
of law. Where the rules of law on which the orphans’
court relied are palpably wrong or clearly
inapplicable, we will reverse the court’s decree.
Moreover, we point out that an abuse of discretion is
not merely an error of judgment. However, if in
reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or
misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is
shown by the record to be manifestly unreasonable
or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
discretion has been abused.
In re Estate of Zeevering, 78 A.3d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
quotations and citations omitted), appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1010 (Pa. 2014).
In her first issue on appeal, Spriggs claims that the orphans’ court
erred by admitting new evidence in its de novo review of the Register of
Wills’ decision to remove her as the administratrix of the Decedent’s estate.
Spriggs’ Brief at 13. Specifically, Spriggs argues that the orphans’ court
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should not have admitted evidence of Wade III’s birth certificate because it
was not part of the certified record created while the case was before the
Register of Wills. Id. Spriggs contends that an orphans’ court’s review of a
Register of Wills’ decision to grant or revoke letters of administration is
limited to a review of the discretion exercised by the Register of Wills. Id.
at 14. Spriggs further asserts that, in such case, the orphans’ court may not
supplement the certified record through the submission of new testamentary
or written evidence. Id.
Section 776 of the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code states the
following:
On appeal from the register, or in a proceeding
removed from the register, the orphans’ court
division may find, upon the testimony taken before
the register, that a substantial dispute of fact exists
and grant a jury trial. When upon the testimony
taken before the register a jury trial is not
granted, the division shall hear the testimony
de novo unless all parties appearing in the
proceeding agree that the case be heard on the
testimony taken before the register. In any
event, the division may require witnesses already
examined and other witnesses to appear before it.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 776 (emphasis added). Consistent with the statutory
mandate, this Court has held that “the hearing on appeal to the [o]rphan[s’]
court from a decision of the Register of Wills is de novo, unless the parties
appearing in the proceeding have agreed otherwise.” In re Estate of
Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 960 (Pa. Super. 2003). Our Court explained that
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“[a] hearing de novo ... means that the orphans’ court shall not arrive at a
decision on the basis of the testimony offered before the register, but shall
hear afresh all evidence that either party shall desire to present[.]” Id.
(quoting In re Estate of Szmahl, 6 A.2d 267, 269 (Pa. 1939), abrogated
on other grounds, In re Loudenslager’s Estate, 240 A.2d 477 (Pa. 1968)).
Only where the orphans’ court does not receive additional evidence in
proceedings on appeal from the Register of Wills’ action is judicial review
“confined to a determination of whether the Register abused his or her
discretion in the issuance of letters to an administrator.” See In re Estate
of Dodge, 522 A.2d 77, 78 (Pa. Super. 1987); see also In re Estate of
Tigue, 926 A.2d 453, 456 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that “if the orphans’
court did not take evidence, then our appellate review is limited to
determining if the register abused its discretion”); In re Estate of Klink,
743 A.2d 482, 484 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Had the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt not taken
any evidence, we would agree that our review would be limited to a
determination of whether the Register abused his discretion in the issuance
of letters.”).
Based on the foregoing statutory authority and case law, we conclude
that the orphans’ court did not err in admitting new evidence on appeal from
the decision of the Register of Wills. In this case, there is no indication in
the certified record on appeal that the parties agreed that the orphans’ court
would hear the case solely on the testimony taken and evidence admitted
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before the Register of Wills. Likewise, Spriggs’ appellate brief raises no such
contention. See Spriggs’ Brief at 13-15. Therefore, because there was no
agreement between the parties to have the orphans’ court hear the case
only on the testimony taken and evidence admitted before the Register of
Wills, the orphans’ court properly conducted a de novo review of this case in
which it permitted the parties to introduce new evidence. See 20 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 776.
In her second issue on appeal, Spriggs claims that the orphans’ court
erred by relying on Wade III’s Arizona death certificate as proof that he was
the son of the Decedent and consequently that the Decedent was the
grandfather of Marci and Jeffrey. Spriggs’ Brief at 16. First, Spriggs argues
that Wade III’s Arizona death certificate is inadmissible hearsay not subject
to any exception because the information provided in the death certificate is
untrustworthy. Id. at 16-19. Second, because Spriggs believes the
information in Wade III’s Arizona death certificate is untrustworthy, Spriggs
contends that the orphans’ court could not have admitted the death
certificate as an official record under 42 Pa.C.S.A § 6104(b).1 Id. at 19-23.
1
Section 6104(b) provides:
(b) Existence of facts.--A copy of a record
authenticated as provided in section 6103 disclosing
the existence or nonexistence of facts which have
been recorded pursuant to an official duty or would
have been so recorded had the facts existed shall be
admissible as evidence of the existence or
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Third, Spriggs asserts that the orphans’ court’s admission of Wade III’s
Arizona death certificate violated the best evidence rule because Wade III’s
birth certificate should have been available to Marci and Jeffrey to prove that
Wade III was the Decedent’s son. Id. at 23-25.
We conclude that Spriggs has waived the second issue that she raises
on appeal for failing to timely object to the admission of Wade III’s Arizona
death certificate. Regarding the preservation of issues for appeal, our Court
has frequently held the following:
In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a
party must make a timely and specific objection at
the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the
trial court. Failure to timely object to a basic and
fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.
On appeal[,] the Superior Court will not consider a
claim which was not called to the trial court’s
attention at a time when any error committed could
have been corrected. In this jurisdiction ... one must
object to errors, improprieties or irregularities at the
earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process to
afford the jurist hearing the case the first occasion to
remedy the wrong and possibly avoid an
unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.
In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Thompson v.
Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475–76 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
nonexistence of such facts, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6104(b).
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The transcripts from the orphans’ court’s de novo proceedings in this
matter reflect the following:
Mr. Vreeland: Exhibit 11 is the death certificate
for [Wade III] from the State of
Arizona.
Mr. Coster: Which would have been -- are we
in agreement Exhibit 13 is indeed
the Arizona death certificate?
Mr. Vreeland: It says a copy of the original death
certificate of [Wade III]. The
informant on this form is [Jeffrey].
Mr. Coster: So then I stipulate to Exhibit No.
13, Your Honor.
The Court: Which is Exhibit 11 for this
purpose.
N.T., 4/17/13, at 81-82. Although Spriggs stipulated to the admission of
Wade III’s Arizona death certificate at the April 17, 2013 hearing, she
subsequently attempted to object to the admission of the document when
the hearing on this matter resumed on May 3, 2013. N.T., 5/3/13, at 3-8.
Nevertheless, the certified record reflects that not only did Spriggs fail to
timely object to the admission of Wade III’s Arizona death certificate when
the orphans’ court admitted it into evidence, but she also stipulated to the
admission of the death certificate. See N.T., 4/17/13, at 81-82. Spriggs’
later attempt to raise an objection to the admission of the death certificate
did not cure her failure to timely object. Thus, Spriggs did not object to the
orphans’ court’s alleged error at the earliest possible stage of the
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adjudicatory process. See In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d at 767. As a result, this
Court will not consider a claim that an appellant did not call to the orphans’
court’s attention at a time when any alleged error committed could have
been corrected. See id. Accordingly, Spriggs has waived her right to
contest the admission of Wade III’s Arizona death certificate on appeal.
The third issue that Spriggs raises on appeal is that the orphans’ court
erred by affirming the Register of Wills’ grant of letters of administration to
Jeffrey and Marci because they failed to meet their burden of proof that they
are the grandchildren of the Decedent and that they had standing to pursue
their right to the Decedent’s estate. Spriggs’ Brief at 26-36. Spriggs
maintains that Marci and Jeffrey failed to present sufficient proof, other than
testimony based upon memory and family traditions, that Wade III was the
Decedent’s son and that Marci and Jeffrey are the Decedent’s grandchildren.
Id. at 28.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “[t]he burden of
proving heirship rests with the claimant.” In re Kasula’s Estate, 318 A.2d
338, 340 (Pa. 1974) (citations omitted). The standard of proof necessary to
sustain this burden requires that “the evidence must be so [c]lear, precise,
and definite in quality and quantity as to satisfy the court below that the
relationship claimed existed.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Our review of the record demonstrates that there is substantial
evidence supporting the orphans’ court’s finding that Marci and Jeffrey are
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the grandchildren and sole heirs of the Decedent. At the outset of the de
novo hearing, Spriggs stated that she did not dispute that the Decedent had
a son, Wade III, who pre-deceased the Decedent. N.T., 4/17/13, at 3. The
certified record reflects that Spriggs knew Wade III to be the Decedent’s son
and that she maintained a relationship with him. See id. at 31. The
orphans’ court also admitted Wade III’s birth certificate, which shows him to
be the Decedent’s son, into evidence. N.T., 5/3/13, at 43-45.
Rather, in her testimony before the orphans’ court, Spriggs
acknowledged that she was only disputing whether Marci and Jeffrey are
indeed the grandchildren of the Decedent. Id. at 3-4. However, the
orphans’ court admitted Marci’s and Jeffrey’s birth certificates, which show
them to be Wade III’s children, into evidence without objection by Spriggs.
Id. at 81-82. Moreover, throughout the de novo proceedings, Spriggs
admitted countless times that Marci and Jeffrey are the grandchildren of the
Decedent. For example, Spriggs testified that she told her attorney when he
helped her apply for letters of administration for the Decedent’s estate that
the Decedent had two living grandchildren, Marci and Jeffrey. Id. at 65.
Likewise, Spriggs admitted in her testimony that there was no question that
the Decedent had a son, Wade III, who had two children, Marci and Jeffrey,
who are the Decedent’s grandchildren. Id. at 72. Spriggs also identified
Marci and Jeffrey in family photographs as Wade III’s children and the
Decedent’s grandchildren. See id. at 19-21.
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Therefore, the certified record reflects that there is substantial
evidence proving that Marci and Jeffrey are the grandchildren and heirs of
the decedent. Wade III’s birth certificate reveals that he was the decedent’s
son and Marci’s and Jeffrey’s birth certificates show that they are Wade III’s
children. Thus, there is irrefutable proof in this case that Marci and Jeffrey
are the Decedent’s grandchildren and heirs. Even if Spriggs was correct in
the first two issues that she raised on appeal, that the court should not have
admitted Wade III’s birth certificate and death certificate into evidence,
there is still ample evidence, through Spriggs’ own admissions,
demonstrating that Marci and Jeffrey are the Decedent’s grandchildren and
sole heirs. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that Marci and
Jeffrey met their burden of proving that they are the grandchildren and sole
heirs of the Decedent.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/19/2014
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