In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 22, 2014
S14A0793. DEKALB COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. BUTLER.
BENHAM, Justice,
Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary
school. On August 13, 2010, appellant DeKalb County School District notified
appellee it would be terminating her employment on grounds of (1)
incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other
good and sufficient cause.1 Appellee was placed on suspension while the
charges were pending.2 A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal
Act, OCGA § 20-2-940 et seq., but the parties agreed to a continuance and then
the hearing never took place.3 On May 11, 2011, appellant offered appellee, in
lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011-
1
Among the reasons appellant was no longer willing to employ appellee as a school
administrator was the allegation that while appellee was a principal, she used school funds to
purchase books she authored from a company she owned.
2
Although suspended, appellee received her full contracted salary as a school administrator
for the 2010-2011 school year. That contract expired as of June 30, 2011.
3
It appears from the record that the parties attempted to negotiate a mutual resolution
regarding appellee’s employment status during the time the hearing was continued.
2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May
19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded
to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her
May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered
position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel,
appellee returned the signed teaching contract “under protest.” On July 15,
2011, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s
employment had ended as of June 30, 2011.
On March 9, 2012, appellee filed the instant mandamus action, requesting
an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012
teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court
granted and denied in part both parties’ motions. The trial court’s ruling
effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that
appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee
and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial
court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as
appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied
2
appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not
timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school
year.
1. On appeal, appellant asserts that appellee was not entitled to an FDA
hearing and that the trial court erred when it partially granted appellee’s motion
for summary judgment and ordered mandamus relief. We agree. The
employment rights of public school employees in this state are statutory and are
set forth in the FDA. See OCGA § 20-2-940, et seq. Prior to April 7, 1995, the
FDA defined the word “teacher” broadly so as to include school administrators
such as assistant principals and principals. Patrick v. Huff, 296 Ga. App. 343
(1) (674 SE2d 398) (2009). Under the pre-1995 FDA, school administrators
could not be removed from their administrative positions without notice and a
hearing. See OCGA 20-2-942 (b) (2) (1994). In 1995, the legislature amended
the FDA in order to “limit certain rights of school administrators.” Ga. Laws
1995, p. 304. The post-1995 FDA provides that any person who becomes a
school administrator on or after April 7, 1995, is no longer entitled to FDA
procedural protections when faced with the non-renewal of his or her
employment contract as a school administrator. Id. at 345-346; OCGA § 20-2-
3
942 (c) (1). The post-1995 FDA defines a school administrator as a professional
school employee who: (1) is certificated by the Professional Standards
Commission; (2) holds a leadership certificate; and (3) is assigned to a
leadership position. OCGA § 20-2-942 (a) (1.1).4 As part of the 1995
amendments to the FDA, the legislature included a grandfather clause for those
who were tenured teachers as of April 7, 1995, and who later became school
administrators:
A teacher who had acquired any rights to continued employment
under this Code section prior to April 7, 1995, and who is or
becomes a school administrator without any break in employment
with the local board for which the person had been a teacher shall
retain those rights under this Code section to continued employment
in the position as teacher with such local board.
OCGA § 20-2-942 (c) (2).
Here, the record shows appellee worked as a classroom teacher from 1989
to 1992. In August 1992, appellee became a school counselor (or, “Lead
Teacher for Special Services”) and held the position for three years. According
to the affidavit of Dr. Tova Jackson Davis, the Director for Employment
Services for the DeKalb County School System, the school counselor position
4
The post-1995 FDA defines a “teacher” as a professional school employee who is
certificated by the Professional Standards Commission, but who is not a school administrator.
OCGA § 20-2-942 (a) (4).
4
held by appellee did not require a certificate in leadership and appellee did not
hold such a certificate when she was assigned to the position in 1992. In July
1993, appellee obtained a conditional certification in administration and
supervision.5 In August 1995, appellee received her renewable certification in
administration and supervision and was promoted to assistant principal (or,
“Instructional Lead Teacher”), an administrative position which required the
renewable leadership certification. In 1998, appellee was promoted to principal
and stayed in that position until 2010.
It is appellant’s position that it was not required to hold an FDA hearing
regarding the non-renewal of appellee’s administrative position because
appellee did not become a school administrator until after April 7, 1995. The
facts show that appellee first obtained a position requiring certification in
administration and supervision in August 1995, four months after the amended
FDA took effect. For that reason, she had no right to an FDA hearing for the
non-renewal of an administrative position. OCGA § 20-2-942 (c) (1) (“A
person who first becomes a school administrator on or after April 7, 1995, shall
5
According to affiant Dr. Davis, this was a non-renewable certificate in leadership and
required additional course work and experience to become renewable.
5
not acquire any rights under this Code section to continued employment with
respect to any position of school administrator.”)
However, since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher prior to April 7,
1995, she was covered by the grandfather clause set forth in OCGA § 20-2-942
(c) (2). That is, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in
2010, the only right appellee had under the FDA was continued employment as
a teacher. Therefore, appellant complied with the FDA when it offered appellee
a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her
termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by
appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was
required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering
appellee continued employment as a teacher.
2. The trial court held that appellee’s request for a name-clearing hearing
was moot because it reasoned that she could clear her name at the FDA hearing.
Since we have concluded appellee is not entitled to an FDA hearing, appellant
requests that we revisit the name-clearing issue. The record shows that appellee
has a court order requiring the Professional Standards Commission to conduct
a hearing on the underlying issues which led to appellant’s non-renewal of
6
appellee’s contract as a school administrator. As that hearing has yet to be
conducted, appellee still has the opportunity to present any name-clearing
evidence during that proceeding. Thus, we leave the trial court’s ruling on
appellee’s request for a name-clearing hearing undisturbed pursuant to the right
for any reason rule.6 See Cobb v. Hart, 295 Ga. 89 (2) (757 SE2d 840) (2014).
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur.
6
Inasmuch as there is no challenge on appeal to the trial court’s denial of appellee’s claim of
damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, we likewise do not disturb
that ruling.
7