FINAL COPY
295 Ga. 362
S13G1167. RODRIGUEZ v. THE STATE.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
In August 2010, a City of Norcross police officer stopped Sonia
Rodriguez, and in the course of that traffic stop, the officer found more than four
ounces of marijuana in her car. Rodriguez was indicted for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, and she moved to suppress the discovery of
the marijuana, conceding that it was reasonable for the officer to stop and detain
her for a brief investigation, but contending that the marijuana was discovered
only after her detention was unreasonably prolonged. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied her motion, but it certified its decision for
immediate review, and the Court of Appeals allowed an interlocutory appeal.1
The appeal eventually was heard by all twelve judges of the Court of Appeals,
and although the Court of Appeals entered a judgment affirming the denial of
the motion to suppress, only six judges concurred in that judgment. See
Rodriguez v. State, 321 Ga. App. 619 (746 SE2d 366) (2013).
1
See generally OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).
Upon the petition of Rodriguez, we issued a writ of certiorari to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals, and we directed the parties to address two
questions in their briefs:
1. Was the Court of Appeals equally divided in this case, and
therefore, should it have transferred the case to this Court? See Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V.
2. If so, did the trial court err when it denied the motion to
suppress?
We now conclude that the Court of Appeals never should have rendered any
decision in this case and instead should have transferred the appeal to this Court.
About the merits of the appeal, we see no error in the denial of the motion to
suppress. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court, and we remand for the Court of Appeals
to transmit a remittitur to the trial court consistent with this opinion.
1. We begin with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, where the
appeal was docketed in the September 2012 term. At first, the appeal was
assigned to a panel of three judges, and on February 19, 2013, the panel issued
a unanimous decision, affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.2 Eight
2
The original panel was composed of Presiding Judges Andrews and Doyle and Judge
Boggs.
2
days later, Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration. That motion was
granted, the panel decision was vacated, and the case was referred to the full
bench of twelve judges. See OCGA § 15-3-1 (c). On April 12, 2013, the Court
of Appeals entered the decision of the full bench, again affirming the denial of
the motion to suppress. That decision was announced in a per curiam opinion,
which was joined in full by Presiding Judges Andrews and Barnes, in part and
in judgment by Judges Boggs and Branch, and in judgment only by Judges Ray
and McMillian. See Rodriguez, 321 Ga. App. at 623. Presiding Judge Doyle
wrote a dissenting opinion, in which she proposed to reverse the denial of the
motion to suppress, and her dissent was joined by then-Chief Judge Ellington,
then-Presiding Judge Phipps, and Judge McFadden. See id. at 623-626 (Doyle,
P. J., dissenting). Judge Dillard wrote his own dissenting opinion, in which he
proposed to vacate the denial of the motion to suppress and remand for the trial
court to reconsider the motion. See id. at 627 (Dillard, J., dissenting). Then-
Presiding Judge Miller dissented separately, but without any opinion indicating
3
whether she would have reversed or only vacated the denial of the motion to
suppress.3
Our Constitution provides that, “[i]n the event of an equal division of the
Judges [of the Court of Appeals] when sitting as a body, the case shall be
immediately transmitted to the Supreme Court.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI,
Sec. V, Par. V. We have addressed the meaning of the Equal Division clause
before, and under our precedents, when the full bench of the Court of Appeals
has considered every claim of error that might cause the judgment of the trial
court to be set aside, and when the full bench is equally divided about whether
3
Other possible judgments, of course, are conceivable — that the appeal be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, for instance, or that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed in part
and reversed in part — but none seem plausible in this case. About jurisdiction, there is no
doubt that the Court of Appeals properly had jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal, and no
party urged that it was without jurisdiction. About a split judgment, there was only one
question before the trial court — whether the discovery of the marijuana ought to be
suppressed — and it would make no sense to affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and
to reverse it in part. And in any event, if then-Presiding Judge Miller had proposed to affirm
the judgment of the trial court in any respect, she would have concurred at least in part in the
judgment announced in the per curiam opinion, but she did not. As such, we do not think
then-Presiding Judge Miller meant to indicate by her dissent that she would favor any
judgment other than those proposed by the two dissenting opinions, even if she did not join
either of those opinions. Accordingly, we consider then-Presiding Judge Miller to have
indicated by her unexplained dissent that she would either reverse or vacate the denial of the
motion to suppress. Nevertheless, we note that such ambiguity in the judgment line of a
decision complicates matters considerably.
4
that judgment must be set aside, there is an “equal division,”4 and the case must
be transferred to this Court. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga.
41, 42 (83 SE2d 591) (1954) (Equal Division clause “contemplates the transfer
by the Court of Appeals to this court of cases where the Judges of the Court of
Appeals are equally divided on all questions in the case which would require an
affirmance or reversal of the judgment of the trial court.”). See also Ford v.
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 270 Ga. 730, 731, n. 4 (514 SE2d 201) (1999)
(noting that there was no equal division in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford,
218 Ga. App. 248 (461 SE2d 877) (1995), where a majority of judges were of
the opinion that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed upon some
ground, notwithstanding that the judges were equally split as to whether it had
to be reversed on one particular ground); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Clinard,
211 Ga. 340, 342-343 (86 SE2d 1) (1955) (citing Godard and returning case to
4
This understanding is consistent with the approach of the federal courts and many
of our sister states. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263, 264 (80 SCt 1463,
4 LE2d 1708) (1960) (court was equally divided where one justice did not participate, four
justices would affirm the judgment of the court below, and four justices would reverse);
Reyes v. Egner, 991 A2d 216, 217 (N.J. 2010) (court was evenly split when three justices
would affirm the judgment below and three would reverse); Sharpe v. Pugh, 209 SE2d 456
(N.C. 1974) (court was equally divided when one justice did not participate, three justices
would affirm the judgment below, and three justices would reverse); Stubblefield v. Wilson,
102 S 885 (Fla. 1924) (court was equally divided where three justices would affirm the
judgment below and three would reverse).
5
Court of Appeals where judges were equally divided upon one claim of error,
but had not considered other claims of error that might equally require reversal
of the judgment below).
In this case, six judges of the Court of Appeals were of the opinion that the
denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed, and six were of the opinion
that it should not. To be sure, of the latter six judges, four were of the opinion
that the denial should be reversed entirely, Rodriguez, 321 Ga. App. at 623-626
(Doyle, P. J., dissenting), one was of the opinion that it should be vacated and
remanded for further proceedings on the motion, id. at 627 (Dillard, J.,
dissenting), and one did not say whether she would reverse or vacate, nor did she
say what should happen next in the trial court, only that she dissented from the
decision to affirm. But for purposes of the Equal Division clause, differences of
opinion in this case about whether the judgment of the trial court should be set
aside as “reversed” or instead as “vacated” are not dispositive. See Newman,
“Last Words of an Appellate Opinion,” 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 727, 728 (2005) (“If
a judgment is to be undone, at least in some respect, there is a difference of
opinion among judges as to the circumstances in which ‘vacated’ or ‘reversed’
should be used in decretal language.”). See also Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga.
6
506, 512-513 (1) (6 SE2d 304) (1939) (“The judgment of reversal, without more,
operated only to vacate the orders and decree as therein stated . . . .”). Nor are
differences of opinion in this case among the six dissenting judges about what
ought to happen next in the trial court dispositive. See Parfait v. Transocean
Offshore, Inc., 980 S2d 634, 635-637 (La. 2008) (12-member court of appeals
was equally divided where six judges would affirm award of damages, two
would reduce the award by an amount certain, one would reduce the award by
another amount certain, and three would reverse the award entirely). Six judges
would have let the judgment of the trial court stand, and six would not. There
was an equal division in this case, the Court of Appeals ought not have rendered
any decision, and it instead should have immediately transferred the case to this
Court.5 Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals.
5
We note as well that, when the decision of an appellate court is remitted to the trial
court, the decision on appeal must be “respected and carried into full effect in good faith by
the court below.” OCGA § 5-6-10. Consequently, any appellate decision must be clear at the
very least about whether the judgment from which the appeal was taken still stands or instead
has been set aside. In this case, six judges at the Court of Appeals were of the opinion that
the denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed, and six other judges were of the
opinion that it should be set aside. If their split decision were the last word, the trial judge
could not possibly be expected to know whether the motion to suppress still stood denied,
and in such circumstances, the trial judge could not reasonably be expected to “carr[y] into
full effect in good faith” the decision on appeal. The Equal Division clause keeps a trial
judge from being put into such an untenable position.
7
2. We now consider whether the trial court erred when it denied the motion
to suppress.6 Viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court,
the evidence shows that Rodriguez was driving along Mitchell Road in the City
of Norcross late in the afternoon of August 18, 2010. She was accompanied by
a female passenger, Ereka Taszeika Williams. Rodriguez and Williams passed
by a Norcross police officer, whose patrol car was equipped with an automatic
license plate recognition system.7 The system alerted the officer that Rodriguez
was driving a vehicle that was known to have been driven by Enrique Sanchez,
who was wanted on an outstanding warrant. Based upon this alert, the officer
stopped Rodriguez and Williams. After he stopped them, but before he exited his
6
Because this case should have come to this Court by transfer pursuant to the Equal
Division clause, and because we have vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, we could
remand for the Court of Appeals to transfer the case back to this Court. But our issuance of
a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals was sufficient to put the whole case before this
Court, and a remand-with-direction-to-transfer-back is unnecessary. We will go ahead and
decide the merits of the appeal, as if it had been properly transferred here in the first place.
7
According to the record, the automatic license plate recognition system uses a
camera mounted on the patrol car to photograph the licenses plates of vehicles passing within
15 feet of the patrol car. The system identifies the license plate numbers of the passing
vehicles from the photographs, and it then compares those license plate numbers with a
database of license plate numbers associated with stolen vehicles and persons with
outstanding warrants. If the system matches a license plate number from a photograph to a
license plate number in the database, the system alerts the officer of the match.
8
patrol car and approached their vehicle, the officer checked the registration of
their vehicle and learned that it was registered to Rodriguez.
When the officer approached the vehicle, he asked Rodriguez and Williams
for identification. Rodriguez produced her driver’s license, and Williams
produced no identification card, but she gave her name and date of birth to the
officer. At that point, the officer explained the reason for the stop, and Rodriguez
responded that Sanchez is her son and that he was in prison. The officer noticed
that Rodriguez did not look at him as they spoke, and he asked whether there
were any weapons or contraband in the car, to which the women quickly and
simultaneously responded “no.” Both women appeared nervous when they
responded to the question about weapons or contraband. The officer also
observed an “unusually strong” odor of air freshener from the passenger
compartment of the car, which he knew to be frequently associated with attempts
to mask the odor of narcotics.
The officer then returned to his patrol car to verify the identities of
Rodriguez and Williams and to ascertain whether either had outstanding
warrants, and in the course of that verification, the officer determined —
approximately four minutes after he had initiated the stop — that Williams was
9
the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant in Florida. By that time, a second
officer had arrived at the scene, and the two officers awaited information about
whether Florida desired the extradition of Williams. As they waited, they
directed Rodriguez and Williams to exit the car, and the officers spoke with them
separately. About ten minutes after the stop was initiated, Rodriguez gave the
second officer consent to search her vehicle. The officers searched the vehicle,
and in the center console and trunk, they found between four and five ounces of
marijuana.
(a) In the Court of Appeals and this Court, Rodriguez has contended that
the first officer was without sufficient cause to stop and detain her for any length
of time. But Rodriguez not only failed to properly raise this contention in the trial
court, she affirmatively conceded in her motion to suppress — and in her
amended motion to suppress, filed two days after the evidentiary hearing on her
motion — that, when the automatic license plate recognition system alerted the
officer to her car, “the officer certainly had the right to stop the vehicle to
investigate.” She said nothing in her motion to suppress to put the State on notice
that it would be required to prove the lawfulness of the stop itself, as opposed to
the lawfulness of the detention that followed. To the contrary, in her motions, she
10
only complained that the stop had been unlawfully prolonged. As we recently
explained:
Our statutory law provides a procedure by which an accused may
move to suppress evidence that was obtained unlawfully. A motion
to suppress must be in writing and state facts showing that the search
and seizure were unlawful. In the absence of such a motion, the State
has no burden to prove the lawfulness of the manner in which
evidence was obtained, and the accused fails to preserve any error
with respect to the suppression of the evidence.
Hernandez v. State, 294 Ga. 903, 904 (757 SE2d 109) (2014) (citations and
punctuation omitted). In her written motion and amended motion, Rodriguez
failed to state any facts showing that the stop itself was unlawful, and she instead
conceded that it was lawful.8 As such, she waived any contention that the officer
was without good cause to stop her for the purpose of briefly investigating the
whereabouts of Sanchez, see id., and we decide nothing about whether the alert
8
In a brief filed with the trial court more than a week after the evidentiary hearing,
Rodriguez questioned whether the stop itself was lawful. But even then, she said only that
“[i]t is questionable, given the testimony at the hearing, whether the officer even had a
legitimate basis for instituting the traffic stop.” In her brief, Rodriguez did not actually urge
the trial court to suppress any evidence based on the allegedly questionable reasonableness
of the stop itself. Moreover, if the State failed at the hearing to prove a lawful basis for the
officer to stop Rodriguez in the first place — something about which we decide nothing —
it perhaps was only because the State had no notice that Rodriguez disputed the basis for the
stop. The State cannot be faulted for failing to prove something that Rodriguez never
properly put in issue.
11
by the automatic license plate recognition system was a reasonable basis for the
stop.9
(b) Rodriguez argued in the trial court that her detention was unreasonably
prolonged. The officer had sufficient reason, she said, to stop her car and
ascertain whether Sanchez was in it. Once the officer realized that the car was
occupied by two women, the officer still had authority, Rodriguez conceded, to
briefly inquire whether the women knew of Sanchez and his whereabouts. But
the officer had no reasonable basis, she argued, to ask about the identities of
Rodriguez and Williams, to ask about weapons and contraband, to verify their
identities, and to check whether they had warrants. The check for warrants, of
course, led to the discovery that Williams herself was a fugitive, and Rodriguez
never has disputed that an officer has reasonable grounds to detain a person
wanted in another jurisdiction for a short time to ascertain whether that
9
According to the dissent, “we have given police the authority to detain persons who
are lawfully operating their vehicles for being associated with persons who have outstanding
warrants . . . .” We decide nothing, however, about whether the association identified by the
automatic license plate recognition system in this case was enough of an association to justify
the stop. In any event, we note that the record does not include evidence about the precise
parameters of the associative algorithm employed by the system or the reliability of the data
that it uses. Again, perhaps that is because the State never had notice that the validity of the
stop itself was at issue.
12
jurisdiction desires the extradition of the wanted person.10 She argued, however,
that Williams was discovered to be a fugitive only after their detention was
unreasonably prolonged. We disagree.
To begin, we note that the record — viewed in the light most favorable to
the findings and decision of the trial court — shows that the officer discovered
the outstanding warrant on Williams within about four minutes of the stop itself,
a stop that, Rodriguez conceded in the trial court, was lawful.11 Moreover,
Rodriguez acknowledged that her detention for at least a portion of those four-or-
10
Rodriguez does not contend that, even after the officers learned that Williams was
wanted and thereby had additional grounds to detain Williams, it was unreasonable to
continue to detain Rodriguez. We do not, therefore, decide whether Rodriguez was
unreasonably detained after the officers learned that Williams was a fugitive. We note,
however, that although the dissent says it was unreasonable to continue to detain Rodriguez
at that point, the United States Supreme Court has said that it is not reasonable to “expect a
police officer to allow people to come and go freely” from a traffic stop or to “let people
move around in ways that could jeopardize [the officer’s] safety.” Brendlin v. California, 551
U. S. 249, 257-258 (II) (B) (127 SCt 2400, 168 LE2d 132) (2007).
11
About the time that passed before the officer discovered the outstanding warrant,
the officer testified that a second officer arrived around four minutes after the initial stop, and
he said that, when the second officer arrived, he explained to the second officer that
“Williams [had] an active warrant for her arrest.” This testimony certainly suggests that the
first officer ascertained the existence of the warrant within about four minutes of the
initiation of the stop. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the record, it does not help
Rodriguez, who bears the burden of showing error in the record. Boles v. Lee, 270 Ga. 454,
455 (1) (511 SE2d 177) (1999). Moreover, we note that a video recording of the traffic stop
was tendered in evidence at the hearing below, but it does not appear in the record on appeal.
We must assume, therefore, that the recording supports the decision of the trial court. See
Jones v. State, 292 Ga. 593, 597 (3) (740 SE2d 147) (2013).
13
so minutes — including the time it took the officer to initially approach the
stopped car, observe its occupants, and inquire about Sanchez and his
whereabouts — was reasonable. The only question presented in this case,
therefore, is whether the detention was unreasonably prolonged by the inquiry
into the identities of Rodriguez and Williams, the question about weapons or
contraband in the car, the verification of their identities, and the check for
warrants.
The duration of an investigative detention, of course, must be reasonable.
See generally Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (II) (103 SCt 1319, 75 LE2d
229) (1983) (plurality op.). Claims that such a detention was unreasonably
prolonged are of two sorts. In some cases, a detention is prolonged beyond the
conclusion of the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place, and
in those cases, the courts generally have concluded that such a prolongation —
even a short one — is unreasonable, unless, of course, good cause has appeared
in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention to pursue a different
investigation. See Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 736-737 (1) (632 SE2d 645)
(2006). In other cases, the detention is not prolonged beyond the conclusion of
the investigation that originally warranted the detention, but it is claimed that the
14
investigation took too long, perhaps because the officer spent too much time
inquiring about matters unrelated to the investigation. In these cases, the courts
examine “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 686
(II) (B) (105 SCt 1568, 84 LE2d 605) (1985). As the United States Supreme
Court has explained, even when an officer poses inquiries “into matters unrelated
to the justification for the traffic stop . . . [they] do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop.” See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S.
323, 333 (II) (B) (129 SCt 781, 172 LE2d 694) (2009) (emphasis added). In the
end, the question is “whether [the detention] was appreciably prolonged,”
considering “the detention as a whole,” and keeping in mind that “the touchstone
of our inquiry is reasonableness.” United States v. De La Cruz, 703 F3d 1193,
1203 (I) (A) (10th Cir. 2013) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Rodriguez contends that this case presents the first sort of claim, arguing
that the investigation of Sanchez necessarily concluded when the officer
observed two women in the car, asked about Sanchez, and was told that Sanchez
15
was in prison. At that point, Rodriguez claims, there was nothing more for the
officer to do to investigate Sanchez and his whereabouts. But the only
information about Sanchez that had been provided to the officer at the time of the
stop by the automatic license plate recognition system was his name and date of
birth. Although the officer may have assumed from the name that “Enrique
Sanchez” likely was a man, names do not always conform to common gender
stereotypes, and the officer was not absolutely required to accept immediately
that Sanchez was not in the car.12 See Breiding v. Wells, 800 SW2d 789, 790, n.1
(Mo. App. 1990) (citing J. Cash, “A Boy Named Sue” (Columbia Records
1969)). So, although the officer said that the occupants of the car “appeared to
be females,” and even if he subjectively thought it unlikely that either was named
“Enrique,” it was not altogether unreasonable for the officer to inquire about and
12
We note that the record shows that the officer was alerted that “Enrique Sanchez”
was born in 1987, and according to the officer, at least one of the women in the car appeared
to be about the same age as “Enrique Sanchez.” And although “Enrique” is a name given
most commonly to men, the record does not show that it is exclusively given to men. Indeed,
according to data compiled and published by the United States Social Security
Administration, nearly two percent of the American babies born in 1987 and named
“Enrique” were female. See http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/limits.html (visited May 31,
2014). And in any event, naming preferences may change over time, and American naming
preferences may not match those in other countries. By the way, the record does not show
where Sanchez was born, much less that the officer had such information at the time of his
investigation.
16
verify their identities. And, although the officer testified that he had no particular
reason to disbelieve the identifying information provided by Rodriguez and
Williams, or the information provided by Rodriguez about Sanchez, the officer
likewise was not absolutely required to instantly and unconditionally accept the
truth of that information without verification and to ask nothing more.
Moreover, the officer had done or said nothing at that point to indicate to the
women that his investigation of Sanchez was concluded. The investigation was
not, as Rodriguez contends, necessarily at an end when the officer observed two
women in the car and was told that Sanchez was in prison, and this is not a
prolongation case of the first sort.13 The question instead is whether the officer
extended his investigation too long by inquiring about the identities of the
13
That the officer may have subjectively thought it most likely by that point that the
women were not Sanchez, but were themselves wanted or in possession of unlawful
contraband — and that the officer may subjectively have been more interested in pursuing
an investigation of these things — is not dispositive. As the United States Supreme Court has
explained, “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis,” and “the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [do not]
depend[ ] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v. United
States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (II) (A) (116 SCt 1769, 135 LE2d 89) (1996). Nothing objectively
shows that the investigation of Sanchez was at an end before the officer learned that
Williams herself was a fugitive. See Johnson, 555 U. S. at 333 (II) (B) (“Normally, the stop
ends when the police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the driver and
passengers they are free to leave.”).
17
women, asking about weapons or contraband, verifying their identities, and
checking for warrants.
Given that the detention had been underway for only about four minutes
when the officer discovered that Williams was a fugitive, and given that
Rodriguez concedes that she was reasonably detained for a portion of those four
minutes, the inquiries to which Rodriguez objects prolonged the detention for
only a couple of minutes at most. Although the short duration of the prolongation
is not dispositive, it is relevant to our inquiry. See, e.g., United States v.
Digiovanni, 650 F3d 498, 509 (II) (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that, “where a delay can
be characterized as de minimis under the totality of the circumstances, it will not
be recognized as a Fourth Amendment violation” (citations omitted)); United
States v. Mason, 628 F3d 123, 132 (III) (4th Cir. 2010) (“The one to two of the
11 minutes devoted to questioning on matters not directly related to the traffic
stop constituted only a slight delay that raises no Fourth Amendment concern.”
(Citations omitted)). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “the police are not
constitutionally required to move at top speed or as fast as possible. . . . [A]t a
traffic stop, the police can occasionally pause for a moment to take a breath, to
think about what they have seen and heard, and to ask a question or so.” United
18
States v. Hernandez, 418 F3d 1206, 1212, n. 7 (11th Cir. 2005). So long as an
officer pursues his investigation with reasonable diligence, the Fourth
Amendment is not offended. See Sharpe, 470 U. S. at 686 (II) (B).
Moreover, these additional inquiries to which Rodriguez objects were not
altogether unrelated to the investigation of Sanchez and his whereabouts.
Ascertaining and verifying the identities of the women in the car were minimally
intrusive means of confirming that neither was the “Enrique Sanchez” for whom
the officer was looking. Verifying that Rodriguez was, in fact, who she claimed
to be would have provided the officer with at least some additional reason to
believe that, despite her nervous appearance, Rodriguez was being truthful with
him about Sanchez’s whereabouts. And taking a couple of minutes to verify
identities and check for warrants offered a brief opportunity for the officer “to
think about what [he] ha[d] seen and heard” and to consider whether any further
investigative steps were warranted before the detention concluded. The
additional inquiries were not altogether unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop, and that such inquiries and the subsequent identity verification and
warrant check could be accomplished in only a couple of minutes suggests their
reasonableness.
19
Equally important, inquiring about the identities of Rodriguez and
Williams, inquiring about weapons in the car, verifying their identities, and
checking for warrants are activities reasonably directed toward officer safety.
Generally speaking, when an officer lawfully stops and detains an individual for
a brief investigation — something that, we note again, Rodriguez conceded in
this case — the officer is entitled to take reasonable steps to make the scene safe
for his investigation. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 235 (105 SCt
675, 83 LE2d 604) (1985) (“When the Covington officers stopped Hensley, they
were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary to protect their
personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.”). As
the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, investigative traffic stops
“are especially fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long, 463
U. S. 1032, 1047 (103 SCt 3469, 77 LE2d 1201) (1983). See also Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U. S. 408, 413 (117 SCt 882, 137 LE2d 41) (1997) (“Regrettably,
traffic stops may be dangerous encounters.”). Accordingly, the officer may take
reasonable steps to ascertain whether the persons with whom he is dealing might
be dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 23 (III) (88 SCt 1868, 20 LE2d
889) (1968) (acknowledging legitimate interest of “police officer in taking steps
20
to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him”). To this end,
courts throughout the country have held that an officer generally may reasonably
inquire about the identities of persons detained at the scene of a traffic stop and
take reasonable steps to quickly verify their identities and to check their criminal
histories and for warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 600 F3d 56, 62
(1st Cir. 2010) (so long as request does not “‘measurably extend the duration of
the stop,’” no independent justification is required to ask passenger of lawfully
stopped car for identification); United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F3d 495,
500 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, “[a]ssuming a lawful stop, an officer is
entitled to some chance to gain his bearings and to acquire a fair understanding
of the surrounding scene,” including by asking driver and passenger for their
identifications); State v. McMichael, 276 Ga. App. 735, 741 (2) (624 SE2d 212)
(2005) (“The risks inherent in traffic stops create a strong interest in officer
safety that justifies reasonable safety measures that minimally intrude upon the
Fourth Amendment privacy expectations of motorists” including “for the officer
to request identification . . . and to run a computer check on the driver and the
passenger for outstanding warrants.”) (citation omitted); State v. Williams, 264
21
Ga. App. 199, 202-203 (590 SE2d 151) (2003) (“Checking for outstanding
warrants or criminal histories on the occupants of a vehicle at a valid traffic stop
is justified by concern for officer safety during the stop.”). In this case, even
though the additional inquiries made by the officer and the subsequent identity
verification and warrant check may have added a minute or two to the traffic
stop, they were justified for officer safety, as well as for their investigative value.
See, e.g., United States v. Purcell, 236 F3d 1274, 1278-1279 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that “[a] request for criminal histories as a part of a routine computer
check is justified for officer safety,” and holding that, even if check extended
stop for three minutes beyond what was necessary to complete investigation that
justified the stop, the extension was reasonable).
The process of inquiring about the identities of Rodriguez and Williams,
asking about weapons in the car, verifying their identities, and determining if
Rodriguez and Williams were the subjects of outstanding warrants did not
unreasonably expand the scope or duration of the stop, was minimally intrusive,
was justified by the investigation into the whereabouts of Sanchez, and was a
reasonable part of the officer’s efforts to ensure his safety. And given that
Rodriguez has acknowledged that the stop itself and other parts of the detention
22
were reasonable, the detention as a whole was reasonable in duration. The trial
court did not err when it denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress,14 and the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed. This case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals with direction that a remittitur issue to the trial court, affirming the
judgment of the trial court, and accompanied by our opinion.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices
concur, except Benham and Hunstein, JJ., who concur in part and dissent in part.
BENHAM, Justice, concurring in part15 and dissenting in part.
I write and dissent as to Division 2 because I respectfully disagree that any
detainment of Rodriguez was lawful. Otherwise, with this ruling, we have given
police the authority to detain persons who are lawfully operating their vehicles
14
Apart from her contention that the stop was unreasonably prolonged before she gave
consent to search her car, Rodriguez never has disputed — in the trial court or on appeal —
that her consent was voluntary.
15
I concur as to Division 1 of the opinion.
23
for being associated with persons who have outstanding warrants, for failing to
make eye contact and for using air freshener in their vehicles, none of which is
criminal conduct.16
As an initial matter, I agree with Judge Doyle in her dissent that Rodriguez
did not waive her right to protest the validity of the initial stop. It is undisputed
that the officer in this case made the stop solely because the license plate
recognition system alerted that Enrique Sanchez, DOB August 24, 1987, was a
wanted person associated with the vehicle. The officer made no effort prior to
the stop to determine whether the vehicle was registered to Sanchez or whether
Sanchez was still at-large (i.e., that the alert was valid). A basic search of the
Georgia Department of Corrections Offender Query database, which is accessible
to the public on the world wide web through any Internet connection, shows that
a person by the name of Enrique Sanchez, male, YOB 1987, was incarcerated at
the Coastal State Prison from April 22, 2010 to November 5, 2010.17 Thus, the
officer could have easily completed his investigation of the Sanchez warrant with
16
See State v. Thompson, 256 Ga. App. 188 (569 SE2d 254) (2002).
17
The only other Enrique Sanchez in the Department of Corrections database was
born in 1965.
a simple search of his computer or a call to dispatch and without exiting his
vehicle.
Even if the alert from the license plate recognition system created a
reasonable suspicion for the stop, the moment that the officer determined that
Sanchez was not inside the vehicle and was in prison was the moment the
encounter should have ended. Here, Rodriguez had committed no moving
violations, neither woman was observed to be engaging in any unlawful activity,
and no contraband was in plain sight. The officer testified that he had no reason
to disbelieve Rodriguez’s explanation about Sanchez, including her assertion that
Sanchez was incarcerated. Again, that explanation was easily verifiable by a
search of the Georgia Department of Corrections database. There was a complete
absence of reasonable suspicion to conduct any further investigation once it was
clear Sanchez was not in the vehicle. “[I]f the officer continues to detain the
subject after the conclusion of the traffic stop and interrogates him or seeks
consent to search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer
has exceeded the scope of a permissible investigation of the initial traffic stop.”
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Sims, 248 Ga. App. 277, 279 (546 SE2d 47)
(2001). For the officer to detain the women for any amount of time to question
2
them further or run Rodriguez’s and Williams’s information through the GCIC
was wholly unrelated to the reason for the investigatory stop (i.e., the outstanding
bench warrant for Sanchez) and was, thus, unauthorized. Id.18 See also Florida
v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 498 (103 SCt 1319, 75 LE2d 229) (1983) (it is unlawful
for police to detain a person “even momentarily without reasonable, objective
grounds for doing so”); Nunnally v. State, 310 Ga. App. 183 (2) (713 SE2d 408)
(2011). “The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. at 500.
We enjoy many freedoms and rights in this country, including, but not limited
to, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of the
press, the right to a speedy trial by jury, the right to vote, the right to travel, and the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. As the United States Supreme
Court observed over thirty years ago:
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of
transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and leisure activities.
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking
18
Even if, as the majority contends, the officer knew of Williams's outstanding warrant
within four minutes of the stop, there was still no basis to detain Rodriguez because her
driver's license was valid. At that point, the officer should have at least allowed Rodriguez
to leave. Instead, he decided to continue to question the women along with the other officer
who had arrived, making both women exit the vehicle as each officer spoke to each woman
separately.
3
on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and
privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing
themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual
subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an
automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be
seriously circumscribed. . . . [P]eople are not shorn of all Fourth
Amendment protection . . . when they step from the sidewalks into their
automobiles.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 662-663 (VI) (99 SCt 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979).
Because I believe the police went well beyond their authority in this case, I would
reverse the trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s motion to suppress and direct that the
motion be granted upon return of the remittitur to the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins me in this partial
dissent.
Decided June 30, 2014.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia – 321 Ga. App. 619.
Crawford & Boyle, Eric C. Crawford, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, Franklin P. Clark, Ayanna K. Sterling-
Jones, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
4