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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-15961
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00200-AT-JFK-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MOSEZELL KELLY,
a.k.a. Zip,
a.k.a. Zig,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(September 23, 2014)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Mosezell Kelly challenges the substantive reasonableness of his 60-month
imprisonment sentence for aiding and abetting the dealing of firearms without a
license. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Beginning in October 2011, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives and the Atlanta Police Department (“APD”) operated an undercover
warehouse in Atlanta, Georgia. During the undercover operation, Kelly and his co-
defendants, aided and abetted by each other and others in the business of dealing in
firearms without a license, sold firearms to undercover APD officers. From
January 18, 2012, through June 26, 2012, the defendants sold approximately 37
firearms and ammunition to undercover officers. Kelly, while under indictment for
a state burglary offense, directly sold firearms to an undercover officer and was
present during the sale of other firearms to the undercover officer. The undercover
officer informed Kelly that the officer had a felony conviction.
In July 2012, a federal grand jury returned an 11-count superseding
indictment against Kelly and 6 other defendants. The indictment charged Kelly
with aiding and abetting the dealing of firearms without a license, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 2 (“Count 1”), and possessing a firearm while under
indictment for burglary in state court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(n) and
2
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924(a)(1)(D) (“Count 4”). Kelly pled guilty to both counts without a plea
agreement.
Kelly had a total offense level of 25, which included a four-level
enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), for trafficking in firearms based
on Kelly’s belief he was selling firearms to a convicted felon for shipment to
California. Kelly had a criminal history category of IV. His offense level of 25
and criminal history category of IV resulted in an advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range of 84 to 105 months of imprisonment. The statutory maximum sentence that
could be imposed was 60 months of imprisonment on each count, to run
consecutively, for a total of 120 months. Kelly objected to his four-level
enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(5) for trafficking in firearms and the lack of a
minor-role reduction under § 3B1.1.
At sentencing, the government informed the district judge the superseding
indictment had identified the firearm in Count 4 incorrectly, and it was dismissing
Count 4. Kelly needed to be sentenced only for his conviction on Count 1. 1
Because of the dismissal of Count 4, the Guidelines range became the statutory
maximum, 60 months of imprisonment, below the advisory Guidelines range of 84
to 105 months of imprisonment.
1
The dismissal of Count 4 did not affect the Guidelines calculations.
3
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Kelly argued against the four-level trafficking enhancement under
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) and asserted the government had included fictitious facts in the
undercover operation for the express purpose of increasing his offense level and
Guidelines-imprisonment range. He further argued the government had targeted a
low-income, African-American neighborhood during the sting operation. He
specifically requested a 36-month-imprisonment sentence, below the 60-month
statutory maximum. He presented several arguments in mitigation, including the
physical and emotional trauma he had suffered in high school from a shooting
incident, which had ended his basketball career, and his mother’s battle with
cancer.
The district judge recognized Kelly’s concern about the four-level
trafficking enhancement and asked the government:
[H]as the sentence been jacked up by allowing things to go on longer,
adding more twists to the scenario, and unfairly basically putting these
defendants in a position where they’re facing much larger sentences
because of all the fictitious turns?
R. at 1823-24. The government responded in the negative and argued the
defendants’ criminal histories, rather than offense-specific enhancements, had
increased the sentencing ranges. The government requested the statutory
maximum sentence, based upon the seriousness of the offense and Kelly’s
extensive criminal history.
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The district judge overruled Kelly’s objections and sentenced him to 60
months of imprisonment, the statutory maximum. The judge stated she would like
to see Kelly reunited with his family. Nevertheless, she recognized that Kelly had
engaged in very serious, reckless conduct in selling firearms. She was concerned
by Kelly’s conduct, particularly when he had suffered from gunshot wounds. The
judge also noted Kelly was fortunate that the superseding indictment contained an
erroneous charge, because the dismissal of that charge had limited the sentence the
judge could impose. The district judge found a 60-month sentence was reasonable
under the circumstances and recognized both the seriousness of the offense and the
disorder of Kelly’s life caused by the shooting incident. She further stated Kelly
had been given enough opportunities to change his behavior.
On appeal, Kelly argues his 60-month imprisonment sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the district judge failed to consider the
manipulative role the government played in his crime. He further contends the
judge should have placed greater weight on the hardships he had suffered as a
result of being robbed and shot when he was in high school.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591
(2007). We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the
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totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 51, 128
S. Ct. at 597. 2 The § 3553(a) factors to be considered include (1) the nature and
circumstances of the crime and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the crime; (3) the
need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the
applicable Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it does not achieve the purposes
of sentencing stated in § 3553(a). United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191
(11th Cir. 2008). In addition, a sentence may be substantively unreasonable if a
district judge unjustifiably relied on any one § 3553(a) factor, failed to consider
pertinent § 3553(a) factors, selected the sentence arbitrarily, or based the sentence
on impermissible factors. Id. at 1191-92. The weight to be accorded any given
§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district judge.
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). The party who
challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
2
Kelly has abandoned any arguments regarding procedural reasonableness. United
States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing an appellant abandons an
argument not raised in his initial brief on appeal).
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Sentencing factor manipulation occurs when the government manipulates a
sting operation to increase a defendant’s potential sentence, such that a sentencing
reduction is warranted. United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1223 (11th Cir.
2012) (per curiam). A reduction to a defendant’s sentence is only warranted,
however, if the sting operation involved extraordinary misconduct. Id. Although
we recognize sentencing factor manipulation as a means for a sentence reduction,
we have never applied it. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264,
1269-71 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding the government did not engage in
sentencing-factor manipulation, when confidential informant provided defendant
with firearm equipped with silencer, the possession of which resulted in a
mandatory 30-year, minimum-imprisonment sentence); United States v. Williams,
456 F.3d 1353, 1370-71 (11th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the purchase of crack
cocaine, rather than powder cocaine, is not sentencing-factor manipulation),
abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.
Ct. 558 (2007).
The district judge expressly considered the government’s role in the sting
operation and Kelly’s personal history when imposing the sentence. The judge
heard argument from the parties concerning Kelly’s contention that the
government had targeted a low-income, African-American neighborhood. The
judge also noted the undercover officers’ use of fictitious facts had increased the
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applicable Guidelines range. The officers’ use of such facts during the sting
operation did not amount to extraordinary misconduct sufficient to warrant a
sentence reduction.
The judge further explained a 60-month sentence recognized the hardship
Kelly had suffered, because of the earlier shooting, the seriousness of the offense,
Kelly’s criminal history, and the opportunities Kelly had been given. Although
Kelly challenges the weight the district judge placed upon the government’s role
and his personal history, we will not reweigh the sentencing factors. See Clay, 483
F.3d at 743. The dismissal of Count 4, based on citation to an incorrect firearm,
was fortunate for Kelly, because it resulted in a maximum sentence that was much
lower than the applicable Guidelines range of 84 to 105 month of imprisonment.
Under the totality of the circumstances and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, Kelly’s
60-month imprisonment sentence is substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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