Filed 9/23/14 In re Gage J. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re GAGE J., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
D065363
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JCM233464)
v.
GAGE J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Aaron H.
Katz, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General,
Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Minor Gage J. (Gage) admitted to possessing a knife on school grounds, as alleged
in a petition filed in the juvenile court. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1).) During a
later hearing, Gage moved to withdraw his admission. The court denied his request
without prejudice and placed him on formal probation.
Gage appeals, contending he is entitled to withdraw his admission because the
juvenile court failed to orally advise him of the one-year maximum period of
confinement as a direct consequence of his plea. We disagree and affirm the order of the
juvenile court denying his request to withdraw his admission.
BACKGROUND
A petition filed with the juvenile court alleged Gage possessed a knife on school
grounds (count 1) and violated curfew (count 2). (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1); San
Diego Mun. Code, § 58.0102, subd. (a).) The court initially placed Gage on informal
supervision, but reinstated the petition a few months later because Gage was expelled
from school and continued to demonstrate behavioral problems at home.
Immediately after the court reinstated the petition, counsel explained Gage was
willing to admit count 1 in exchange for the People's dismissal of count 2. Gage was
advised of and waived his constitutional rights, then admitted the knife allegation.
Before Gage entered his admission, however, the court did not orally advise him of the
maximum term of confinement, which was one year. Although the court did not orally
advise Gage of the potential term of confinement, both Gage and the court signed the
minute order the same day, which stated: "The minor is advised the maximum term for
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Count 1 is 1 year," and "[t]he minor is advised the overall maximum term of confinement
is 1 year."
At the next hearing Gage moved to withdraw his admission, challenging the
court's decision to revoke his informal supervision. The court rejected this argument,
noting its decision to revoke informal supervision was a separate issue having no effect
on the validity of Gage's admission. The court denied the motion without prejudice "to
be renewed for appropriate grounds."
Gage did not renew his request to withdraw his admission at either of the two
continued disposition hearings that followed. At the final disposition hearing, Gage again
expressed his dissatisfaction with the court's decision to revoke informal supervision,
stating, "I have not broken informal probation . . . and I don't see why the court is pushing
me to be on probation for a year . . . ."
DISCUSSION
Gage for the first time on appeal contends he should be able to withdraw his
admission based on the juvenile court's failure to orally advise him of the direct
consequences of his plea.1 He contends he would not have admitted the knife allegation
had the juvenile court orally admonished him of the one-year maximum term of
confinement. Because the record shows Gage was aware of the one-year maximum term,
we conclude he fails to establish the prejudice necessary to warrant a withdrawal of his
admission.
1 Although the People argue Gage forfeited this claim by failing to raise this
objection in the juvenile court, we nevertheless dispose of it on the merits.
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A. Legal Principles
Generally, a defendant may move the trial court to set aside a guilty plea for good
cause at any time before the entry of judgment. (Pen. Code, § 1018.) "Good cause"
requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence of mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress
or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment. (People v. Cruz (1974)
12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) The grant or denial of such a withdrawal motion is "within the
sound discretion of the trial court and must be upheld unless an abuse thereof is clearly
demonstrated." (People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 796.)
The validity of a guilty plea requires a record demonstrating the trial court advised
the defendant of the direct consequences of the conviction, including the permissible
range of punishment provided by statute. (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d
592, 605.) The phrase, "possible range of punishment," has been interpreted to mean an
advisement of the maximum and minimum prison terms that may be imposed upon
conviction. (In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927, 932-933.) Thus, the trial court
errs when it fails to advise a defendant of the maximum term of punishment as a
consequence of his or her plea. (Bunnell, supra, at p. 605.)
However, as the California Supreme Court explained in People v. Walker (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022-1023, a defendant is entitled to relief based on the trial court's
failure to advise of the maximum term of confinement only if the defendant establishes
that he or she was prejudiced by the error. (In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352.) To
establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate it is "reasonably probable" that he or
she would not have pleaded guilty if not for the error. (Walker, supra, at p. 1023.)
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B. Analysis
Although the juvenile court failed to orally advise Gage he could be subject to
confinement in juvenile court for up to one year, we conclude on this record that the
court's failure to do so was harmless. Gage was represented by counsel (and Gage
indicated to counsel that he was willing to admit the knife allegation). Immediately after
Gage entered his admission, the record shows he signed the minute order, which clearly
advised the maximum term of confinement for possessing a knife on school grounds was
one year.
Moreover, Gage was given several opportunities to move to withdraw his
admission based on the court's failure to advise him of the direct consequences of his
plea. The record also shows, however, Gage made no effort to do so, suggesting he did
not consider the court's failure significant in his decision to admit the knife allegation.
In addition, Gage's statement at the final disposition hearing that he did not "see
why the court [was] pushing [him] to be on probation for a year" shows he was in fact
aware of the maximum term of punishment for possessing a knife on school grounds.
Gage's assertion in his brief that, but for the court's failure to advise him he would
not have made his admission, without any evidentiary support from the record, is
insufficient to establish prejudice. As such, we are satisfied on this record that Gage had
full recognition of the consequences of his admission, including the potential term of
confinement in juvenile hall for up to one year. Because Gage was aware of the potential
term of confinement, he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the juvenile court's
failure to confirm his awareness and is not entitled to withdraw his plea.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the order of the juvenile court denying Gage's request to withdraw his
admission of possessing a knife on school grounds.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
IRION, J.
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