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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-15767
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20524-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEX CHRISTOPHER WESTBROOK,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(September 24, 2014)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Alex Christopher Westbrook appeals his 114-month sentence following his
guilty plea to conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm
in furtherance of a crime of violence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 3, 2013, Westbrook and his codefendants drove to a McDonald’s in
Miami, Florida, to commit armed robbery. Westbrook and one co-defendant, Leon
Escourse-Westbrook (“Escourse”), entered the restaurant, while the other
codefendant waited in, and later drove, the “get-away car.” R. at 202-03. During
the robbery, Westbrook brandished a gun and ordered everyone to the floor.
Westbrook pointed the gun at several customers, from whom Westbrook took
several electronic items.
On July 19, 2013, a federal grand jury indicted Westbrook and two
codefendants for conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 1); Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) (Count 2); and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 3). In September
2013, Westbrook pled guilty to Counts 1 and 3 with a plea agreement in which the
government agreed to seek the dismissal of Count 2 at sentencing. During
Westbrook’s plea proceeding, the government proffered the facts, and Westbrook
testified the government’s proffer was true.
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Westbrook’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which applied the
2012 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, provided a description of the offense conduct
that was materially identical to the government’s proffer. The PSI further reported
one of the victims told police one robber approached him with a gun and told him
to get on the floor, which he did. The robbers then ordered two other patrons to get
on the ground and to give them everything they had. An iPhone and a laptop were
taken from them. Surveillance video showed the shorter of the two robbers had
used the gun. Westbrook is several inches shorter than Escourse.
The PSI assigned Westbrook a base offense level of 20, under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(a). The probation officer added 2 levels, because a person was physically
restrained to facilitate the commission of the offense or escape, under
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The PSI accorded a 3-level acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which yielded an offense level of 19. The
probation officer assigned Westbrook a criminal history category of I, which
resulted in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 30-37 months of imprisonment for
Count 1. Westbrook was subject to a statutory maximum prison term of 20 years
on Count 1, and a consecutive term of 7 years to life on Count 3. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), (D)(ii), 1951(a).
The district judge conducted a joint sentencing hearing for Westbrook and
his codefendants. Westbrook and Escourse objected to the imposition of a
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physical-restraint enhancement. The judge determined the enhancement was
appropriate under United States v. Victor, 719 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2013).
Westbrook’s counsel stated: “Also, the fact that he is getting 84 months for the
firearm, it just seems like a double hit for doing the same action of having a
firearm. But as I’ve set forth, I don’t think that should apply. But your Honor has
ruled on that.” R. at 275-76.
The district judge calculated an offense level of 19, a criminal history
category of I, and a resulting Guidelines range of 30-37 months of imprisonment as
to Count 1, to be followed by an 84-month sentence as to Count 3. Consequently,
the judge imposed a 30-month sentence on Count 1 and a consecutive 84-month
sentence on Count 3, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release. The judge
stated he had “considered the statements of all parties, the presentence report,
which contains the advisory Guidelines, and the statutory factors as set forth in
Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553.” R. at 277. When asked for
objections, Westbrook renewed his physical-restraint-enhancement objection. The
judge dismissed Count 2 on the government’s motion.
Westbrook argues on appeal that the district judge erred in imposing the
two-level § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement. He contends he used the gun not to
move or restrain the victims, but to ensure compliance with his “request,” and he
did not “pistol whip” anyone. Appellant’s Br. at 12. He argues applying
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§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) in his case would subject every armed robber to the enhancement
unless no victims were present during the robbery. Westbrook appears to argue for
the first time on appeal that, because he was subject to an increased mandatory
minimum sentence for brandishing a gun, the two-level enhancement resulted in
impermissible double-counting based on the same conduct.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district judge’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo and his factual findings for clear error. Victor, 719 F.3d at 1290. We also
review de novo a double-counting claim. United States v. Webb, 665 F.3d 1380,
1382 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Assignments of error not raised before the
district judge, however, are reviewed on appeal for plain error. United States v.
Rodriguez, 627 F.3d 1372, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010). Establishing plain error requires
showing (1) an error (2) that was plain, (3) affected one’s substantial rights, and
(4) seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Id. Under
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), a two-level sentencing enhancement applies “if any person was
physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.”
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The § 2B3.1 commentary explains the enhancement
applies in “robberies where a victim was forced to accompany the defendant to
another location, or was physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked up.”
Id. § 2B3.1 cmt. background. The Guidelines define “physically restrained” as
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“the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” Id.
§ 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(K).
The physical-restraint enhancement is not limited to these examples, but also
applies when a defendant’s conduct “ensured the victims’ compliance and
effectively prevented them from leaving a location.” Victor, 719 F.3d at 1290. In
Victor, the defendant entered a credit union with his hand in his jacket as if
concealing a gun and directed a lobby employee to the teller line. Id. at 1289. We
concluded that “by threatening the lobby employee with what the employee
believed to be a gun to prevent her from escaping, [the defendant] physically
restrained her” under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Id. at 1290. Although the defendant
argued on appeal that he had not moved the employee “for a significant distance,”
we highlighted that § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) did not require the victim to be moved at all.
Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (concluding a § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement applied to a bank robbery
where, “[a]lthough no threats were made, the obvious presence of handguns
ensured the victims’ compliance and effectively prevented them from leaving the
room for a brief period while the robbers fled the scene”).
“Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines
is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that
has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the
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Guidelines.” Webb, 665 F.3d at 1382 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Double counting a factor during sentencing is permitted if the
Sentencing Commission intended that result and each Guidelines section in
question concerns conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing. Id.
Westbrook has not shown the district judge erred in imposing the
§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement. Contrary to Westbrook’s suggestion, the
enhancement did not require the movement of victims, much less “pistol
whip[ping].” See Victor, 719 F.3d at 1290; Appellant Br. at 12. He moved several
victims by ordering them to the floor at gunpoint and thereby “effectively
prevented them from leaving” the restaurant. See Victor, 719 F.3d at 1290.
Westbrook’s double-counting claim also is meritless, regardless of the
standard of review. Westbrook’s challenge to § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) involves the
application of a Guidelines provision and a statutory minimum sentence, and not
two Guidelines provisions. See Webb, 665 F.3d at 1382. In any event, the
physical-restraint enhancement and the § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) mandatory-minimum
sentence implicated separate acts. See id. The § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) sentence was
based on Westbrook’s brandishing of a gun and would have applied regardless of
whether any physical restraint was involved. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).
The § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement, however, was based on Westbrook’s
additional act of ordering several victims to lie on the floor at gunpoint, which
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“ensured the victims’ compliance and effectively prevented them from leaving.”
Victor, 719 F.3d at 1290.
AFFIRMED.
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