UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4318
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONNIE COLLINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh,
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00044-GMG-JES-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2014 Decided: September 25, 2014
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen
M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States
Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donnie Collins pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), and was sentenced as an
armed career criminal to 188 months in prison. He now appeals
his sentence, raising two issues. We affirm.
Collins first claims that he was improperly found to
be an armed career criminal. Under the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), if a defendant is convicted of violating § 922(g)(1)
and has sustained three prior convictions for violent felonies
or serious drug offenses committed on occasions different from
one another, the defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). “We
review legal issues such as whether a defendant’s previous
conviction counted as an ACCA predicate de novo, . . . and we
review factual findings for clear error.” United States v.
Washington, 629 F.3d 403, 411 (4th Cir. 2011).
We hold that Collins was properly found to be an armed
career criminal. He was convicted of serious drug offenses
occurring on May 13, 2004, June 18, 2004, and September 6, 2006.
The fact that he was apparently sentenced for the 2004 offenses
on the same date is irrelevant for purposes of determining armed
career criminal status. See United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d
1312, 1315 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Collins additionally contends that his sentence is
unreasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying
“an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In so doing, we examine the sentence for
“significant procedural error.” Id. If there is none, we
“consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence . . . ,
tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Upon a thorough review of the sentencing proceedings,
we conclude that Collins’ sentence is procedurally reasonable
and that he failed to rebut the presumption of substantive
reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence. See
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (explaining presumption of reasonableness).
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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