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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMIEL JOHNSON,
Appellant No. 1831 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered May 20, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0801541-2004
BEFORE: ALLEN, OLSON, and OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014
pro se from the order denying his
petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
sections 9541-46. We affirm.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On August 24, 2003, [at] approximately 9:30 p.m.,
Harrison Wiggins, a/k/a Slim, the decedent, (hereinafter
57th Street, Philadelphia, owned by Dana Wallace
shortly after Harrison. Dana, Geraldine Brooks
present in the house when [Appellant] arrived.
At approximately 4:30 a.m., Dana and Geraldine left
the house to buy drugs. At that time, Jerome and Wanda
were upstairs in the back room, Jason and a young lady
were in another bedroom, Crystal and Angelo were in
another bedroom, Harrison was downstairs in the dining
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room and [Appellant] was sitting on a couch in the living
room.
Shortly after Dana left, Jerome went to buy drugs.
Wanda, who remained upstairs in the back bedroom,
Within a couple of minutes, Wanda heard what sounded
like the furniture being bumped around followed by the
sound of glass breaking.
Immediately thereafter, Dana and Geraldine returned to
the house to find the front door locked. Dana banged on
the door and after five to ten minutes of banging on the
door, [Appellant] opened the door. Dana and Geraldine
entered the house and [Appellant] asked Dana to call 911
and asked for an ambulance but not the police. He then
At that point, Wanda made her way downstairs and on
her way out of the door she observed [Appellant] standing
in the middle of the living room and Harrison in the dining
room with one leg extended straight out, the other bent
with his hands on his head moaning and moving from side
to side. Harrison was completely saturated in blood almost
down to his waist. Dana left the living room, went
upstairs, and when he returned downstairs, [Appellant]
was gone.
Officer Milligan testified that at approximately 6:26 a.m.
she arrived at 1206 South 57th Street, Philadelphia. Upon
entering the house [s]he observed Harrison lying on the
floor in the dining room covered in a large amount of
blood. Officer Milligan noticed broken glass all over the
a rag in a corner. At that time, Officer Milligan sent all of
the individuals in the house outside where they were
detained by Officer Singleton, another officer who had
arrived on the scene. Officer Toughill, who arrived on the
scene at approximately 6:30 a.m., questioned the
individuals who had been in the house. After speaking
with the witnesses, Officer Toughill learned that the
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suspect was a black male named Jamiel wearing a black
doo rag, black shirt and black pants. [She] also learned
that a female wearing a red jacket left the scene. At that
point, Officer Toughill looked down Thomas Avenue and
saw a woman fitting that description. The woman was
brought back to the scene for questioning and identified as
Wanda Ibrahim.
Officer [John] Taggett photographed the crime scene
and recovered a roll of toilet paper with a red stain found
in the bathroom, a door handle with a red stain removed
from the interior side of the front storm door, three pieces
of mirror with a red stain found in the dining room and
several other items. T
were transmitted to the Criminalistics Laboratory for
analysis. Latent prints were lifted from a red stained piece
of mirror found in the dining room. The prints were
s of
was on the piece of toilet paper and a swab of stain taken
from the door handle.
Harrison was pronounced dead at 7:28 a.m. at the
Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania. Doctor Ian
Hood, the medical examiner, testified that Harrison died
from multiple stab and slash wounds and the manner of
death was homicide. He testified that seven slash wounds
were about the forehead, face and cheeks and one stab
wound was in the right side of the neck which severed the
jugular vein. Harrison also had several small scratches
and superficial incised wounds about the neck, back,
shoulders, upper arm and his right thumb. Dr. Hood
testified that [those] wounds are consistent with an
implement such as [a] shard of glass rather than a knife.
An arrest warrant was issued for [Appellant] and the
police made several attempts to apprehend [him] in
Philadelphia. [Appellant] was not apprehended until
February 29, 2004, in Memphis, Tennessee. At trial,
[Appellant] testified that four days before the murder he
went to Memphis, Tennessee and was not in Philadelphia
at the time of the murder. He also testified that he
learned of the murder from family members who told him
that he was accused of committing the murder.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 919 A.2d 289, 290-92 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted).
Based upon the above facts, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree
murder and possessing an instrument of crime. Thereafter, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to the mandatory term of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for the murder conviction, as well as a concurrent eleven
to forty-eight months for the possessing an instrument of crime conviction.
Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court in which he raised the
following issues: 1) a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his murder conviction; 2) a claim that the Commonwealth violated Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to produce allegedly exculpatory
mental health records; and 3) a claim that the trial court erred in concluding
that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Finding that the trial court
correctly addressed and rejected each issue, this Court adopted the trial
See Johnson, supra. On October 24, 2007, our Supreme Court denied
Commonwealth v. Johnson,
934 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 2007).
Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on March 26, 2008, but later
withdrew it. On October 1, 2008, Appellant filed another pro se PCRA
petition, as well as an amendment to that petition on March 18, 2009. On
November 12, 2009, the PCRA court appointed counsel. After receiving
several continuance requests, the PCRA court removed PCRA counsel, and
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appointed new counsel. Ultimately, Appellant requested the right to proceed
pro se. After conducting a Grazier1 hearing, the PCRA court permitted
Appelant to proceed pro se. Thereafter, Appellant supplemented his pro se
PCRA petition.
On February 8, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
hearing. After being granted a continuance, Appellant filed a response on
May 14, 2013. By order entered May 20, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed
PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues verbatim in his handwritten brief:
(1) Should [Appellant] be awarded an arrest of judgment
on the charges of Murder in the First Degree and PIC
where [the Commonwealth] did not have corpus delecti to
prove that [Appellant] is guilty of [these charges] beyond
a reasonable doubt, thus [trial counsel] lacked effective
assistance and [the trial court and the PCRA court are]
stripped of personal jurisdiction?
(2) Should above relief be granted against above cause to
adhesion [sic] of [the Commonwealth] proceeding without
bill of particulars based on unclear first degree murder (in
part) and third degree murder (wholly) statutes because
elements, no factors, thus the statutes are void for
vague[ness] [sic], overbroad, and has caused arbitrary
____________________________________________
1
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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and discriminatory enforcement by commitment and
there is no [controversy], assuredly no subject-matter
jurisdiction?
(3) [] Was [the trial court] uncan[n][o]y [sic] and [the
Commonwealth and trial counsel] unprofessional when
they instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of
-
included offense of third degree murder is recklessness,-
(wanton) a willful disregard of an unjustified . . . high risk
that . . . would result in death or serious bodily injury . . .
., -a callous mistake, and a greater offense of third degree
is specific intent to kill while the evidence only shows the
question was was [sic] the killing done with malicious
intent or the malicious and specific intent, (or voluntary
no corpus delecti for the lesser included offense of third
and Due Process rights, therefore [Appellant] is entitled to
a reversal of the first degree murder conviction, vacation
of the life without parole sentence, and a remand to the
[trial] court for a new trial with instructions on charging
the trial jury only on the greater offense of third degree
murder and first degree murder?
(4) [] Did [the trial court, the Commonwealth, and trial
counsel] apply the wrong standards of [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600
Amendment speedy trial rights were violated pre-trial upon
are responsible in bringing [Appellant] to trial in a timely
manner?
(5) [] [S]hould [Appellant] be awarded a discharge from
custody where [the trial court and the PCRA court] forgot
about a primary (mandatory) authority, Article [1], §
11(,1) Pennsylvania Constitut
-(in) speedy trial to
the claim of (re-)sentencing where they unnecessarily
delayed in ruling on the [PCRA] petition for 4¾ years
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causing gross inadequate communication of [Appellant]
and his (11-age, Jafar) son [sic]?
(6) [] [S]hould [Appellant] be awarded a reduction of
sentence where [the trial court] failed to protect
and trial counsel] failed to advise [Appellant] to openly
plea to third degree murder than go to trial on the theory
of self-defense and theory of first degree murder when the
evidence on [its] body and face is third degree murder?
(7) [] [S]hould the Court take Judicial Notice [of] all the
records of the Court below which purport the facts and
third-party Fifth Amendment (and Fourth and Fourteenth)
rights being violated by Detective(s) [sic] Booker not
reading the Commonwealth witnesses their Fifth
Amendment rights; the police complaints a double
wavier of extradition trial and no warrant of rendition
up a voluntarily waived claim of false DNA at trial, and of
[the PCRA court] committing fraud when [it] states in [its]
opinion that [Appellant] did not prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he is entitled to relief [under the
PCRA]?
(8) [] [S]hould [Appellant] be awarded an arrest of
judgment and a discharge from custody despite [the fact
that Appellant] admitted to the crime [during the] post-
conviction phase, when the confession was brought on by
subterfuge?
See -9 (citations and footnotes omitted).
petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is
supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA
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findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164,
1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a
he
claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the
record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 772 A.2d 1011,
1104 (Pa. Super. 2001).
To be eligible for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects in 42
Pa.C.S.A. section 9543(a)(2), and that the issues he raises have not been
previously litigated. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 131 (Pa.
court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has
ruled on the merits of the issue, or if the issue has been raised and decided
Koehler,
36 A.3d at 131-132; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). If a claim has not been
previously litigated, the petitioner must prove that the issue was not waived.
raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on
appeal, or in a prior state post[- Id. at 132; 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
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Moreover, to the extent Appellant challenges the effectiveness of prior
counsel, we note the following: To obtain relief under the PCRA premised on
a claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that counsel's ineffectiveness so undermined
the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d
s performance is presumed to be
constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon
Id. This requires the petitioner to
demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel
had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)
petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's act or omission. Id. at 533. A
finding of "prejudice" requires the petitioner to show "that there is a
reasonable probability tha
result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. Counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. Commonwealth
v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc), appeal denied,
852 A.2d 311 (Pa. 2004).
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court initially notes that the
all of his claims on appeal, explaining:
It is well settled that when the trial court orders an
appellant to submit a 1925(b) Statement, it is a crucial
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component of the appellate process. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
requires that the statement of issues complained of shall
be concise and set forth only those rulings or errors that
[an] appellant intends to challenge. This rule guards
against lengthy and incoherent statements that impede
appellate review. Issues not raised in accordance with the
provisions of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) are waived. Although the
number of issues, standing alone, is not grounds for
finding such waiver, the issues raised in the 1925(b)
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It is also well settled that when the trial court orders an
appellant to submit a 1925(b) Statement, the statement
must indicate, with specificity, the error to be addressed
on appeal. This rule guards against vague statements
which require the Court to guess which issues are being
raised on appeal. Such vague and nonspecific 1925(b)
Statements do not provide enough for the Court to conduct
a meaningful review of the issues, and are the functional
equivalent of no 1925(b) Statement at all. Furthermore,
even if by chance the trial court correctly guesses the
issues [an appellant] raises on appeal and writes an
opinion pursuant to that supposition, the issues are still
waived.
Here, the Court and the Commonwealth had to literally
guess what issues [Appellant] was seeking to raise in his
handwritten PCRA Petitions. The Court, understanding
that [Appellant] proceeds pro se, went to great lengths to
scour a voluminous record to discern what issues
[Appellant] might be raising, both in the underlying PCRA
claims, all of them are waived on appeal for his failure to
comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/28/13, at 7-9 (citations omitted).
on this basis alone. See generally In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345 (Pa. Super.
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sixteen claims raised by Appellant in his Rule 1925(b) statement. PCRA
claims, finding them either previously litigated, waived, or otherwise without
Thus, to the extent that Appellant has properly raised and preserved any of
his appellate issues, we adopt
Here, our appellate review is hampered for several reasons. First, we
agree with the trial court that Appellant did not raise some of his issues with
the requisite specificity in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Thus, the PCRA court
did not address them, and they are inappropriately being raised for the first
time on appeal. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, although
superficially complies with the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure as to the contents of an appellate brief,
Appellant fails to separate his supporting argument as to each issue,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), and within the argument section of his brief he raises a
myriad of claims not raised in his statement of questions involved. See
PCRA court error, and ineffective assistance of counsel, amount to no more
than bare assertions, and therefore are undeveloped. See Commonwealth
v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that undeveloped
claims will not be considered on appeal); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 783
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A.2d 328, 333 (Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining that claims of ineffectiveness
cannot be raised in a vacuum).
PCRA Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/26/2014
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