Com. v. DiPrimio, D.

J-S47011-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. DAVID DIPRIMIO Appellant No. 945 EDA 2013 Appeal from the PCRA Order February 8, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005763-2008 CP-51-CR-0005764-2008 CP-51-CR-0005765-2008 CP-51-CR-0005766-2008 CP-51-CR-0005767-2008 BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2014 Appellant, David DiPrimio, appeals from the February 8, 2013 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, without a hearing. In addition, together with a Turner/Finley no-merit letter, averring the appeal is without merit.1 and affirm the PCRA ____________________________________________ 1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super 1988) (en banc). J-S47011-14 The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history of this case as follows. On April 27, 2008, [Appellant] got into a fight with patrons at Mick Daniels Bar in South Philadelphia. After closing, while the crowd was leaving the bar, [Appellant] opened fire from across the street, shooting six times and hitting three victims. One of the victims was a man he argued with inside the bar, the second victim was a man he argued with outside of the bar, and the third victim was a man who had been talking to the second victim at the time of the shooting. When the crowd chased [Appellant], he shot a fourth victim. Another man who heard the shots and saw [Appellant] running eventually subdued [Appellant] and gained control over the firearm. However, [Appellant] flagged down a police officer and blamed the shooting on the man who had subdued him. An off- duty police officer who had witnessed the shooting then arrived on scene and explained that [Appellant] was really the shooter[]. On March 25, 2009, [Appellant] was found guilty after a waiver trial before the Honorable John count of attempted murder, simple assault, and possessing an instrument of crime.[2] On May 29, 2009, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 [3] [Appellant] appealed his sentence; the judgment of sentence was affirmed on June 17, 2010. Commonwealth v. David DiPrimio, [4 A.3d 691 (Pa. Super. 2010) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 14 A.3d ____________________________________________ 2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 901(a) (to commit 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a)), 2701, and 907, respectively. 3 Appellant was represented by Brian J. McMonagle, Esquire during trial and sentencing, and was represented by Mitchell Strutin, Esquire during his direct appeal. -2- J-S47011-14 of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied on December 28, 2010. On March 26, 2012, Appellant, represented by [private counsel,] Kenneth A. Young, Esquire, filed a Petition pursuant to the [PCRA]. [On July 12, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss On December 6, 2012, and January 7, 2013, [the PCRA] court sent [Appellant] notice pursuant to dismiss his PCRA Petition, explaining that the issues raised in his PCRA were without merit. [No response February 8, 2013, [the PCRA] court formally 2013, [Appellant] filed this Notice of Appeal. On April 11, 2013, [the PCRA] court ordered a 1925(b) Statement from [Appellant]. Postmarked April 26, 2013, [Appellant] sent this court his 1925(b) Statement, raising numerous claims on appeal. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/21/13, at 1-3. Young filed a petition to withdraw before the PCRA court, averring he had not been retained to represent Appellant on appeal and that Appellant could not afford counsel. On August 14, 2013, Appellant petitioned this Court for appointment of new counsel. On August 27, 2013, we remanded the matter to the trial court for resolution. On September 10, 2013, the PCRA court ordered that new counsel be appointed to represent Appellant in the instant -3- J-S47011-14 appeal. On October 4, 2013, John Belli, Esquire (Attorney Belli) filed his Attorney Belli, subsequently filed a petition to withdraw as counsel, together with a Turner/Finley letter on October 29, 2013. On May 5, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se no-merit letter. In his Turner/Finley letter, Attorney Belli identifies the following 1925(b) statement. 1. The PCRA Court erred by holding that ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present evidence that [A]ppellant was suffering from severe cognitive deficits at the time of the incident did not entitle him to relief; 2. The PCRA Court erred by holding that ineffective for failing to argue that he was incompetent to stand trial lacked merit; 3. The PCRA Court erred by holding that ineffective for failing to investigate and subpoena witnesses for the defense entitled him to no relief; 4. The PCRA Court erred by not granting relief on a claim alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and present of establishing that he lacked the mental capacity to form specific intent to kill; -4- J-S47011-14 5. The PCRA Court erred by holding that was ineffective for not reviewing the crime scene photos, which established that the entitled him to no relief; 6. The PCRA Court erred by dismissing appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the preceding claims in a post[-]sentence motion and on direct appeal respectively; and 7. The PCRA court erred by failing to provide [A]ppellant with a [Rule] 907 notice that specifically identified the reasons why the court dismissed his PCRA petition without a hearing. Had [A]ppellant been aware of the reasons for denying him PCRA relief he would have alleged that PCRA counsel was ineffective because he: a. failed to seek a retrospective competency evaluation; b. investigation to an alternative to justification; c. failed to certify the PCRA record with mental health records; and d. fail[ed] to submit affidavits of witnesses. Turner/Finley Letter, at 8-9. In his pro se Turner/Finley letter, Appellant raises the following additional issues. -5- J-S47011-14 [1.] [W is not in compliance with the procedures for filing an [sic] Brief[?]4 [2.] [Whether] trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object to the inadequate jury waiver colloquy denying [] Appellant [h]is Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel and [whether] PCRA counsel was ineffective for behalf[?] Pro Se Response at 1, 2. We reiterate the following principles guiding our consideration of an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. standard and scope of review is limited to support Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted) [, cert. denied, Edminston v. Pennsylvania, 1345 S. Ct. 639 findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159, 36 A.3d by Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17, 18 A.3d Court applies a de novo standard of review to the Id. Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-1215 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). Further, in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must ____________________________________________ 4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). -6- J-S47011-14 plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. Id. § 9543(a)(3). without conducting a hearing. [T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post- conviction petition is not absolute. It is within the support either in the record or other evidence. It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 882 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007); see also Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. We stress that an evidentiary hearing is not meant to function as a fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may support some speculative claim of Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604-605 (Pa. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review a PCRA Id. at 604. -7- J-S47011-14 aw from representation. As described by our Supreme Court, the requirements PCRA counsel must adhere to when requesting to withdraw include the following. - detailing the nature and extent of his review; - listing each issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed; - were meritless[.] Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 (Pa. 2009), quoting Finley, supra Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the - a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new counsel. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007). [W]here counsel submits a petition and no- merit letter that do satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court - trial court or this Court - must then conduct its own review of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if the claims appear to have merit, the court will deny at least instruct Id. (citation omitted). -8- J-S47011-14 As referenced above, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of Attorney Turner/Finley no-merit letter. Pro Se Response at 1. However, he does so by arguing that the standards governing withdrawal of counsel from a direct appeal as required by Anders, supra, and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), apply. Id. first error is that [Attorney Belli] filed a no-merit letter to this Court instead 5 of an Id. confusion stems from his interpretation of Santiago as applying to all appeals as opposed to only direct appeals. As the instant appeal is from a final order in a collateral challenge to his judgment of sentence through the PCRA, the afore-described Turner/Finley standards apply. See Pitts, supra. Instantly, we conclude that Attorney Belli has complied with the requirements of Turner/Finley. Specifically, Attorney Belli Turner/Finley letter details the nature and extent of his review, addresses the claims Appellant raised in his amended PCRA petition and Rule 1925(b) Statement, and determines that the issues lack merit. Attorney Belli provides a ____________________________________________ 5 One distinction between an Anders brief and a Turner/Finley no merit letter is that on direct appeal counsel must discuss all issues arguably supporting an appeal, while in collateral proceedings counsel must discuss all issues a petitioner wishes to raise. Wrecks, supra, 720-721. Hence, applying Anders criteria, Appellant avers Attorney Belli was ineffective for not spotting an issue, i.e. Appellant now claims has arguable merit even though it was not included in his Rule 1925(b) statement as an issue he wished to raise. As such, this issue is waived for our consideration on appeal. -9- J-S47011-14 Additionally, Attorney Belli served Appellant with a copy of the petition to withdraw and Turner/Finley brief, advising Appellant that, if Attorney Belli was permitted to withdraw, Appellant had the right to proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel. We proceed, therefore, to conduct an . pro se response alleg When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the following test, first articulated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987). When considering such a claim, courts presume that counsel was effective, and place upon the appellant the burden of proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failure to assert a baseless claim. To succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or him. [T]o demonstrate prejudice, appellant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for have been different. - 10 - J-S47011-14 Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). tablish any prong of Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 24 A.3d 319, 330 (Pa. 2011). the Turner/Finley letter, which pertain to his allegations of trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to investigate, raise or develop certain issues 6 Appellant known to the was ineffective assistance of trial counsel not to raise the issue. PCRA Petition, 3/26/12, at 10, ¶ 30. statutory: [W]henever a person who has been charged with a crime is found to be substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him or to participate and assist in his defense, he shall be deemed incompetent to be tried, convicted or sentenced so long as such incapacity continues. 50 P.S. § 7402(a). In order to establish incompetence, an appellant has the burden of ____________________________________________ 6 second and fourth questions. We therefore address them coordinately. ineffectiveness into an allegation of ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel. - 11 - J-S47011-14 proving that he was either unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to participate in his own defense. In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 665 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 56 A.3d 398 (Pa. 2012). Instantly, Appellant, in his PCRA petition made no averments that he was incompetent, that he was unable to understand the proceedings, or that he could not assist in his defense. He merely alleges that circumstances at trial suggested there was a question of his competency, but those circumstances are not identified.7 Appellant also, did not identify any experts prepared to testify on the issue. Further the PCRA court noted that the record, including colloquies with Appellant belied his incompetency claim. Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/13, at 6. Accordingly, we conclude the PCRA court did not err in determining there were no material issues of fact relative to the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel concerning their failure proffered no basis to conclude a material issue of fact exists, relative to the merits of the underlying issue. See Wah, supra.8 ____________________________________________ 7 PCRA Petition, 3/26/12, at 10, ¶ 30. 8 To the extent Appellant alleges trial court error in failing to act sua sponte in holding a competency hearing as a basis for PCRA relief, the claim fails as waived for failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. See Commonwealth (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 12 - J-S47011-14 In his first and fourth issues on appeal, Appellant makes a similar claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to investigate, develop, or possible diminished capacity defense. Turner/Finley Letter at 13, 20. In this at 5, ¶ 16. Appellant f medication, testimony from various friends and family, jail records will Id. obtained the background data, he would have been able to present testimony that Id. would have provided diminished capacity and unreasonable belief at the Id. at 8, ¶ 26.9 _______________________ (Footnote Continued) v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 903 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, Smith v. Pennsylvania, 133 S. Ct. 240 (2012). 9 The PCRA court determined that this issue lacked merit because diminished capacity defense is only available to defend a charge of first-degree murder. available only as a defense to first-degree murder []. Likewise, it is not - Commonwealth v. Russell, 938 A.2d 1082, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). However, we have explained that the specific intent element for attempted murder is identical to first-degree murder. Commonwealth. v. Spells, 612 A.2d 458, 461 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1992); In (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 13 - J-S47011-14 preceding issue. Diminished capacity is an extremely limited defense, which requires extensive psychiatric testimony establishing a defendant suffered from one or more mental disorders which prevented him from formulating the specific intent to kill. Only where a defendant admits liability and contests the degree of guilt is a diminished capacity defense available. Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 832 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. 2003) (citations actions or acted impulsively is irrelevant to specific intent to kill, and thus is not admissible to Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1122 PCRA petition did not identify with any specificity a mental illness or disorder that affected his ability to form the specific intent to kill. His generic material issue of fact in the absence of any proffer of expert psychiatric testimony on the subject. See id. _______________________ (Footnote Continued) re R.D., supra at 678. Thus, diminished capacity is a defense available to a charge of attempted murder. See Commonwealth v. Rovinski, 704 A.2d 1068, 1071-1072 (Pa. Super. 1997) (involving an appeal after this Court defense claim to a charge of attempted murder), appeal denied, 723 A.2d 1024 (Pa. 19 Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 64 A.3d 631 (Pa. 2013). - 14 - J-S47011-14 Appellant has included in the certified record various medical records pertaining to his traumatic head injury and recovery from 2005. These abil condition at the time he shot the four victims three years later. 10 In light of assistance of counsel relative to developing a defense of diminished capacity, we conclude the PCRA court did not err or abuse its discretion in See Commonwealth v. McLaurin, 45 A.3d 1131, 1137 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 2013). assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate and present witnesses for his defense. Turner/Finley Letter at 18. We have described a PCRA in presenting this type of claim as follows. to testify does not constitute ineffectiveness per se. Commonwealth v. Cox, 603 Pa. 223, 267, 983 A.2d establishing whether defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses, a defendant must prove the witnesses existed, the witnesses were ready and ____________________________________________ 10 nd accounts of its effect on father. N.T., 3/24/09, at 19-20. - 15 - J-S47011-14 testimony prejudiced petitioner and denied him a fair Id. at 268, 983 A.2d at 693. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 244, 247 (Pa. Super. 2011). Further, a petitioner must provide proof of the availability of the witness, his or her willingness to testify and the substance of the proposed testimony by including an appropriate affidavit or other proof with the PCRA petition. McLaurin, supra. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d 945, 960 (Pa. 2008). Nevertheless, a similar threshold testimony[,] Appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice sufficient to establish ineffectiveness of tr Id. at 965. witness to the assault of the Complainants against [Appellant] who was not the [] PCRA petition, 3/26/12, at 12, ¶¶ availability or willingness to tes supposed testimony is averred or supported in an affidavit. Absent these - 16 - J-S47011-14 pleading requirements, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the dismissal of this claim without a hearing.11 In his fifth issue, Appellant alleges trial counsel was ineffective for not reviewing crime scene photos that Appellant contends could have contradicted trial testimony of Commonwealth witnesses. Turner/Finley Letter at 20. Appellant did not include this issue in his PCRA petition, raising it for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement. -settled Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487 (Pa. 2011). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has waived this issue, and is due no relief. In his seventh issue, that his issues lacked merit. Turner/Finley Letter at 22. Appellant argues, s basis, he could have timely alleged ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel in failing to rectify the afore- e.g., failing to provide ____________________________________________ 11 Appellant only identified potential witnesses, albeit without any supporting material, for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement. - 17 - J-S47011-14 mental health records and failing to submit affidavits of witnesses. 12 Id. Additionally, in his response to ineffectiveness for, in turn, failing to raise an issue contesting the Pro Se Response to Turner/Finley Letter at 2-4. None of these issues were raised before the PCRA court in the first instance. In Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), this Court conducted an exhaustive review of Pennsylvania law regarding review of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims for the first time on appeal. The Henkel Court concluded that issues of PCRA counsel notice or in a serial PCRA petition. Id. at 29. We recognize that Appellant was still represented by PCRA counsel at the time the Rule 907 notice was issued and that the PCRA time bar may be an obstacle to future PCRA petitions. However, these factors do not alter the aforesaid requirement. for the first time on appeal renders any effective enforcement of the rule- Id. ____________________________________________ 12 At the time the PCRA court sent its two Rule 907 notices of its intent to dismiss, Appellant was represented by counsel. Additionally, the Commonwealth had filed a motion to dismiss reciting the above discussed deficiencies in Ap - 18 - J-S47011-14 counsel ineffectiveness are reviewable in this appeal. without merit, waived, or premature. Additionally, finding Attorney Belli compliant with the Turner/Finley requirements, we grant his motion to withdraw as counsel. Finally, discerning no error or abuse of discretion by PCRA petition without a hearing. Order affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted. Judge Olson joins the majority. Judge Wecht concurs in the result. Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 9/26/2014 - 19 -