UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4927
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VERNON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00081-F-2)
Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: September 29, 2014
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Andrea T. Barnes, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2012, Vernon Williams pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to falsely make and counterfeit obligations of the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and was
sentenced after a downward variance to three years’ probation.
Williams appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his
probation and imposing an eighteen-month sentence. On appeal,
Williams argues his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district
court may revoke probation and resentence a defendant to any
sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d
505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). We apply the same standard of review
for probation revocation as for supervised release revocation.
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).
Thus, a probation revocation sentence should be affirmed if it
is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40
(4th Cir. 2006).
To determine whether a sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first consider whether the sentence is
unreasonable. Id. at 438. In reviewing for reasonableness,
this court “follow[s] generally the procedural and substantive
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considerations that [are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original
sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into
account the unique nature of . . . revocation sentences.” Id.
at 438-39. A sentence imposed upon revocation of probation is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656. The court
need not robotically tick through every subsection of § 3553(a),
however. Id. at 657.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Ultimately, the
court has broad discretion to revoke probation and impose a
sentence up to that maximum. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657. Only if
a sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable[.]”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
With these principles in mind, we conclude that
Williams’ eighteenth-month sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Although Williams was sentenced above the recommended policy
statement range, the district court’s explanation for the
sentence reveals that the court considered the policy statements
and the § 3553(a) factors when determining the sentence, which
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was below the statutory maximum applicable to Williams’
conviction. We further conclude that the district court’s
decision to vary upward and impose an eighteen-month sentence
was substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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