UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CEDRIC LLAWENLLYN SURRATT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00055-MR-DLH-1)
Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: September 29, 2014
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross Hall Richardson, Acting Executive Director, Ann L. Hester,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cedric Llawenllyn Surratt was found guilty of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2012). The district court sentenced Surratt to 100
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Surratt questions whether the
district court procedurally erred when it ordered his federal
sentence to run consecutively to an unrelated, undischarged
state sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
Surratt contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court made a mistake of fact
and also did not give proper consideration to his mitigation
arguments. We review the sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the court properly calculates the defendant’s
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, gives the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considers the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, does not rely on clearly
erroneous facts, and sufficiently explains the selected
sentence. Id. at 49–51. “[I]f a term of imprisonment is
imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged
term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or
consecutively.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2012); see also U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.3(c) (2012).
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We conclude that the district court acted well within
its discretion in imposing the sentence to run consecutively to
the state sentence. The court properly considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to run the sentence
concurrently or consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) (2012)
(court must consider § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether the
federal term is to run concurrently or consecutively). The
court did not make a factual error in stating that the defendant
had a history of both drug and firearm offenses. Surratt’s
criminal conduct underlying his most recent state drug offense
conviction occurred just over one year before the conduct giving
rise to the federal offense.
As to Surratt’s argument that the district did not
sufficiently consider his mitigation arguments, the court also
did not err. The explanation of sentence given “must be
sufficient to satisfy the appellate court that the district
court has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”
United States v. Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330, 343 (4th Cir.)
(internal alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2747 (2013). We are satisfied that the
district court considered Surratt’s arguments for mitigation.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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