Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Sep 30 2014, 9:35 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DEBORAH MARKISOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CRAIG HATCHETT, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1402-CR-88
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven Eichholtz, Judge
The Honorable Peggy Hart, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49G20-1302-FB-12394
September 30, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Craig Hatchett appeals his conviction for Class B felony dealing in cocaine. We
affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to support Hatchett’s
conviction.
Facts
On February 21, 2013, officers of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
made plans to attempt undercover buys of drugs from suspected dealers. Two undercover
officers in an unmarked car saw Hatchett standing in a small group of people in a
neighborhood where there had been complaints of drug dealing. Hatchett made eye contact
with one of the officers, Hatchett and the officer nodded to each other, and Hatchett waved at
the officers, motioning for them to come to him. The officers drove over to Hatchett, who
then approached the passenger side of the car. Hatchett asked the officer in the passenger
seat what he was looking for, and the officer responded “forty.” Tr. p. 104. This is a
common drug dealing term that refers to forty dollars, which generally translates into two
small rocks of crack cocaine. Hatchett then gave the officer two baggies containing small
rocks of what appeared to be crack cocaine in exchange for two twenty-dollar bills, the serial
numbers of which had been pre-recorded. Later testing confirmed that the rocks were crack
cocaine. After the undercover officers left the area, uniformed officers arrived and arrested
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Hatchett. Officers found the two twenty-dollar bills with the pre-recorded serial numbers in
Hatchett’s pocket.
The State charged Hatchett with one count of Class B felony dealing in cocaine and
one count of Class D felony possession of cocaine. A jury found Hatchett guilty of both
counts. The trial court only entered judgment of conviction on the dealing count. Hatchett
now appeals.
Analysis
When we review a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we must
consider only the evidence most favorable to the conviction and any reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from that evidence. Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012). We
will affirm if a reasonable fact finder could determine from the evidence that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the
credibility of witnesses. Id. A conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone.
Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
Hatchett’s sole argument is that there is insufficient evidence he knew that the
substance he sold the undercover officer was crack cocaine. In Indiana, knowledge of the
nature of the substance sold is an element of dealing in a controlled substance. Bemis v.
State, 652 N.E.2d 89, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Such knowledge may be inferred by a trier of
fact based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances. McClendon v. State, 671
N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
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There is no evidence in this case to suggest that Hatchett was accidentally in
possession of crack cocaine. Rather, he engaged in conduct entirely consistent with drug
dealing when he sold the substance to the undercover officer in exchange for forty dollars,
evidencing familiarity with the street slang connected with the sale of crack cocaine.
Although Hatchett did not admit to selling crack cocaine or explicitly offer to sell the officer
cocaine, there clearly is sufficient circumstantial evidence that he knew he was selling
cocaine.
Conclusion
There is sufficient evidence to sustain Hatchett’s conviction. We affirm.
Affirmed.
BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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