UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RANDOLFO MARROQUIN, et al.,
Civil Action No. 13-598
Plaintiffs, DAR
v.
COUNTRY CHOICE, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Randolfo Marroquin, Juan Jose Guillen Morales, and Emilio Ortega Marroquin
bring this action against Defendants Country Choice, LLC, Merhan Haj-Momenian, and
Houshang Momenian, alleging violations of the minimum wage and overtime compensation
requirements of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the District of Columbia
Minimum Wage Act Revision Act (“DCMWA”). First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”)
(Document No. 24). With the consent of the parties, this case was assigned to the undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge for
All Purposes (Document No. 16); Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a
Magistrate Judge (Document No. 18). Pending for determination is Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Default Judgment of Amount Certain (Document No. 28). Upon consideration of the motion, the
exhibits submitted in support thereof, and the entire record herein, the court will grant Plaintiffs’
motion and enter default judgment against Defendants.
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 2
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are former employees of Defendant Country Choice, LLC, a corporation
operating “continuously in the District of Columbia and surrounding states acting as a meat
wholesaler and grocery store.” Complaint ¶¶ 3, 4. Defendant Haj-Momenian was the general
manager of Defendant Country Choice, and in that capacity, supervised Plaintiffs and held
authority with respect to the terms of their employment. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant Houshang
Momenian was the owner and manager of Defendant Country Choice during Plaintiffs’
employment, and similarly supervised Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs allege that they were
“employees,” and that Defendants were their “employer,” as defined by the FLSA and the
DCMWA. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 28, 35, 38.
Plaintiffs allege that during the course of their employment, they worked approximately
60 hours per week and received set weekly rates “irrespective of the number of hours that [they]
actually worked.” Id. ¶¶ 13-15. From approximately September 1, 2010 until January 15, 2013,
Plaintiff Randolfo Marroquin worked as a “general laborer, butcher, and delivery driver” for nine
and one-half to ten hours per day, six days a week. Id. ¶ 13. Defendants paid him $360 per week
from September 1, 2010 until December 1, 2010; from December 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011,
Defendants paid him $400 per week; from July 1, 2011 to June 20, 2012, Defendants paid him
$450 per week; and from June 20, 2012 to January 15, 2013, Defendants paid him $500 per
week. Id. Plaintiff Juan Jose Guillen Morales was employed by Defendants as a “general laborer
and butcher from roughly September 12, 2012 to March 20, 2013.” Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff Morales
also worked nine and one-half to ten hours per day, six days a week. Id. Defendants initially
paid him $380 per week; starting in November 12, 2012, they paid him $400 per week. Id.
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 3
Plaintiff Emilio Ortega Marroquin was employed by Defendants as a “general laborer and
butcher from roughly August 2006 to May 4, 2013,” and also worked for nine and one-half to ten
hours per day, six days a week. Id. ¶ 15. Defendants paid him $400 per week. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Haj-Momenian and Defendant Houshang Momenian
“controlled” their work schedules and “determined the rate and method of [their] pay.” Id. ¶¶ 13-
15. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants “willful[ly] and intentional[ly]” failed to pay
Plaintiffs the minimum wage and overtime compensation required by D.C. and federal law. Id.
¶¶ 13-15, 17. Plaintiffs assert the following claims against Defendants: violation of the overtime
requirement of the FLSA (Count I); violation of the minimum wage requirement of the FLSA
(Count II); violation of the overtime requirement of the DCMWA (Count III); and violation of
the minimum wage requirement of the DCMWA (Count IV).
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Default Judgment
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[w]hen a party against
whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend . . . the
clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After the clerk’s entry of default, the
party may then move for entry of default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). “The determination of
whether default judgment is appropriate is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”
ITPE Pension Fund v. Stronghold Sec., LLC, No. 13-0025, 2014 WL 702580, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb.
25, 2014) (citations omitted) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
defendant “must be considered a totally unresponsive party and its default plainly wilful,
reflected by its failure to respond to the summons and complaint, the entry of default, or the
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 4
motion for default judgment.” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting another source) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “The standard for default judgment is satisfied where the defendant makes no
request to set aside the default and no suggestion that it has a meritorious defense.” Id. (citations
omitted) (quoting another source).
The Clerk of Court’s entry of default “establishes the defaulting party’s liability for the
well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting other source) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Unless the amount of damages is a sum certain, the court must make
an “independent determination” and has “considerable latitude” in awarding a sum of damages.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The court may rely upon detailed
affidavits and documentary evidence in the determination of the amount of the default
judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).
Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that “[e]very employer shall pay to each of his
employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce . . .” a minimum wage, which, during the period relevant to this action, was $7.25
an hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). The statute further provides that “no employer shall employ any of
his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” § 207(a)(1).
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 5
The statute provides employees a cause of action for their employer’s violation of these
provisions, and provides for damages “in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.” § 216(b); see also Thompson v. Linda And A., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 139,
153 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 260) (finding that an award of liquidated damages under
the FLSA “is mandatory unless ‘the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or
omission giving rise [to the FLSA action] was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds
for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the [FLSA]’”). “The court in such
action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” § 216(b). For purposes of the
statute, and relevant to this action, an “employer” is “any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . .” § 203(d).
District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act Revision Act
Under District of Columbia law, from January 1, 2006 until July 1, 2014, “the minimum
wage required to be paid to any employee by any employer in the District of Columbia shall be
$7 an hour, or the minimum wage set by the United States government pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, plus $1, whichever is greater.” D.C. Code § 32-1003(a). Thus, during the period
of time in question, the minimum wage under District of Columbia law was $8.25 an hour. The
DCMWA also provides that “[n]o employer shall employ any employee for a workweek that is
longer than 40 hours, unless the employee receives compensation for employment in excess of 40
hours at a rate not less than 1 1/2 times the regular rate at which the employee is employed.” §
32-1003(c). For violations of these provisions, employees may bring an action to recover “the
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 6
amount of the unpaid wages,” “an additional amount as liquidated damages,” and “reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs of the action.” § 32-1012(a), (c).
Under the DCMWA, “[t]he term ‘employer’ includes any individual, partnership,
association, corporation, business trust, or any person or group of persons acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . .” § 32-1002(3); see also
Guevara v. Ischia, Inc., No. 13-895, 2014 WL 2535872, at *3 (D.D.C. June 6, 2014) (citations
omitted) (“For purposes of individual liability, the word ‘employer’ in the FLSA and the
DCMWA is generally interpreted in the same way. At minimum, an individual who exercises
operational control over an employee’s wages, hours, and terms of employment qualifies as an
‘employer,’ and is subject to individual liability.”).
DISCUSSION
Defendants’ participation in this action has been sporadic. Defendants have been
represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. Defendants Country Choice, LLC and
Houshang Momenian previously filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ original complaint. See Answer
(Document No. 8). Upon reassignment of this matter to the undersigned, the court scheduled a
status conference for August 20, 2013. Counsel for Defendants did not appear for the scheduled
hearing, and when contacted via telephone, requested that it be rescheduled. 08/20/2013 Minute
Order. Counsel for Plaintiffs and Counsel for Defendants appeared for the rescheduled
conference, and they agreed to engage in mediation through the Circuit’s mediation program.1
1
The court was advised by a representative of the Circuit’s mediation program that Defendants’ counsel
failed to respond to attempts at scheduling mediation sessions, and accordingly, the parties did not engage in
mediation.
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 7
See Order Referring Civil Action for Mediation (Document No. 21). The Clerk of Court had
entered default against Defendant Merhan Haj-Momenian (Document No. 15), but Plaintiffs,
through counsel, consented to Defendant Haj-Momenian’s oral motion to vacate the entry of
default to allow him an opportunity to file an answer. See Scheduling Order (Document No. 20).
The court conducted another status hearing on October 8, 2013, at which Defendants,
through counsel, indicated their consent to Plaintiffs’ request for leave to file an amended
complaint. Accordingly, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and ordered that Defendants file
their answers to the amended complaint by no later than October 28, 2013. See Supplemental
Scheduling Order (Document No. 23). After Defendants failed to file their answers in
accordance with the court’s order, the court, sua sponte, provided them an extension of time in
which to comply. 10/31/2013 Minute Order. To date, Defendants have not filed answers, or any
responsive pleading, to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, and have not offered any explanation for
their failure to do so.
At the request of Plaintiffs, the Clerk of Court entered default (Document No. 27) against
Defendants on December 5, 2013, and Plaintiffs subsequently filed their motion for default
judgment. The undersigned observes that initial counsel for Defendants has not withdrawn his
appearance in this action, and still receives notices through the court’s electronic filing system.
Defendants did not file a response to Plaintiffs’ motion, and have not otherwise sought to vacate
the entry of default.2
The undersigned thus finds that default judgment is warranted under the circumstances
2
By separate order filed on this date, the undersigned denied the motion filed by different
counsel for leave to file an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. See Order
(Document No. 33).
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 8
because the instant litigation “has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” See
ITPE Pension Fund, 2014 WL 702580, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Boland v.
Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011)). The Clerk of Court’s entry
of default establishes Defendants’ liability for the well-pled allegations contained in Plaintiffs’
amended complaint. Plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to support the alleged violations, and the
court will thus enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all four counts.3
With respect to damages, Plaintiffs filed a chart calculating their respective unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, and resulting liquidated damages. See
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Default Judgment of Amount Certain (“Memorandum”)
(Document No. 28-1), Exhibit 1. In support of their request for damages, each Plaintiff
submitted an affidavit attesting to the hours that he worked and the payment that he received.
Memorandum at 4-6; see also Memorandum, Exhibits 2, 3, 4. Plaintiffs calculate their damages
based on 59 hours worked per week, and the $8.25 minimum wage under District of Columbia
law. See Memorandum, Exhibit 1. Plaintiffs did not submit evidence with respect to their
request for attorney’s fees and costs, but indicated their intent to submit a subsequent petition
with respect to that request. See Memorandum at 6.
As previously noted, Defendants are represented by counsel in this matter, and they did
not file an opposition or other response to Plaintiffs’ motion. Upon review of Plaintiffs’
calculations and their affidavits in support of their request, the undersigned will award the
requested damages.
3
Plaintiffs aver that this court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 and 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), and that “[v]enue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.” Complaint ¶¶ 9, 10.
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 9
Plaintiff Randolfo Marroquin, upon consideration of the evidence in accordance with the
applicable standards, is awarded damages in the amount of $31,538.76, as set forth in the tables
below. From September 1, 2010 through June 20, 2012, Plaintiff Randolfo Marroquin should
have received $330 per week in regular wages (40 hours per week at $8.25 an hour) and $235.13
per week in overtime compensation (19 hours per week at $12.38 an hour). Thus, during that
period of time, Plaintiff Randolfo Marroquin should have received $565.13 each week.
Number Amount Amount owed per Amount owed per Liquidated damages
of weeks paid per week week times number
worked week ($565.13 minus of weeks worked
amount paid)
13 $360 $205.13 $2,666.63 $2,666.63
30 $400 $165.13 $4,953.75 $4,953.75
50 $450 $115.13 $5,756.25 $5,756.25
From June 20, 2012 through January 15, 2013, Plaintiff Randolfo Marroquin earned $500
per week, resulting in an hourly rate of approximately $8.47, which was higher than the required
minimum wage. Thus, his overtime rate for that time period was $12.71 an hour. Accordingly,
during that time period, Plaintiff Marroquin should have received $580.51 per week to account
for working 40 hours at $8.47 an hour and 19 hours at $12.71 an hour.4
Number Amount Amount owed per Amount owed per Liquidated damages
of weeks paid per week week times number
worked week ($580.51 minus of weeks worked
amount paid)
30 $500 $80.51 $2,415.25 $2,415.25
4
For purposes of simplifying the discussion, the undersigned rounded the hourly rates to two decimal
places; however, the undersigned utilized the non-rounded values when calculating damages. Thus, the amount
owed is calculated as $580.51, rather than $580.29.
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 10
Plaintiff Juan Jose Guillen Morales, upon consideration of the evidence in accordance
with the applicable standards, is awarded damages in the amount of $43,252.50, as set forth in
the table below. During the period of time in which he was employed by Defendants, he should
have received $565.13 each week to account for working 40 regular hours at $8.25 an hour, and
19 overtime hours at $12.38 an hour.
Number Amount Amount owed per Amount owed per Liquidated damages
of weeks paid per week week times number
worked week ($565.13 minus of weeks worked
amount paid)
8 $380 $185.13 $1,481 $1,481
122 $400 $165.13 $20,145.25 $20,145.25
Finally, Plaintiff Emilio Ortega Marroquin, upon consideration of the evidence in
accordance with the applicable standards, is awarded damages in the amount of $51,849.25, as
set forth in the table below. During the period of time in which he was employed by Defendants,
he should have received $565.13 each week to account for working 40 regular hours at $8.25 an
hour, and 19 overtime hours at $12.38 an hour.
Number Amount Amount owed per Amount owed per Liquidated damages
of weeks paid per week week times number
worked week ($565.13 minus of weeks worked
amount paid)
157 $400 $165.13 $25,924.63 $25,924.63
Therefore, Plaintiffs are awarded damages in the amount of $126,685.51 to account for
unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, and liquidated damages.
Marroquin, et al. v. Country Choice, LLC, et al. 11
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is, this 30h day of September, 2014,
ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Document No. 28) is
GRANTED. The court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter default judgment against
Defendants in the amount of $126,685.51.
/s/
DEBORAH A. ROBINSON
United States Magistrate Judge