In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the *665 plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated March 20, 2013, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Luisa Reyes did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of Reyes’s spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use category or the significant limitation of use category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz, 95 AD3d 950 [2012]).
The plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.